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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
 
I. INTRODUCTION AD SUMMARY
 
Contract NASw-1734 was initiated 23 April 1968. It specified anal­
ysis and planning activities to support NASA's Planetary Quarantine (PQ)
 
Office in four areas, viz..
 
Review and Interpretation of Planetary
 
Quarantine Requirements
 
Analysis of Microbial Survival
 
Development and Application of Pertinent
 
Analytical Techniques
 
Implementation of a Lunar Chemical Con­
tamination Inventory
 
The results of the work in these areas is reported herein Where pre­
liminary findings have already been presented in interim reports, these
 
are referenced. Copies of these interim documents are appended in those
 
cases where their content is felt necessary to support the material
 
presented herein.
 
A WORK ELEMENTS
 
A listing follows of the work elements involved in the four tasks 
enumerated above. 
(1) Review and Interpretation of Planetary Quarantine Requirements
 
Development of an approach to the justification
 
of modified PQ requirements.
 
Review of PQ requirements for proposed Planetary
 
Explorer Missions to Mars and Venus.
 
Review of Mars Mariner 169 PQ Plan
 
Review of Viking Project PQ Provisions document.
 
Development of plans for the review of Viking
 
PQ related documents.
 
(2) Analysis of Microbial Survival
 
Survival curve analysis
 
Study of physical processes in microbial resis­
tance to sterilization
 
(3) Development and Analysis of Pertinent Analytical Techniques
 
Analytical estimation of buried contamination.
 
Study of microbial release through material
 
break up and erosion.
 
(4) Planetary Chemical Contamination
 
Plannng for the implementation of a Chemical
 
contamination inventory.
 
B. DELIVERED PRODUCTS
 
Among the products delivered under this contract are
 
Exotech Inc., Systems Res. Div.: An Analytical Basis
 
for Assaying Buried Biological Contamination. Appendix C.
 
Report no. TRSR-036. Jan. 1969.
 
Exotech Inc., Systems Res. Div.: Implementation of a
 
Chemical Contaminant Inventory for Lunar Missions.
 
Appendix E. Report TRSR 70-07. Dec. 1969.
 
Barrett, M. J.* Investigations into a Diffusion Model
 
of Dry Heat Sterilization. Appendix B. Report no. TRSR-041,
 
Systems Res. Div., Exotech Inc., Nay 5, 1969.
 
DeGraff, E.. Review of JPL Report 605-87, Mariner Mars 1969
 
PQ Plan. Systems Res. Div., Exotech Inc., Memo., Aug. 21, 1968.
 
NASA Headquarters Review of Viking PQ Plans. A Document Pro­
viding Background Information for Reviewers of Viking Plans. 
Space Bioscience Research material dated Nov. 5, 1969 for
 
Code SB Document on Applications.
 
Proposed Planetary Chemical Contamination Requirements statement,
 
Feb 1969.
 
Guidelines for Review of JPL-Martin Bioburden Accumulation Model,
 
Nov. 13, 1969.
 
Exotech Inc., Systems Res. Div.: Monthly Letter Status Reports
 
as Required by the Contract.
 
C. PRESENTED PAPERS
 
"Potential Effects of Recent Findings on Spacecraft Sterilization
 
Requirements", presented at the l1th Plenary Meeting of COSPAR,
 
Tokyo, Japan, May 14, 1968.
 
Report on "Development of Analytical Techniques in Planetary
 
Quarantine", presented at Semi-Annual Planetary Quarantine
 
Seminar, Cape Kennedy, June 10, 11, 12, 1968
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"Effects of Mated D-Values on Terminal Sterilization Cycle",
 
presented to Subcommittee IA of PQAC, University of Minnesota,
 
July 25 - 26, 1968.
 
"Stochastic Diffusion Model for Microbial Survival in Heat 
Sterilization", presented at Semi-Annual Planetary Quarantine 
Seminar, Cape Kennedy, February 11 - 12, 1969. 
"Systems Approach to Compliance With PQ Requirements", presented
 
at Semi-Annual Planetary Quarantine Seminar, Cape Kennedy,
 
February 11 - 12, 1969.
 
"Estimation of the Mean Concentration of Microorganisms Buried
 
in Spacecraft Materials", presented at Semi-Annual Planetary
 
Quarantine Seminar, Cape Kennedy, February 11 - 12, 1969.
 
"Tradeoff Studies in Heat Sterlization',' presented to a committee
 
of the Space Science Board at Stanford University on April 19, 1969.
 
"Consequences of Stochastic Diffusion of Moisture in Microbes",
 
presented at Semi-Annual Planetary Quarantine Seminar, Las Vegas,
 
September 24 - 25, 1969.
 
"Application of a Systems Model for Spacecraft Sterilization",
 
presented at Semi-Annual Planetary Quarantine Seminar, Las Vegas,
 
September 24 - 25, 1969.
 
D. OTHER MEETINGS ATTENDED
 
Additional meetings attended include-

PQAC, NASA/Hdgts., October 1968.
 
Microbiological Assay Standardization Meeting,
 
NASA/Hdqts., December 13, 1968.
 
Planetary Explorer PQ Meeting, NASA/Hdqts
 
January 29, 1969.
 
Taft Health Center, Cincinnati, Ohio, April 22, 1969 -
Review of Experimental Data on Microbial Die Off, 
Lunar Sample Analysis Symposium, 157th National Meeting
 
American Chemical Society, Minneapolis, Minnesota,
 
April 13 - 18, 1969.
 
Viking Planetary Quarantine Reviev Meeting, Martin Co.,
 
Denver, Colorado, October 22, 1969.
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II. RESULTS
 
II. RESULTS
 
Because extensive material has already been reported in interim
 
documents and papers, those results will not be duplicated in this
 
final report. Where previous findings are felt necessary for the
 
reader, they are provided in summarized form or appended.
 
The material presented herein extends and complements this pre­
vious work. It is reported in the sequence of the four tasks enumerated
 
in the previous section.
 
A. REVIEW AND INTERPRETATION OF PQ REQUIREMENTS
 
The pre-contract status of planetary quarantine standards, their
 
formulation and their impact upon spacecraft programs was summarized in
 
1
 
a paper presented at the l1th Plenary Meeting of COSPAR on May 11, 1968,
 
in Tokyo, Japan.
 
Although the work summarized at COSPAR was supported under earlier
 
contracts (NASi7-1558 and NASw-1666), a copy of the paper is attached
 
(Appendix A) because it adds to the prospective of the work reported here­
in. The formulation of planetary quarantine standards was shown to be a
 
continuing effort requiring a compromise between the assurance of the pre­
vention of planetary contamination and the minimization of the impact of
 
quarantine requirement on planetary missions. It was suggested that further
 
work in several areas could lead to less severe sterilization requirements
 
for planetary spacecraft than had been considered necessary in the past.
 
Such areas for further research include tasks undertaken in the study reported
 
herein. Of specific interest in this regard are.
 
Estimation of buried contamination.
 
Analysis of release of buried contamination.
 
Microbial resistance to sterilization processes.
 
Work in these areas is reported in Tasks B and C.
 
IExotech Incorporated, Potential Effects of Recent Findings on Space­
craft Sterilization Requirements, May 1968, also Space Life Sciences 1 (4)
 
March (1969) 520-530.
 
The focus of activity in this initial task of contract NASw-1734
 
was in the application of planetary quarantine requirements. This is
 
typified in the review of PQ constraints conducted in January 1969 for
 
two proposed Planetary Explorer missions to orbit Venus and Mars. Pro­
babilities of contamination for the two missions vere computed based
 
upon COSPAR constraints and estimates made by NASA's Planetary Program
 
Office of the total number of different missions to be conducted within
 
the quarantine period by all nations. The characteristics of the pro­
posed Planetary Explorer missions were reviewed in the light of these PQ
 
2
 
requirements. An analysis performed by Bird Engineering Research
 
Associates Inc. of the probability of contamination for the two missions
 
was reviewed for accuracy and completeness
 
Spacecraft project plans and provisions for compliance with PQ
 
requirements were studied. In particular, the Planetary Quarantine
 
Plan proposed for Mars Mariner 1969 was assessed.3 The Viking project
 
PQ Provisions document4 was reviewed for compliance with PQ standards.
 
- In addition, plans were developed for the systematic review of further 
Viking project PQ related documents including: 
The PQ Plan
 
The Microbiological Assay and Monitoring Plan
 
The Sterilization Plan
 
Methodology for the development and evaluation of feasible alternative
 
approaches for compliance with PQ constraints was presented in the Semi-Annual
 
Planetary Quarantine Seminar at Cape Kennedy in February 1969.
 
2Letter report 24 February 1969, Bird Engineering Research Associates Inc.
 
to GSFC, Code 724 "Preliminary Report on Planetary Explorer Contamination Problem."
 
3Exotech letter 21 August 1968, subject Review of JPL Report 605-87.
 
4Langley Research Center document, "Viking Planetary Quarantine Provisions",
 
No. M73-109-0, February 20, 1969.
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B. ANALYSIS OF MICROBIAl. SURVIVAL
 
Kno71edge of the life and death processes of microorganisms is
 
essential to the development of realistic PQ requirements and NASAts
 
Planetary Quarantine Office has directed several research efforts in
 
a total program with the objective of expanding this knowledge.
 
Exotech's efforts in this program involved a study of microbial resis­
tance to sterilization. An earlier report5 had suggested the advantages
 
of log-normal over the simpler logarithmic model to describe the decay
 
of viable microorganisms when subjected to heat sterilization. This
 
report recommended that furthet analytical work be complemented by phy­
sical modeling and be closely related to measured laboratory parameters.
 
The exceptional resistance of microbial spores to sterilization by
 
heat had long been observed in laboratory tests. The lack of a cohesive
 
theory to explain this behavior, however, represented a Weakness in the
 
development of a defensible basis for the formulation of sterilization
 
requirements. Exotech attempted under this contract to form an empirical
 
-,frame7ork from fragmentary theories and hypotheses so as to relate the
 
effectiveness of environmental factors on dry heat sterilization as prac­
ticed in the NASA planetary quarantine program.
 
Earlier work reviewed included the "water activity" theory of Murrell
 
and Scott 6 who observed experimentally the existence of an optimum water con­
tent in the spore that maximizes spore resistances to heat destruction,
 
and more recent research
water and heat effect measurements by Angelott7 , 
5 Schalkowsky & Wiederkehr "Estimation of Microbial Survival in Heat
 
Sterilization" COSPAR Technique Manual No. 4, November 1968.
 
W. G. Murrell and 17. J. Scott, "The Heat Resistance of Bacterial Spores
 
at Various Water Activities", J. Gen icrobiol. 43, 411-425 (1966).
 
7R. Angelotti, "Protective Mechanisms Affecting Dry-Heat Sterilization ',
 
COSPAR Technique Manual Series, Manual No. 4, November 1968.
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of water intake and release by Campbell and coworkers . VariousI 
mechanisms have been considered in an effort to explain this often­
observed non-logarithmic heat destruction characteristic of spores in
 
terms of their water content and its changes.
 
In the model under investigation the heat resistance of spores
 
is attributed to the partial dehydration of some unidentified but
 
vital protein in the cytoplasm. During sporulation, chemical binding
 
of water to this protein is inhibited by the chelating agent, calcium
 
dipicolinate. This action frees nonessential water molecules, which
 
can then be squeezed from the cell by the surrounding cortex that
 
appears to contract as the spore forms. During wet heat sterilization,
 
water diffuses through the outer layers of the spore and interchanges
 
with the chelating agent, thus, increasing the susceptability of the
 
vital protein to denaturation, resulting in nonviable spores. The large
 
differences between resistances of species may be due to the variable
 
efficiency of the outer layers in inhibiting water diffusion. The great
 
-difference in heat resistance of B. subtilis and B. stearothermophilus
 
in aqueous solutions, which essentially disappears in dry heat sterili­
zation, can be attributed to this diffusion effect.
 
A time dependence of the sporels water activity can be predicted
 
on the basis of a diffusion mechanism whereby loosely bound water migrates
 
from one molecule in the microbe to another, with a mobility determined by
 
the temperature and the existing gradient, according to well-known physical
 
laws of diffusion.
 
A technical report was presented at the February 1969 Semi-Annual
 
Planetary Quarantine Seminar at Cape Kennedy and early results were sub­
mitted in Exotech report TRSR-041, "Investigations into a Diffusion 'odel
 
of Dry Heat Sterilization", May 1969, attached as Appendix B Further
 
results on this effort were reported at the Semi-Annual Planetary Quarantine
 
Seminar in las Vegas in September 1969. At that time the existence of two
 
8 
Private communication, J. E. Campbell, PHS, Cincinnati, Ohio.
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distinct bonding sites for water in B. subtilis was demonstrated from
 
data supplied by Campbell. A sample of the evidence presented for this
 
conclusion is given in Figure 1, which is a replot of the experimental
 
measurements, demonstrating that the rate of water release can be
 
described by the sum of two exponentials. This supports the theoretical
 
framework of the diffusion approach, but further work would be necessary
 
to identify and locate the two sites within the spore.
 
The implications of this work to the quarantine program are signi­
ficant. First, it promises an analytical basis for the observed deffl­
ciencies in the simple logarithmic description of the microorganism
 
die-off curve. The existence of a significant "tail off" in this curve
 
can perhaps be quantitatively defined and predicted, thus, providing a
 
defensible basis for the design of realistic sterilization cycles. This
 
work also suggests the advisability of monitoring or perhaps controlling
 
the humidity levels during assembly of spacecraft to modify the contami­
nants present for greatest susceptibility to subsequent sterilization con­
ditions. Perhaps a low temperature preconditioning cycle during which the
 
water activity is equilibrated at some sensitive value could precede high
 
temperature sterilization to make it more effective. Finally, water con­
tent of such materials as lucite and epoxy might be controlled during manu­
facture to make their buried contaminants more susceptible to sterilization.
 
C. DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF PERTINENT ANALYTTCA. TECHNIQUES
 
The need for improved estimation of the amount of buried contamination
 
and of its probability of release was indicated in earlier work (see page 2)
 
as worthy of further study. The difficulties in detecting and enumerating
 
buried contamination derive from their inaccessibility. To overcome this,
 
the contaminated material may be.physically shattered or chemically dis­
solved and the resultant released microorganisms then counted. In both cases,
 
however, there are serious questions of the validity of the yield since die­
off can occur in the release processes.
 
9Private communication, J. E. Campbell, PHS, Cincinnati, 
Ohio.
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FIGURE I
 
RATE OF WATER RELEASE AT 300
 
-4 i_ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 minute s-

Rate (mnglsec) at which water is released by a sample of B. subtilis
 
spores in a current of dry air at 3000. (Datus points, provided by
 
Dr. J. B. Campbell of the Taft Health Center, Cincinnati, Ohio, have
 
been corrected for background water release. Straight lines indi­
cate that the sum of two exponentials would reproduce measurements
 
after an itial build-up period.)
 
A statistical assay technique originally suggested by Mr. L. Hall,
 
NASA Planetary Quarantine Officer, was further developed by Exotech and
 
a protocol10 proposed for its application (See Appendix C) The statis­
tical assay technique does not require that all microorganisms contained
 
in the material be recovered but produces an upper bound estimate based
 
upon assay results of new surface exposed by minor fracturing which in­
troduces minimum lethality.
 
The procedure requires the controlled fracture of representative
 
samples of a material whose buried loading is of interest. Each sample
 
is tested for biological contamination on the totality of new surfaces
 
exposed as a result of the fracturing process. The basic datum or ob­
servation consists of the proportion of samples which yield contamination
 
upon culturing. Conventional statistical techniques, combined with an
 
analytical expression relating the mean concentration of organisms buried
 
within the material and the observed datum, produce an upper bound esti­
mate for the unknown mean concentration, expressed to any prescribed level
 
of confidence. In principle, the'Eonfidence level" of the resulting esti­
mate is directly related to the sample size and the amount of surface area
 
exposed by fracture; as the sample size and exposed area increase, the
 
difference between the estimate and the unknown mean load tends to decrease.
 
The procedure can be very useful in the development of more realistic
 
spacecraft sterilization specifications where the sterilization cycle is
 
sensitive to the estimated number of buried contaminants. In particular,
 
a significant decrease in the severity of the cycle may be possible if
 
realistic estimates of the buried bioloads can be developed. (These bene­
fits are not restricted to spacecraft applications but could also be
 
extended into sterilization processes in the food and drug and other spin off
 
areas.)
 
10Exotech Incorporated, TRSR-036, "An Analytical Basis for Assaying
 
Buried Biological Contamination", January 1969.
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A preliminary analysis of the probability of microbial release
 
of buried contamination considered two release mechanisms; viz., break
 
up in hard impact and aeolian erosion. Further, it formulated analytic
 
expressions for the probability of release as a function of pertinent
 
parameters and identified areas of uncertainty.
 
Specifically, the fracture ratio, i.e., the ratio of newly exposed
 
area to the initial volume of material, upon which the non-nominal land­
ing probability of release is especially sensitive,was one area of study.
 
The results of impact tests 1 2 conducted by the Boeing Aircraft Company
 
were reviewed and a method was devised for accounting for impact die off.
 
The ratio of the viable spores recovered from the fragments to the initial
 
load seeded into the pellet is a product of the release depth, the fracture
 
ratio and the degree of impact die off. Values for release depth can
 
'3
 
confidently be assigned in the I to 3 micron range. Fracture ratios can
 
be determined by physical measurement of the recovered fragments. The
 
accuracy of this measurement varies with the number and size of the frag­
-- ments and has yet to be quantitatively bounded.
 
When values for release depth and fracture ratio are assigned, the
 
recovered lethality ratio is then a direct measurement of the impact die
 
off. This method of analysis will be applied when additional impact data
 
becomes available.
 
llExotech Incorporated, TRSR 70-03, "Development and Application of
 
a System Model for Spacecraft Sterilization", August 1969.
 
12S. J. Fraser, "Survival and Release of Viable Microorganisms After
 
a Hard Impact", Boeing Company report #D2-114143-1, May 27, 1968
 
13N. J. Peterson, R. G. Cornell, and J. R. Puleo: 
'Release of Micro­
bial Contamination from Fractured Solids!' Paper presented at llth Plane­
tary MeetLing of COSPAR, Tokyo, Japan, May 1968.
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Further study of theoretical fracturing may provide an insight
 
into fracturing mechanisms. An upper bound to the area exposed dur­
ing impact can be calculated from the kinetic energy at impact,
 
knowing the energy required for a unit area of fracture. The materials
 
,of interest are mostly noncrystalline, buried viable spores are incon­
ceivable in metal structures. Measurements in polymeric materials
 
give 0.5 in.-lb/in2 (about 10 erg/cm2 ) for energy per unit area of
 14
 
fracture. This estimate may be useful for preliminary upper-bound
 
calculations of fracture associated with hard impact landings. Further
 
work remains in this area.
 
Microbial release due to aeolian erosion was also studied and is
 
1 
 15

reported in Appendix D . Although a model has been developed, conclu­
sions as to whether a release factor significantly less than unity for
 
Mars can be invoked will require an agreed upon estimate of Martian
 
meteorology. It is well known that astronomers have interpreted shift­
ing haze that occasionally obscures the planet's features as being due
 
_to large sandstorms. Sand or dust is, of course, a major erosion agent,
 
and simulations of the erosion effect of postulated sandstorms have been
 
16
.
reported1 Analysis of the photography of the planet's surface by
 
Mariner 6 and 7 tends to support the sandstorm hypothesis- the scarcity
 
of small craters in the size distribution can be accounted for by an
 
erosion process.
 
14M. L. Williams, "The Fracture of Viscoelastic Material" in 
Fracture of Solids, D.C. Drucker and J. J. Gilman (ed,), Interscience (1963). 
15M. J. Barrett and J. I. Woodall: The Release of Buried Microbial
 
Contamination by Aeolian Erosion Exotech Report No. TRSR 70-14.
 
16G. Dyhouse, "Simulated Martian Sand and Dust Storms and Effects on
 
Spacecraft Coatings", ASTM/IES/AIAA Second Space Simulation Conference
 
(Sept. 1967). Am. Soc. Testing Materials, 1967, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
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K second area of uncertainty that deserves investigation is the
 
possibility of spore destruction during the erosion process. The di­
mensions of a spore, typically on the order of a micron, are consi­
derably smaller than those of the average sand particle encountered
 
on Earth. Those dust particles in the micron range are generally more
 
dominant in the stratosphere, and particle size can be loosely correlated
 
with altitude since smaller size permits particles to be carried higher
 
and farther by the wind. Presumably, the same mechanisms apply on Mars,
 
and a lander in a Martian dust storm would be pelted by particles con­
siderably larger than a spore. The erosion model to be applied, there­
fore, is akin to the use of boulders in chipping away seeds. One sus­
pects a significant amount of lethality in this process.
 
Further study should concentrate on areas most conducive to per­
mitting the unit value of probability of release to be reduced thereby
 
alleviating sterilization cycle requirements. Analysis should be con­
ducted to identify the areas of uncertainty where additional knowledge
 
will produce the maximum benefit. Each factor should then be reviewed
 
to permit selection of those most achievable within time and resource
 
constraints. Effort should be expended only so long asia payoff in
 
terms of further relaxation of the probability of release will result.
 
C. CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION
 
A common prerequisite for space exploration is the absence of con­
tamination by terrestrial material in the area being explored. In the
 
search for biological life, this concern has led to the establishment of
 
rigorous planetary quarantine standards. The danger, hoWever, exists in
 
all science fields where experiment objectives can be compromised by the
 
undesired introduction of unknown quantities of'foreign" matter.
 
In previous work 7, Exotech studied the problems of unintentional
 
contamination of lunar samples to be returned to Earth for analysis.
 
1 7Exotech Incorporated, TRSR 68-029, "Planning Study for an Organic
 
Constituents Inventory Program", May 1968.
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Adopting a philosophy that absolute purity cannot be guaranteed and that
 
some contamination will be introduced by astronauts, vehicle ejecta and
 
the capsule environment, an approach was developed which attempts to
 
identify and quantify the types and levels of expected contamination.
 
This is achieved by establishing an inventory of organic materials con­
tained in Lunar landing spacecraft as part of an information system
 
which can identify regions of high contamination risk and the probable
 
contaminating materials.
 
The study undertaken in this contract defines the initial step in
 
the implementation of the above approach. It considers the detailed pro­
cedures and tasks necessary to collect, evaluate, store and disseminate
 
data which will serve anticipated needs of lunar sample investigators,
 
consistent with the requirement that costs associated with implementation
 
and operation of the inventory be compatible with known needs for this
 
information. The primary tasks pertinent to this effort involved.
 
(1) determining the availability of lunar mission vehicle documentation
 
and the means for collecting it in a form suitable for future evaluation,
 
(2) the collection and utilization of spacecraft trajectory parameters,
 
landing sites, and dispersion patterns for crash and soft landings, and
 
(3) evaluation of the compatibility of required data inputs with an exist­
ing Planetary Quarantine information system. The final report 18 of this 
effort is appended. -
Should further implementation be warranted, future efforts should
 
include the following
 
Retention of documentation identifying types and
 
quantities of chemical materials in lunar mission
 
spacecraft landers.
 
1 8Exotech Incorporated, TRSR 70-07, "Implementation of a Chemical
 
Contaminant Inventory for Lunar Missions," December 1969
 
Designation of a Federal Records Center to receive
 
these documents and organization of a suitable filing
 
system
 
Preparation of a contamination risk model of the
 
lunar surface based on the best available estimates
 
of spacecraft landing sites and the partn cle disper­
sion associated with the mass and velocity charac­
teristics of hard and soft landers.
 
Dissemination among lunar sample investigators, and
 
others associated with the planning of lunar scienti­
fic exploration, of information concerning the docu­
mentation to be kept in storage.
 
With the advent of landing missions to the planets of the solar
 
system, similar attention is warranted to the question of chemical con­
tamination by terrestrial material. The study should be extended to
 
consider the acquisition of documentation and material samples from
 
planetary flight missions. Information requirements of current and
 
potential experimenting scientists who will analyze planetary materials
 
should be collected. Information system designs which can serve these
 
needs for data on material contamination should be formulated.
 
III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMENDATIONS
 
III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECO1DJENDATIONS
 
Planetary Quarantine requirements, policies and constraints should
 
be reviewed in the light of past experience and new knowledge to
 
insure that maximum possible relaxation of sterilization specifi­
cations is realized.
 
The implication on planetary quarantine requirements for approved
 
flight projects of recommendations made by the Space Science
 
Board at its December 11, 1969 meeting should be evaluated.
 
2. 	 Flight project quarantine plans should be evaluated for their respon­
siveness to NASA PQ requirements and compatibility with accepted
 
practices for their implementation.
 
3. 	 Past planetary flights should be evaluated to develop realistic
 
levels for the probability of contamination for future missions
 
4. 	 The probability that microorganisms contained on landing spacecraft
 
will be released in a viable state on a planetary surface should be
 
further studied. The effect of fracture upon impact and aeolian
 
erosion during the period of biological exploration and the survi­
vability of microorganisms in the course of the above release mechanisms
 
should be considered.
 
5. 	 Analytical models should be developed to facilitate the implementation
 
of planetary quarantine requirements on flight projects through the
 
utilization of new laboratory data or related technological progress in
 
the following areas:
 
(a) 	Estimation of microbial contamination in spacecraft
 
environments.
 
(b) 	Dry heat resistance of microorganisms on open sur­
faces, mated surfaces and buried contamination in
 
spacecraft equipment. Microbial die off in dry heat
 
sterilization should be further analyzed with empha­
sis on the role of moisture content.
 
(c) 	Thermal dynamics in heat sterilization of space­
craft equipment.
 
(d) 	System tradeoff model encompassing all relevant
 
factors prior to, during, and after the applica­
tion of heat sterilization.
 
6. 	 The requirements for a planetary chemical inventory should be
 
studied Potential information requirements of scientists who
 
will perform analyses of planetary materials to be collected
 
during planetary flight missions should be identified, other
 
material information systems should be investigated for their
 
applicability.
 
7. 	 A quarantine document system should be designed specifically
 
oriented to serve the management of planetary quarantine on
 
flight missions.
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APPENDIX A
 
Potential Effects of Recent Findings on
 
Spacecraft Sterilization Requircments
 
POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF RECENT FINDINGS 
ON SPACECRAFT STERILIZATION REQUIREMENTS 
L. B Hall (1 ) and R. C.S. Schalkowsky( 2 ) , Kline(2 ) 
ABSTRACT 
An important task related to the formulation of planetary quarantine 
standards is the achievement of an acceptable compromise between (1) the 
prevention of planetary contarmnation and (2) the impact of quarantine 
requirements on the conduct of planetary missions. Such a task is a con­
tinmng effort which must take all pertinent new information into account as 
it becomes available. This paper provides an analytical framework for the 
assessment of data which has become available during the past year or wich 
is currently being evolved. In particular, an evaluation is made of the prob­
ability of release of -viableorganisms from the spacecraft as a function of (1) 
impact velocity magnitudes and the probability of their occurrence; (2) the 
degree of equipment fracturing at impact velocities, and (3) the number of 
viable orgamsms in spacecraft materials. Work being done to quantify each 
of three types of contamination, i. e. that on open surfaces, mated surfaces 
and buried contamination, is described in the context of seeking an approach to 
spacecraft sterilization that would be most compatible with the implementation 
of planetary missions. It is concluded that the results of work now in progress 
on spacecraft material fracturing, on the estimation of buried contamination 
loads and on microbial resistance on mated surfaces may lead to less severe 
dry-heat sterilization of planetary spacecraft than had been considered necessary 
m the past 
*Work reported herein by Exotech Inc. authors has been supported under contract 
NASw- 1558 with the NASA Office of Planetary Programs and under contract N.AS-,­
1666 with the NASA Office of Biosciences. 
(1) National Aeronautics and Space Admimstration, Washington, D. C. 
(2) Exotech Incorporated, Washington, D. C. 
J INTRODUCTION 
The process of specifying spacecraft sterilhzataon requirements encom­
passes numerous factors, many of which contain considerable uncertainty. A 
suitable analytical model or structure is necessary in order that the various 
factors be properly weighed and their relative impact on requirements assessed. 
This paper summarizes the essential aspects of an extended analytical model, 
beyond that used in the past, to accommodate information which has been devel­
oped in the past year, or which is currently being evolved. 'The various factors 
currently receiving detailed attention are discussed in this paper and their poten­
tial effects on spacecraft'sterilization requirements assessed. 
This paper reflects some basic premises currently under consideraton m 
the implementation of planetary quarantine constraints by the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration of the United States. In particular, the use of gaseous 
treatment for spores is viewed as an effective decontammant, but such treatment 
is not considered to provide adequate confidence in the destruction of all viable 
spores present. Similarly, emphasis is placed herein on the evolution of dry heat 
sterilization requirements, reflecting an earlier choice of this method over radia­
tion sterilization for spacecraft equipment. 
2. 	 MAJOR CONSIDERATIONS IN THE FORMULATION OF
 
STERILIZATION REQUIREMENTS
 
The degree of risk which should be accepted for planetary contamination 
has been the subject of discussion in the past. This aspect of the problem is 
readily summarized in the simple but adequate relationship, 'COSPAR Info. Bull. 
(1966) andNASA(1966),' 
P. = N P(N) 	 + N' P(N') (1) 
P. is the probability that the planet will be contaminated in the course of 
-planetary exploration and a value agreed upon for this parameter is P0 = 1x 10 , 
'COSPAR Info. Bull. (1966)'. 
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N and N' are, respectively, the number of landing and non-landing spacecraft 
which are expected to be flown during unmanned planetary exploration and 
P(N) and P(N') are the respective probabilities that any given landing or non­
landing flight will cause planetary contamination. Using a total number of 
flights of N-tN' = 100 and allowing the contamination probabilities for landing 
and non-landing missions to be equal, it is readily found that the constraint 
on any one mission reduces to P(N) = P(N') -I x i0t i.e. the probability 
that any one planetary spacecraft will contaminate the planet should be 
< 1 x i0 -5 . In this paper, attention is focused on the requirement P(N) for 
landing missions since it is for these spacecraft that sterilization procedures 
become necessary. As demonstrated in connection with planetary fly-by 
missions, the constraint of 1 x leO can be met for non-landing missions by 
taking precautionary measures in mission design without having to resort 
to spacecraft sterilization. 
One major area of uncertainty is the probability P(g) of growth and 
spreachng on the planet by microbial contamination of terrestrial origin. 
Thus, assuming that a viable terrestrial orgamsm has been deposited onto 
the planet surface, it is necessary to assign a probability that it will grow, 
spread and bias future biological exploration of the planet. For consistency 
with the analytical mhodel to be used herein, it is essential to note that this 
probability refers to a single viable organism released onto the planet sur­
face; the fact that the probability of planetary contamnation is increased if 
more than one viable organism are released is accounted for in the model. 
It cai. be shown that the ratio P(N)/P(g) is no greater than 
the mean number of viable microorganisms which can be released onto the 
planet surface by any one landing spacecraft. This ratio is denoted as n(r). 
If P(g) = 10l - , a value currently considered a conservative assessment of 
.the growth probability on Mars, then n(r) i0 - From the point of view 
of implementauon, n(r) is the controlling planetary quarantine constraint. 
(The "mean" number, as used herein to characterize a microbial count, 
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represents the number to be expected, on the average, over repeated trials. For 
example, n = I x 10-2 implies that if a count was repeated 100 times, we would, 
on the average, expect to find only one orgamsm during one of these counts and 
no organisms in the other 99 counts 
The major considerations which enter into the evolution of explicit sterili­
zation requirements from the planetary quarantine constraint on n(r) are summa­
rized in Figure 1. Thus, the landing spacecraft is partitioned into discrete 
sources of contamination, classified in accordance with actual, physical sub­
assemblies of the spacecraft. The constraint n(r) can therefore be viewed as 
being distributed amongst all of these subassemblies and the reqmrement is 
that the sum of the n, (r) not exceed the constraint n(r). (The designation ni (r) 
refers to the contribution of the ith subassembly. ) Within each subassembly a 
distinction is also made between the following three sources of biological con­
tamination (1) contamination located on open surfaces, (2) contamination which 
has been occluded between mated surfaces; and, (3) that winch is buried inside 
spacecraft materials. (In Figure 1 the subscript j denotes the particular 
source under consideration and the superscripts sB identify the source as 
being either of the surface, mated or buried type.) 
The above classification of sources emphasizes the fact that any one sub­
assembly in the spacecraft can contain, and usually does contain, all three types 
of contamination sources. The contr]bution of any one of these sources to the 
problem can be assessed in terms of the major post-launch and pre-launch 
factors shown in Figure 1. The major pre-launch factors are (1) the pre- steri­
lization microbial load at the various spacecraft locations, categorized into sur­
face, mated, or buried types, and (2) microbial resistance to sterilization for 
the three types of contamination. Referring to the major post-launch factors 
in Figure 1, all but one of these relate to the probability that viable organisms 
present in the spacecraft at launch wall be released upon arrival at the planet. 
The first two factors, i. e. spacecraft impact velocities and the probabilities 
that these impact velocities w ll occur, are unrelated to the partitioing of the 
spacecraft into subassemblies or contamination sources. However, the other 
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two release factors are intimately related to this partitiomng. Thus, in order 
to evaluate microbial release caused by a crash landing from a particular 
source, it is necessary to know to what degree the impact velocity is attenuated 
at tius source Similarly, the degree of equipment fracturing must be con­
sidered in terms of the physical and design characteristics associated with a 
particular contamination source. The last item noted in the post-launch cate­
gory is the probability of microbial survival in transit and has to do with the 
effects of hard vacuum and ultraviolet radiation during flght to the planet. 
The major elements of a sterilization specification are shown in the 
last block of Figure 1. To explicitly define these sterilization controls and 
procedures, .and to do it in a maimer -which would meet the requisite planetary 
quarantine constraint, n(r), without unduly constraining mission implementa­
tion or unnecessarily degrading engineering and scientific mssion success 
probabilities, it is necessary to quantitatively account for all of the factors 
shown in Figure 1. 
In view of the above, effort is being applied to gain a better under­
standing of and,where possible, to quantify the major factors in the pro-launch 
and post-launch categories. In the sections which follow, pertinent aspects of 
these factors are discussed as a prelimnary step to the consideration of their 
potential effects on sterilization requirements. 
3. DISCUSSION 
In discussing the individual post and pre-launch factors, it will be rele­
vant to establish the degree to which any one of them is either determinable or 
controllable. The determinability of a factor depends upon how amenable it is 
to measurement and, also, on the degree of confidence which can be placed upon 
the values measured or estimated However, regardless of how well a factor can 
be determined, it is equally important to establish the degree to which it is con­
trollable, for At is often possible to confLne a factor to below a value winch would 
make it a significant influence on the sterilzation requirements. 
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3. 1 Imntial Microbial Load - n1 '8 (o) 
Progress made in assessing and quantifying the imtial microbial load varies 
in accordance with the source category considered. Because of the availability of 
suitable experimental techniques, the accumulation of microbial contamination on 
open surfaces is most readily assessed. Microbial load on mated surfaces is, of 
course, the result of the occlusion of what was at a prior stage an open surface. 
Knowledge of contanunation on open surfaces can therefore be tTansferred, to 
some degree, also to mated surfaces. However, a direct measurement of mated 
surface contamination is not readily made. The measurement of microbial loads 
contained within spacecraft materials is least amenable to effective experimental 
procedures and reliable data in this category are therefore not available. 
Depending upon the size of the spacecraft and controls used in assembly 
and manufacturing, it is estimated that the microbial load on open surfaces would 
be in a range between 104 and iO. A proportonate range could be applied to 
mated surfaces. Any estimate of the buried contamination would at this time be 
largely speculative. However, a reasonable upper bound can be established in 
terms of microbial concentration per unit volume of material, depending upon 
the contamination present during manufacturing and heating or other sterilizing 
factors, which might be natural aspects of the manufacturing or quality assur­
ance processes. 
A recent development which may enhance the estimation of buried con­
tamination is associated with the experimental work by'Peterson et al. (1968)'. 
This -workwas oriented towards the assessment of microbial release, or 
exposure, from fractured material, but it now appears feasible to reverse the 
statistical procedures used and, by fracturing sample spacecraft materials and 
measuring growth on these fractured surfaces, to obtain an estimate of the con­
centration of viable contamination in the materials. 
The nilal load can be controlled or limited during final spacecraft 
assembly and to a lesser degree during subassembly. Control derives primarily 
from the use of clean-rooms and/or decontamination procedures. - During compo­
nent manufacture, however, limiting of the contamination load is not too practical. 
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D s' i'Microbial Resistance ­8. 2 
The resistance of microorgamsms to dry heat sterilization has been found 
to vary considerably depending upon whether the organisms are contained within 
materials, between mated surfaces or on open surfaces In terms of the loga­
rnthmic reduction tLme, i. e. the D-value, or the time reqmred to reduce the 
population by one decade, the resistance on open surfaces is about 0. 8 hours 
whereas spores in spacecraft materials have shown resistance as high as 5 hours. 
On mated surfaces, microbial resistance ranges between 0. 8 and about 4. 4 hours, 
depending upon conditions of moisture-vapor transfer at the mated surface and the 
relative humidity prior to and during sterilization. 
It has been well established in the past few years that moisture plays a 
dominant role in determining the resistance of microorgamsms to heat sterilization 
(Pflug, 1967 and Angelotti, 1967), Further attention is currently being given to under­
standing the role of moisture in a way whichwillpermitmore effective control over 
stezilization procedures. This is particularly relevant for mated surfaces, as it 
would be highly desirable to be able to characterize this type of microbial resis­
tance towards the lower range of the D-values given above and thereby make 
them nearly equivalent to open surfaces. 
3. 3 Spacecraft Impact Velocities - vj 
The velocity of the spacecraft upon arrival on the planet is critical to the 
consideration of microbial release from the spacecraft. Under nominal soft 
landing conditions, there can be microbial release from external surfaces but 
not from internal surfaces or from the inside of spacecraft materials In 
general, it can be assumed that so long as spacecraft landing is at nominal soft­
landing velocities, spacecraft equipment will have been designed to operate at 
these velocities without breakup. 
Since hard impact velocities are critical to the estimation of release 
probabilites, it is not adequate to evaluate them in general terms. Specifically, 
it is necessary to establish the explicit events for a given planetary mission 
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which would lead to non-nominal landing conditions and to assess the impact 
velocities, vb, associated with these events. As mission design progresses, 
the quantification of these velocities becomes a feasible task. 
3. 4 Probabilities of Impact Velocities - P (vYb) 
The explicit events which lead to impact velocities are related to 
failure modes of particular spacecraft equipments, e. g. deviations from 
planned midcourse maneuvers, failures in deorbit equipment, or failures in 
landing deceleration equipment such as parachutes. The probability that a 
particular impact velocity wall occur is therefore intimately related to the 
engineering reliability of spacecraft equipment and mission design The 
probabilities of various impact velocities will thus be constrained for engi­
neering reasons and the possibility of closer control for quarantine purposes 
is available, at least in principle. 
- ysii B3. 5 Attenuation of Spacecraft Velocities 
As noted in Figure 1, the various release factors must be viewed in the 
context of discrete spacecraft subassemblies and particular sources of con­
tamnation within these subassemblies. It is therefore necessary to ascertain 
what additional effect may result from the attenuation of spacecraft impact 
velocity at the source under consideration. In some instances, such as external 
structural pieces, this may ,not be too sigmfLcant a consideration. However, 
some very fragile subassemblies within a functional element of the spacecraft 
may have significant velocity attenuation by virtue of the physical path between 
this element and the point of spacecraft impact. Although a detailed quantif-ca­
tion of velocity attenuation factors may be difficult, it may be possible to esti­
mate them using well developed theory and empirical knowledge on the shock 
resistance of structural elements in various configurations. The controllability 
of this factor can be similarly characterized, i. e. to the extent that techniques 
are known which will increase impact resistance, they can be utilized in space­
craft design in appropriate circumstances. 
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3. 6 Equipment Fracturing - fI (vh. y B) 
In the case of mated and open surfaces, it is assumed that when a critical 
velocity is reached, contamination from these sources is released. However, in 
the case of buried contamination it is necessary to identify an additional event 
before actual release from the inside of materials can occur. Specifically, for 
any assumed impact velocity, it is necessary to establish the degree to which the 
material will break up. This parameter is identified herein as the fracture ratio, 7, 
and is given by the ratio of area exposed in the course of impact to the original 
volume of material under consideration. To complete the characterization of 
microbial release from materials, it is also necessary to consider a parameter 
noted herein by 'Peterson et al. (1968)' as the exposure depth coefficient, X.This coef­
ficient can, for the present purposes, be viewed as the depth at the exposed sur­
face to which a microorganism is considered physically free from the material 
and, therefore, released onto the planet surface. 
Peterson et a. (1968) has established experimentally the value of X to be 
about 3 microns. In these experiments, the value of X represents, to some 
degree, the amount of penetration of the nutrient medium into the exposed sur­
face. For the present purpose of considering physical release at impact, it 
appears reasonable to assume that the value of X is of the order of the size of 
the microorganism, i. e. about 1 p. Considering the uncertainty in other param­
eters, it is of little consequence at present whether X is taken to be 1 or 3 
microns. 
Efforts are currently in progress to quantify fracture ratios for typical 
spacecraft materials, based on information in other areas where experimenta­
tion has been carried out. It is also possible to establish upper bounds on the 
value of the fracture ratio by assuming all of the energy at impact to go into 
producing fractured areas. 
Contributions by Dr. William C. Cooley of Exotech Incorporated on obtaining
 
upper bounds of f are gratefully acknowledged.
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IIn general, the fracture ratio, f, would be proportional to the square of the 
impact velocity. To obtain some feel for the niagmtudes of f, consider a solid cube 
of material about I ft. on each side. 'This volume of material wculd fracture into 
about 260, 000 pieces when the fracture ratio is about 1, 200 1/m. A fracture 
rato on the order of 106 implies pulverization of the material to micron size and 
represents a release probability of unity. 
- P'4,B (a)3.7 Probability of Microbial Survival in Transit 
The effects of ultraviolet radiation on microorganisms located on the exte­
riors of the spacecraft, and the effects of hard vacuum on other microbial con­
tarnination, have been considered in the past as possible causes of microbial 
destruction in transit. The effectiveness of ultraviolet radiation is limited by 
uncertainties on microbial exposure to tis radiation. As regards the destruc­
ive effects of vacuum in interplanetary space, some initial die- off has been 
observed in laboratory experimentation but the long-term effects have not been 
substantiated to make this a major destructive factor. (Stern, 1968) 
4. ANALYTICAL MODEL 
Equation 2 below provides a basic framework for assessing the effect of 
the various factors discussed above on the development of spacecraft steriliza­
tion reqmrements. 
P (N)/P (g) n (r) = 
e(s).- I+n,, 4J+n84±J(0) P,(s).kt]1ZI nsi (o)Ps J(0).(s) (2) 
The double summation in equation 2 reflects the need'to partition the 
requirement, n (r), into the various spacecraft subassemblies and to consider 
within any one subassembly the chfferent contamination sources. The parameter 
k summarizes all of the post-launch factors which influence the sterilization 
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requirement. To permit a reasonably simple presentation, tIns parameter is 
firmulated below under the simplifnng assumption that the spacecraft will 
either land at the desired velocity, i. e. a soft landing, or else there w111 be 
a single impact velocity denoted by vh. 
1, for exterior surfaces 
Pit (a) Pi (r) P1 (r) = P(vh), fot interior surfaces (3) 
S 3 
0, otherwise 
if vh- vt /Yl 
43 - Pi (a) Pij (r) pf (r)= 
f( (4) 
0, otherwise 
Xfij(vh Y)- P(vh), If Vh 
v B J/BB 
rLj Pik , =P(a) (r) 8 (r) = ) j lYi a (5) 
0' otherwise 
where X = 10-m for fj in umts of 1 /mP 
The velocities, vt , above represent critical velocities at which the contamination 
contained at individual sources will be released onto the planet surface. It is to be 
noted that release from surfaces and mated surfaces is taken to occur only if the 
spacecraft impact velocity exceeds this critical velocity, as modified by the attenu­
ation factor for the source considered. 
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The parameter pS MCB (s)in equaiton 2 denotes the probability that any one 
I
nicroorganism will survive sterilization of a specified duration. In the case of 
heat sterilization, P"" (s) could be represented by the corresponding D values, 
PS11,B (s) = 1 0- t/DsMB (6) 
The DS M3,above, are the microbial resistances at a constant sterilization temper­
ature and t is therefore the time required to maintain this temperature in order to 
achieve a desired value of P(s). In practice, suitable allowances are made for time 
at transient temperatures in a sterihzing range. For present purposes, t can be 
viewed as representing the terminal sterilization requirement. 
The above model, and extensions thereof which allow for a wider spectrum of 
impact velocities, is appropriate for operational use in developing specific sterih­
zation procedures and controls. The subject matter of this paper is, however, more 
readily treated in terms of the simplified version defined below. 
5. POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF RECENT FINDINGS 
A conservative approach to the implementation of the constraint n (r) would 
result if the spacedraft impact velocity, vh, is taken to be larger than the smallest 
SM, B
critical velocity, vi j , at the individual contamnation sources. It will also be 
assumed that microbial destruction in transit will be effective only for external sur­
faces. It will therefore be convement to segregate open surfaces into external ones, 
denoted by the superscript s and internal surfaces, denoted by s This yields 
the following expressions for n(r) in terms of total imtial contamination on open 
and mated surfaces and the various factors previously defined 
3 -t/o s
n(r) n > (o). Ps" (a) 10 + 
s 0+ P(vh)n (o) 0 t/DS+nM(o) D] i (7) 
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It is evident from equation 7 that the terms for each source category, i. e 
for'open surfaces, mated surfaces, and buried contamination, must separately be 
less than the quarantine constraint, n (r). Furthermore, that term in equation 7 
which is largest will necessarily dominate the specification of the sterilization 
tame t. The principal questions, therefore, relate to which of these source 
categories represents the doimnant term and whether the dominant term yields 
the smallest terminal sterilization time. A corollory question is whether a pre­
ferred term could be made dominant. Figure 1 indicates a number of controls 
which might be made a part of the specification of sterilization procedures for 
the above purpose. For example, design constraints may be imposed on space­
craft impact velocities and/or the probabilities of their occurrence. Similarly, 
some latitude may be available in altering critical velocities of components 
which may contain large contamination loads, or to improve the velocity attenua­
tion at these sources through appropriate design procedures. Another control is 
that of minimizing the contamination load through the use of clean-rooms and 
related procedures. Some, or all, of these, may be useful. However, to justify 
their use, it must be ascertained that they are contributing to the reduction of 
a dominant term in equation 7. 
Until recently, a conservative estimate was made of the probability of 
release of buried contamination. In terms of the parameters defined herein, a 
probability of release of unity is equivalent to a fracture ratio of about ls, 
which implies pulverization of the entire spacecraft. This js clearly not a 
reasonable estimate of conditions which are likely to occur. Although work on 
fracture ratios of typical spacecraft materials is still in progress, it is evident 
that the fracture ratio will be significantly lower than that implied in earlier 
estimates. In any event, the probability of release must be less than unity by 
virtue of the fact that the probability of non- nominal landing velocities is less 
than unity. 
Earlier conservative estimates of microbial release of buried contami­
nation, combined with the Imown higher resistance of such contamination to heat 
sterilization, have made buried contamination the dominant term and, necessarily, 
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led to a relatively stringent terminal sterilization requirement Referring to the 
terms in the parenthesis of equation 7, it is likely that work now in progress will 
show the product X 1F2 nj (o) f(vh YB1j) to be smaller than niM(o). Tis 
would imply a shift towards mated contamination as a basis for defining steriliza­
tion requirements. However, to benefit from such a shift in any significant way, 
Dm would have to be sign bcantly smaller than DB. For, as noted earlier, 
current work sets the value of IT between 0. 3 and 4. 4 hours and the upper 
value is very close to microbial resistance for buried contamination, upon which 
requirements have been based to date. There is thus a need to gain a better 
understanding of both the effects of equlibrium humidity and pressure at the 
mated surfaces during assembly and sterilization. This may then produce a 
value of D' closer to 0. 3 hours, and lessen the ultimate sterilization require­
ments. 
It is also evident from equation 7 that even very low fracture ratios and 
low microbial load for buried contamination could not move sterilization pro­
cedures to the point where only gaseous or other non- thermal (or radiation) 
treatment could be used. To permit consideration of the latter approaches, a 
signifLcant change would have to occur in the value of n (r), i. e. either in P(N) 
or P(g). For unless the value of n(r) is on the order of unity, or larger, each 
of the terms on the right side of equation 7 must be sigmfcantly less than unity. 
This implies sterilizing methods which can be relied upon to destroy all spores 
present with a high degree of confidence. 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Work currently in progress is focused on the following areas (1) the degree 
of spacecraft equipment fracturing at spacecraft impact velocities, both in mate­
rials and at equipment interfaces, so as to obtain more realistic estimates of 
probabihties of microbial release, (2) microbial resistance to heat sterilhza­
tion at mated surfaces and the physical conditions which will determine its magni­
tude; and, (3) estimation of microbial contamination buried in spacecraft material. 
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The above work, combined with suitable controls over mission and space­
craft design procedures, may lead to less stringent terminal heat sterilization 
requirements than had been considered necessary in the past. A determination 
of the specific values to be specified for terminal heat sterilization must, how­
ever, await the more detailed quantification of the various parameters discussed 
herein, it will at all times depend upon the values selected for the quarantine 
goal, namely, the probability assigned to the risk of any one landing mission 
contaminating the planet, and the probability estimated for any one viable 
terrestrial microorganism spreading and growing on the planet surface. 
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ABSTRACT
 
The analytical model described in this study formalizes the hypothesis
 
that dry heat inactivation of microorganisms is closely related to the
 
iater content of the spore and its micro-environment. Experimental
 
data are examined relative to this model and it appears to be valid.
 
This model is aimed at overcoming the well known deficiencies of the
 
logarithm model.
 
INTRODUCTION
 
Several recent investigations have related environmental con­
ditions other than temperature to microbial spore survival under heat
 
sterilization. Murrell and Scott, Angelotti, and Reid have sbown strong 
dependency of dry heat death rates on ambient relative humidity and on 
water content of the spore"'. Hunnell and Ordall have found that heat causes 
spores to exude calcium and dipicolinic acid (DPA) prior to death, while
 
Alderton, Thompson, and Snell show that spores in aqueous suspension have
 
improved heat resistance wThen calcium ions are present.
 
In addition to these correlations with environmental conditions
 
during sterilization, spore survival shows correlations with environmental
 
conditions that prevailed when the spore formed. Vinter shows heat re­
sistance is affected by calcium and cystine availability during sporulation;
 
Murrell and iarth show correlations of heat resistance with five different
 
substances found in the spore.
 
These investigations show the importance of environment'on heat
 
sterilization characteristics. A simple chemical reaction does not appear
 
to be the complete mechanism for spore destruction. Rather, a sequence of
 
,transport of chemicals, notably water, occurs and modulates the rate at
 
which chemical reactions destroy the viability of the spore.
 
In this report we present a diffusion-denaturatLion model of
 
spore heat resistance that attempts to correlate with the water effects
 
observed, and to provide a basis for determining the efficiency of proposed
 
dry-heat sterilization plans. Such a model is immediately useful in a dry­
heat sterilization program, and also offers promise of eventual under­
standing of the remarkable resistance of spores to heat.
 
'References are listed at the end of this,report.
 
DIFFUSION MODEL
 
A model to predict the water content of a spore as a function
 
of time, temperature and initial water concentration within the spore
 
has been developed. The assumptions made are that heat deactivation in
 
spores is due to protein denaturation and that the rate of this reaction
 
is controlled by the waLer content of the spore core.
 
A spore is composed of an outer coat (cortex plus spore coats)
 
and a central core (cytoplasm) Which is the dormant micro-organism. The
 
cortex protects the core from physical damage, chemical contamination
 
and rapid wetting by the environment. The cortex is mainly composed of
 
mucopeptide polymers (Warth et al, 1963) with the chains twisted and
 
coiled or interwoven (Mayall and Robinou 1957). The coat is mainly pro­
tein with a high cystine disulphide bond content (Vinter 1961).
 
The heat resistance of spores is assumed to rest in the ability
 
to control the amount of water internal to the spore. A contractile cor­
tex system (Lewis, Snell and Burr 1960) would provide a mechanism to de­
hydrate the cytoplasm and maintain it in this state. Chemical variation
 
in the mucopeptide of the cortex and in the amount of Cu -+ or Ca-DPA
 
(Young 1959) binding to the mucopeptide which may cause the contraction,
 
could result in differences in the degree of contraction and therefore in
 
the final water content of the spore, resulting in marked difference in
 
heat resistance.
 
In the development of this diffusion model we have assumed a
 
simplified spore structure composed of an outer coat of negligible thick­
ness at a radius surrounding a spherical, homogeneous one.
 
Water transport thru the spore can be described by the well known
 
diffusion equation
 
] = dC (1)DVC -dt 
where C is the concentration of water/cm3, as a function of position and
 
time. D is a diffusion coefficient depending on the medium.
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For a simple example, assume the initial water content in a
 
spherical spore is distributed radially according to
 
n b " sin 2TrrC(r) b TT IS _bj(2) 
where C(r) is the water concentration at a distance r from the center of
 
the spore, and b is the radius of the spore (see Fig 1). This expression,
 
as seen in Figure 2, corresponds to a distribution that is peaked in the
 
outer portion of the spore, and can be considered as approximating the
 
case where a spore contains more water than an optimum amount. This ex­
cess water is stored in the cortex.
 
Applying the diffusion equation to this initial distribution re­
sults in the time variation shown in Figure 3. Water diffuses inward to
 
the cytoplasm, and the spore gradually loses water to the medium. As a
 
result, the initially-dry central region reaches a peak concentration of
 
water that occurs around a time t given by
 
D t = 1.5 (3) 
b2
 
where D is the diffusion coefficient of the system. This simple model
 
assumes D to be independent of position. As a result, it approximates the
 
situation when the spore is buried in an appropriate medium, since normally
 
one would expect the diffusion coefficient of water outside a spore to dif­
fer from D inside the spore.
 
Data have been reported by Angelotti (1966) for the thermal ster­
ilization of spores in lucite. These data (Fig 4) indicate the death rate
 
to be greatest at about 1.5 hours after commencing to heat the spores at
 
1251C. Using this value for t, in the above equation, we arrive at an es­
timate for the diffusion coefficient at 1250C-

D = 1.2.1076 (cm2/sec) (4) 
This estimate is in reasonable agreement with values for diffusion of protein
 
molecules in water (Clark, p. 138). Our example requires the opposite water
 
molecule diffusion in protein, which has an unknown diffusion coefficient,
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an further assumes this coefficient does not differ greatly from water 
-diffugion in lucite. 
Ii 
One method of evaluating the diffusion coefficient, which is
 
necessary if a diffusion model is to be applied to dry sterilization, is
 
to look at wet sterilization curves. Such curves are shown in Figure 5
 
for four temperatures. In wet heat, the spores should absorb water to
 
some maximum. Then, the denaturation of proteins in the spore, with this
 
water present, results in a straight logarithmic curve for survivors, as
 
a function of time of heating.
 
Such a description fits the curves shown. The knee of each
 
curve represents the time at which the cytoplasms of the spores are in
 
equilibrium with the external Water. For a purely exponential buildup of
 
water, this occurs about when three relaxation times have passed, accord­
ing to diffusion kinetics. The diffusion coefficient calculated by this
 
method can be fitted to a formula
 
DH = 60 K cal 
D = D e H/RT . where R =1.98(5
w T = temperature (OK) (5) 
Do = Constant
 
0f 
Results of the calculations are shown in Figure 6, together with the diffu­
sion coefficient calculated as Eqn. 5. The two sets of experiments seem 
to be in fair agreenent, and indicate initial success in applying a diffu­
sion model to the data. 
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IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL
 
The correlation of water activity with spore resistance in­
dicates that the death mechanism is a denaturation of some vital pro­
tein. Much the same correlation has been observed between protein de­
naturation and water content. Furthermore, the reaction is generally
 
of first-order kinetics, resulting in a logarithmic curve such as is
 
frequently seen for thermal die-off of spore populations.
 
The vital protein is clearly in the cytoplasm, since the
 
outer portions of the spore, shedded during germination, are not vital.
 
This outer portion, the cortex, appears to squeeze water from the cyto­
plasm during the formation of the spore, and thereby provides that there
 
will be a residual concentration that is near the optimum for heat re­
sistance.
 
Part of the heat resistance of spores has been shown to be
 
due to calcium dipicolinate, manufactured during the formation of the
 
spore, and present in the cytoplasm. Ca-DPA is a chelating agent. Pre­
sumably, the vital protein has sensitive bonds that are protected by
 
Ca-DPA and other sensitive bonds protected by Water molecules.
 
Germination of the spore presumably requires that the protein
 
be rid of these protections. Excess water can remove the Ca-DPA, the
 
attached water molecules may separate thermally (heat shock). These
 
separations, if reversible, would be of little help to germination un­
less the protecting molecules stripped from the protein were toleave
 
the cytoplasm. This is the argument for diffusion- it allows proteins
 
to react with enzymes, etc., in the germination process without hin­
drance from the former bond-protecting agents. At the same time, the
 
proteins become more sensitive to heat.
 
Diffusion is the random movement of molecules. It is charac­
terized by straight-line paths between molecule interactions, and arbitrary
 
change of direction after the interaction. The net result of the ran­
dom motion 3s a movement of molecules from regions of high density to
 
regions of low density. Frequently, these interactions are mere colli­
sions. In such a case, the diffusion constant D is proportional to
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teAmperature. A less frequent situation is where the collisions involve
 
chemical reactions. The molecule moves in a straight line, collides
 
and "sticks" to a fixed obstacle, is freed by the action of heat, and
 
moves off in an arbitrary direction. This kind of diffusion, charac­
terized by a diffusion constant as given in Eq. 5, appears to fit the
 
process of water diffusing through the spore cortex.
 
The environmental conditions prevailing during spore forma­
tion have been shown to affect the subsequent resistance of the spore to
 
heat. This, too, is as the model would imply. There is no known
 
mechanism by which the spore can control the water concentration in the
 
cortex and spore coats. As a result, the moisture content of these
 
regions will vary so that they are in equilibrium With external con­
ditions. 'Whenthe spore is heated, the contents of these regions can
 
diffuse inward and outward to affect the heat sensitivity of the spore.
 
These tpo mechanisms - diffusion and chemical reactions of
 
proteins - appear responsible for the survival probability of spores as
 
a function of humidity, temperature and time. Much work remains in the
 
analysis of their quantitative aspects. What are the equilibrium moisture
 
contents of sporesl What is the water distribution inside the spore9
 
What are the surface transfer properties? Does the Ca-DPA diffuse, too?
 
What is the protein denaturation reaction that occurs How many pro­
tein molecules must denature before the spore becomes nonviable9 The
 
-answers to these questions require further study. Many previous experi­
ments, unfortunately, are of little help since not all the pertinent
 
variables were measured.
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RECObf4ENDAT IONS FOR FUTURE UORK 
1. Moisture Content Analysis
 
Measurements of the moisture content of spores are needed.
 
For ease in comparing results of different environments, only one
 
species (B. subtilis var. niger is the accepted norm) should be used
 
and standard harvesting, washing, and drying procedures employed. Se­
lection of procedures is a subject for discussion, but standardization
 
will permit studies of the results to be concentrated on the environ­
mental effects.
 
The environments to which the spores are equilibrated can
 
vary in temperature, in humidity, and in length of time of equilibration.
 
Down-side and up-side equilibration need separate studies, in view of
 
the "hysteresis" effect observed. The rate at which spores give off
 
water during an analysis, together with the cumulative water emission,
 
should be measured.
 
These measurements should be analyzed to see wThether they con­
form to the hypotheses discussed in this report. Evaluations of dif­
fusion coefficients and surface transfer effects should be possible.
 
2. Correlation of Moisture and Sterilizability
 
Dry heat sterilization, with moisture content as a parameter,
 
has been measured with uncertain results. The understanding gained
 
from the analysis above should provide benchmarks for future measure­
ments of spore sterilizaton rates. The early work sometimes suffered
 
from a lack of determination of the pressure or the relative humidity
 
during sterilization. The substrate deserves attention* if it has
 
good water transference propertLies it can affect the experiment signif­
icantly.
 
With knowledge of moisture tiansfer properties in the spore,
 
on its surface, and through the environment, it should be possible to
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design crucial experiments where the moisture content and temperature
 
ofIthe spores are known quantities. The die-off of spores under these
 
conditions should be measured. Such experiments include:
 
(a) Spores in vacuum. The moisture transfer outside the spores
 
is a relatively easy calculation.
 
(b) Spores in non-permeable materials (e.g. epoxy). With different
 
initial moisture contents, spores hould show different die-offs, but
 
each experiment should provide nearly logarithmic curves.
 
(c) Spores in air. Moisture transfer is affected by the relative
 
humidity and this can be varied in a sequence of experiments.
 
(d) Spores of different initial N, in air.
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SECTION 1 - Introduction
 
SUMMARY AND EVALUATION
 
This document prescribes and evaluates a procedure for estimating upper
 
bounds on the mean concentration of viable organisms buried within
 
individual spacecraft materials.*
 
Presented herein is an analysis of a procedure for assaying biological
 
contamination buried or embedded in spacecraft materials. The procedure
 
requires the controlled fracture of representative samples of a material
 
whose buried loading is of interest. Each sample is tested for bio­
logical contamination on the totality of surfaces exposed as a result of
 
the fracturing process. The basic datum or observation consists of the
 
proportion of samples which yield contamination upon culturing. Conven­
tional statistical techniques, combined with an assumed relation between
 
the mean concentration of organisms buried within the material and the
 
observed datum, produce an upper bound estimate for the unknown mean con­
centration, expressed to any prescribed level of confidence. In principle,
 
the "conservativeness" of the resulting estimate is directly related to
 
the sample size and the amount of surface area exposed by fracture; as the
 
sample size and/or exposed area increase(s) the difference between the
 
estimate and the unknown mean load tends to decrease.
 
-The procedure, if feasible in terms of accuracies derived, engineering
 
practicality and economics, would be very useful in the specification of
 
realistic spacecraft sterilization requirements. This follows from the
 
fact that sterilization requirements are quite sensitive to the release
 
of buried contamination. Significant decreases in these requirements may
 
be possible if realistic estimates of the buried bio-loads are made avail­
able. Conventional bio-assay techniques are impractical for most applications
 
to spacecraft materials since they require that the materials be either
 
pulverized or dissolved. The procedure discussed herein requires neither
 
of these actions and, moreover, requires no direct counting of viable
 
organisms.
 
There are potential shortcomings in the proposed procedure. In particular,
 
there may be practical engineering difficulties or cost considerations
 
which limit the application of the technique. Moreover, the accuracies
 
resulting from its application could turn out to be less than desired. For
 
these reasons, it is important that tests and further analyses be conducted
 
to resolve these questions before steps are taken to operationally imple­
ment the~procedure.
 
*The concept underlying the procedure discussed herein was originally
 
suggested by 1. Hall, Office of Biosciences, National Aeronautics and Space
 
Administration.
 
SECTION 2 - B3ckground 
SENSITIVITY OF MISSION REQUIREMENTS TO THE RELEASE OF BURIED 
CONTAMINATI ON 
Sterilization requirements for individual lander missions are quite sensi­
tive to the release characteristics of buried contamination. Effective
 
techniques for assaying buried contamination could lead to substantial
 
decreases in these requirements.
 
Recent analyses indicate that spacecraft sterilization requirements for
 
planetary lander missions are quite sensitive to the release characteristics
 
of contamination buried (embedded) within spacecraft materials.1 In fact,
 
under the majority of presumably realistic situations studied, the threat
 
of buried contamination was the controlling factor in the determination
 
of sterilization requirements. Within the context of the subject analyses,
 
this result was attributed to the relatively high resistance of buried
 
contamination 'to sterilizing temperatures, as compared with resistances of
 
contamination located on open and between mated surfaces (resistance being
 
represented by the D-value parameter of the exponential survival curve).
 
The relatively high resistance of buried contamination presently assumed
 
=
(viz. D1 2s2c 5 hours) was not the only factor contributing to the
 
dominance of buried contamination in the determination of sterilization
 
-Xequirements. Two other major contributors were (1) the break-up character­
istics of spacecraft materials containing buried contamination and (2) the
 
amount of contamination actually buried within these materials, i.e. the
 
threat of buried contamination is directly related to the existing amount
 
of contamination and its accessibility to a planetary environment upon
 
impact. The lack of definitive data relating to these factors presently
 
necessitates a pessimistic view of their quantitative effects on steril­
ization requirements. Therefore, in exploring alternatives for decreasing
 
sterilization requirements on individual lander missions, consideration should
 
be given to justifying less pessimistic representations of the effects of
 
these factors. This could be accomplished by determining more realistic
 
estimates of spacecraft break-up characteristics and buried blo-loadings.
 
The break-up characteristics of spacecraft materials should be and are being
 
investigated. 2 However, there are inherent difficulties associated with the
 
quantification of this aspect of the buried biological threat. For example,
 
there are practical problems associated with measuring the amount of break­
up and relating it to flight path parameters such as impact velocity, In
 
fact, very little is presently known about the fracturing characteristics of
 
the many varieties of spacecraft materials. In many respects, determination
 
of the amount of buried contamination is less complicated than the break-up
 
problem. For example, the magnitude of the buried bio-load has nothing to
 
do with the uncertainties of the mission flight path whereas the amount of
 
spacecraft break-up is intimately related to the mission flight path para­
meters. The extensive background material in existence concerning biological
 
loadings and their measurement, also suggests it to be a more fertile area
 
of investigation.
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SECTION 2 - Background
 
DRAWBACKS OF CONVENTIONAL BIO-ASSAY TECHNIQUES
 
Conventional techniques for assaying buried contamination are impractical
 
for applications to most spacecraft materials since they require that
 
materials be either pulverized or dissolved.
 
Standard laboratory procedures for the detection and enumeration of buried
 
contamination fall into two major categories. One class of procedures
 
requires that the subject material be broken into very small pieces (i.e.
 
pulverized) and that direct counts of the exposed organisms be made. A
 
second class of procedures requires that the material under investigation
 
be dissolved in a suitable solvent which is non-toxic to the buried organisms.
 
This second procedure also involves the subsequent counting of exposed
 
organisms.
 
Several drawbacks are inherent in the application of the above techniques,
 
especially where spacecraft materials are involved. Basically, there are
 
serious questions relating to the practicality of pulverizing or dissolving
 
most spacecraft materials (as opposed to laboratory application of those
 
techniques which mainly involve materials that can be appropriately pulverized
 
or dissolved). In the particular case of pulverization techniques, the
 
basic objective is to reduce the solid to particles of a size which essentially
 
--releases all organisms that are present without damaging the individual
 
cells. Significant numbers of organisms usually go undetected since the
 
chance of releasing all of them is very small. In addition, it has been
 
found that the pulverization process itself damages or "kills" significant
 
numbers of organisms, thus rendering them undetectable. For the most part,
 
these two engineering problems prohibit a precise assay; if the pulverization
 
is complete enough then it is likely that a significant number of organisms
 
will be damaged in the process. The analogous problem associated with the
 
use of solvents is that very few types of materials can be dissolved with­
out using combinations of heat, pressure and chemicals which destroy the
 
buried organisms. Finally, both classes of procedures are appropriate only
 
when counting high concentrations of contamination. They are ineffective
 
or, at best, inefficient when applied to the low numbers of organisms
 
buried within aerospace hardware. Their reliability for measuring low densi­
ties, (e.g. less than one organism per cubic centimeter) has not been ade­
quately established.
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SECTION 3 - Development of the Bio-Assay Procedure
 
BASIC CONCEPTS AND ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE PROPOSED PROCEDURE
 
The proposed procedure is premised upon a more-or-less uniform distribution
 
of buried contamination and the release of the biological contents of a
 
subvolume of material exposed through fracturing.
 
Suppose a given volume of homogeneous spacecraft material which contains
 
buried contamination is fractured into several dtstingt pieces. It is reason­
able to assume that the fracturing process effectively exposes the bio­
logical contents of a subvolume, Ve, ?f the interior of the material. Anal­
ysis of recent fracturing experiments 1) indicates that Expression (1) on
 
the facing page is an acceptable representation of the exposed subvolume.
 
In this expression Ae denotes the surface area newly exposed as a result
 
of fracturing and X denotes an effective depth of penetration, i.e., the
 
depth beneath the exposed surface to which previously buried contamination
 
is released. For convenience, X is designated the "exposure depth co­
efficient". This concept of a subvolume exposed'by fracturing was applied
 
to the data obtained from the previously mentioned experiments. Estimates
 
of X evolved which ranged between one (1) and three (3) microns. This
 
range has intiuitive appeal in that it encompasses the mean diameter of
 
microbial spores.
 
It is reasonable to assume that contamination buried within an homogeneous
 
material is, for the most part, uniformly distributed throughout the in­
terior. Moreover, assuming a standardization or uniformity of parts pro­
duction procedures suggests that the concentration of contamination per
 
unit volume of material is randomly distributed about some fixed value) C.
 
These observations, along with recognition of an essentially unending
 
source of contamination in production environments suggest the ?oisson
 
distribution as an appropriate formulation for describing the dispersion
 
of buried contamination within homogeneous solid materials. This being
 
the case, the probability that exactly K organisms are contained within
 
the exposed subvolume V is given by Expression (2). In this expression
 
Ne denotes the number of organisms exposed through the fracturing process.
 
The preceding two assumptions on the effective subvolume of material ex­
posed by fracturing and the uniform dispersion of biological contamination
 
within the selected materials constitute the basis for the analytical bio­
assay procedure presented and applied in the remainder of this report.
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Effective Subvolume of Material Exposed Through Fracturing
 
Ve = ,Ae (1) 
X - Exposure depth coefficient
 
Ae - Exposed surface area
 
Probability that Exactly K Organisms are Exposed Through Fracturing
 
(XA eC) K -XAC 
P{N=K}= e (2
P fe = KI = KAI e )e kAeC(2) 
K = 0, 1, 2 " 
C = Mean concentration of organisms per unit volume of material. 
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SEION 3 - Development of the Bio-assay Procedure
 
THE BASIC MATHEMATICAL RELATIONSHIP (MODEL) 
The probability that buried contamination will be exposed through fracturing
 
is obtained from the assumed Poisson distribution. The resulting repre­
sentation is the basic relationship or model underlying the proposed bio­
assay procedure.
 
The probability that buried contamination will be exposed when a solid
 
material is fractured can be obtained from the previously developed form of
 
the Poisson distribution (Expression (2) ). It coincides with the Poisson
 
probability, p, that at least one viable organism is contained in the
 
effective subvolume of material exposed as a result of the fracturing pro­
cess. The expression for this probability, indicated by Expression (3) on
 
the facing page, constitutes the basic relationship underlying the proposed
 
bio-assay procedure. For convenience, it is rewritten in Expression (4)
 
as a relationship which specifies the mean concentration, C, of organisms
 
per unit volume of material in terms of the parameters k , Ae, and p.
 
In principle, if values of k , Ae, and p are specified, then the unknown
 
concentration, C, can be determined on the basis of Expression (4). In 
practice, none of the above parameters can be determined or controlled 
exactly. The exposure depth coefficient, k , can be estimated on the basis 
of experimental laboratory data on varied materials. (The previously men­
tioned estimates of X were determined on the basis of Expression (3),
 
controlled values of C and Ae and experimentally obtained estimates of p.)
 
Assuming that the area, Ae, exposed through fracturing,can be controlled
 
sufficiently, estimates of p can be obtained experimentally. These estimates
 
of p can be converted to upper bound estimates of C to any level of confidence
 
on the basis of Expression (4) and standard statistical estimation techniques.
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Probability that Buried Contamination is Exposed Through Fracturing 
p = { Ne>II 
(3)

P { Ne =O
= 
eC
eX
1 -
The Mean Concentration of Buried Contamination Per Unit Volume of Material
 
C - l -p) (4) 
XA
 
e 
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SECTION 3 - Development of the Bio-assay Procedure
 
STATISTICAL LOAD ESTIMATION PROCESS
 
An upper bound estimate of the mean bio-load, expressible to any level of
 
confidence, is determined from Expression (5) and experimentally obtained
 
estimates of the probability that buried contamination will be exposed
 
by fracturing.
 
Suppose that s samples of a specific spacecraft material are selected at
 
random (e.g., the samples could be piece parts constructed from a particular
 
homogeneous material). Further, suppose that each sample is fractured ex­
posing a predetermined amount of new surface area, the same area being gen­
erated for all samples. Each sample is classified as "positive" if and
 
only if biological contamination is found on the newly exposed surface area
 
upon culturing. Assuming all samples are processed according to a fixed
 
experimental procedure, the number of positives is Binomially distributed
 
with "success" parameter p, as defined in Expression (3). Hence, the pro­
portion, b,of positives has an average or mean value p and is distributed
 
as specified in Expression (5) on the facing page. Knowledge of the dis­
tribution of p allows for the determination of arbitrary confidence in­
tervals for the unknown p, expressed in terms of observed values of .
 
Appendix A contains a procedure for obtaining confidence intervals for p
 
-in terms of D and the sample size s. Figures I - B through IV - B of
 
Appendix B are displays of 50, 80, 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals
 
for p, respectively, determined using the procedures outlined in Appendix
 
A. The various curves in each figure correspond to selected sample sizes.
 
Since the mean bio-concentration, C, specified in Expression (4) is an in­
creasing function of p, upper confidence limits for p can be transformed,
 
via this expression into corresponding confidence limits on C. Since this
 
transformation involves the exposed area as well the sample size, a given
 
confidence limit on p transforms into a distinct confidence limit on C for
 
each value of exposed area. Figure V - B through VIII - B of Appendix B
 
display the resulting upper confidence limits on C, corresponding to selected
 
values of s, Ae and the observed proportion, , of positives. It should be
 
noted that the lower confidence limits on p.are not transformed into
 
limits on C in these figures since primary concern here is with upper bound
 
limits.
 
Figures V - B through VIII - B of Appendix B provide the necessary tools for
 
testing and implementing the proposed analytical bio-assay procedure. The
 
remainder of this report contains a tep-by-step procedure for applying
 
these figures, an illustrative application and a discussion of potential
 
sources of load estimation error associated with the procedure.
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S k p -(5) 
k =0, 1, 2, --- ,s 
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SECTION 4,- Applications of the Bio-assay Procedure
 
SUMMARY PROCEDURE AND ILLUSTRATION 
The preceding development is converted to an operational procedure using
 
Figures V-B thru VIII-B of Appendix B.
 
On the basis of the preceding development, a protocol for establishing upper
 
bound estimates df the mean bio-load buried within a given spacecraft
 
material is summarized as follows
 
1. 	Determine an appropriate combination of sample size,
 
s, and area to be exposed, Ae (this decision is
 
based, for the most part, upon "fracturability" and
 
cost considerations)
 
2. 	Select at random a number, s, of samples of the
 
given spacecraft material.
 
3. 	Fracture each sample so as to yield the selected
 
amount, Ae, of newly exposed area.
 
4. 	For each sample, establish whetheT viable organisms
 
were exposed upon fracture. Let p denote the
 
proportion of samples which yield contamination,
 
i.e. p is the proportion of positive samples.
 
A 
5. 	On the basis of s, Ae andp and the desired
 
level of confidence read the corresponding upper
 
bound estimate of the mean bio-load on the appro­
priate graph from Figures V-B through VIII-B of
 
Appendix B.
 
The indicated graphs do not allow for arbitrary selections of the sample
 
size and exposed area. In the event that curves corresponding to other
 
values of these parameters are needed, they can be determined from
 
Expression (4) and Figures I-B through IV-B of Appendix B.
 
To illustrate the procedure, suppose that 25 samples of a given spacecraft
 
material are selected and each sample is fractured, yielding an exposed
 
area of 2.5 square inches. Suppose that 15 of these samples display con­
tamination on the newly exposed surfaces. Finally, assume that an upper
 
bound estimate of the mean bio-concentration is desired at the 90% confidence
 
level. It is determined from Figure VIII-B of Appendix B, i.e. the graph­
ical display corresponding to the 90% confidence level. The appropriate
 
curve in this figure is the one corresponding to the given sample size, i.e.
 
s=25. The observed proportion of positive samples is given by p = 15/25 = 0.6.
 
This value on the horizontal axis of the figure determines the appropriate
 
point on the s=25 curve. Using the vertical scale corresponding to the
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expoded area A = 2.5 in , an upper bound estimate of the mean bio­
concentration is seen to he less than 1.04 x 104 viable organisms per
 
cubic inch with 90% confidence. This concentration, when multiplied
 
by the total volume of subject material on the spacecraft, produces an
 
upper bound estimate of the bo-load buried within the given material.
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SECTION 5 - A Preliminary Evaluation of the Bio-assay Procedure
 
SENJITIVITY OF LOAD ESTIMATES TO THE CONTROL AND MEASUREMENT OF X AND A 
e 
To a first order approximation, percent errors in the measurewent of either
 
or Ae induce equivalent percent errors in estimates of the mean con­
centration of buried contamination.
 
As indicated in Expression (4), the mean concentration of buried contamination
 
is inversely proportional both to the exposure depth coefficient, X , and
 
to the exposed area, Ae . Therefore, to a first order approximation, percent 
errors in the measurement of either one of these parameters result in 
identical percent errors in the mean concentration of buried contamination. 
Although this statement cannot be extended beyond certain limits, it does
 
provide an approximate quantitative measure of the effects of measurement
 
errors in X and Ae on estimates of the unknown mean concentration, C.
 
As noted earlier, experimentally determined estimates of X ranged between
 
one and three microns for a specific material (lucite) and particular
 
measurement procedures. If the "true" value of X lies within this range
 
for all spacecraft materials then a maximum of 300% error in k is possible
 
(i.e., assuming X equals 3 microns but is estimated to be 1 micron).
 
Assuming that order or magnitude estimates of spacecraft bio-loads are
 
sufficient for most applications, errors of the above magnitude appear to
 
be acceptable. In any case, taking X as the lower limit of the range of
 
estimates (i.e., 1 micron) provides more concervative upper bound estimates
 
of C than would any other value selected in the given range; this is con­
sistent with sterility assurance. There is no question, however, that
 
estimates of X corresponding to materials other than lucite is desirable,
 
if not mandatory.
 
There is a sparsLty of both theoretical and empirical data on the control
 
and measurement of surface areas exposed by fracturing materials of the
 
types used in spacecraft construction. Moreover, the implications of a
 
given distribution of measurement errors in A are, at best, difficult to
 
derive on a statistical basis owing to the reatively complex relationship
 
between A , the observed datum, -, and the estimated mean biological
 
concentration. For these reasons, it is difficult to speculate on the
 
errors introduced into bio-assay estimates as 
a result of incorrect measure­
ments of exposed areas. The previously referenced Pheonix experiments (1)
 
failed to provide sufficient data for resolving these questions completely,
 
even as applied to lucite. However, evaluation of the experimental pro­
cedures and the resulting data does suggest that, for this particular
 
material, the area control and measurement procedures used along with
 
selecting X equal to one micron is adequate for present purposes. Here
 
again, extrapolation to other materials may not be valid; hence, additional
 
data in this regard is warranted.
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SECTION 5 - A Preliminary Evaluation of the Bio-Assay Procedure
 
ADDITIONAL SOURCES OF POTENTIAL ERROR
 
Potential sources of error related to deficiencies in the sampling and
 
culturing processes as well as the analytical model itself indicate the
 
need for controlled tests of the bio-assay procedure.
 
The proposed procedure evolved, in part, from the assumption of a Poisson 
distribution of viable organisms vithin the interiors of materials being 
assayed. Although this representation has intuitive appeal for most appli­
cations, a test and validation phase is nevertheless necessary before
 
implementation is considered.
 
Estimation errors are likely to occur if improper sampling, and/or culturing
 
procedures are followed. In sampling material, care must be taken to insure
 
that a representative cross-section is selected, i.e., samples independently
 
taken from distinct batches of the given material. Otherwise the selected
 
sample size could be insufficient for attaining a desired confidence level.
 
The culturing procedure is intimately connected with the exposure depth co­
efficient, X , since the depth of penetration is likely to vary with the
 
nature or type of culture medium. For any given depth of penetration, how­
ever, the culturing process should be capable of detecting all viable
 
organisms which are exposed.
 
It is important to note that the proposed bio-assay procedure, if successful,
 
produces upper bound estimates of the mean concentration taken over the
 
total population of the sample material under investigation. This is less
 
than desirable from the standpoint of application to sterilization require­
ments for individual lander missions. For example, it is possible, though
 
quite unlikely, that the dispersion of concentration from sample to sample
 
is very large. If so, an upper bound estimate of the mean concentration to
 
any level of confidence could have a relatively high probability of being
 
less than the concentration of a randomly selected sample and spacecraft.
 
Further testing and analysis are warranted on this basis alone.
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SECTION 6 - Recommendations
 
THE NEED FOR TESTING AND FURTHER ANALYSIS
 
Tests and additional analysis of the usefulness, engineering practicality
 
and economics of the proposed procedure are recommended prior to
 
implementation.
 
Application of the proposed bio-assay procedure to any given spacecraft
 
material yields an upper bound estimate, C, of an unknown mean concentration
 
of buried organisms within the material. The usefulness of this estimate
 
depends both upon its accuracy and the amount of information it contains.
 
Acceptable quantitative measures pf the effects of the previously indicated
 
error sources on the accuracy of C must be determined. Further, the pro­
cedure must be shown to yield information which is needed and presently
 
unavailable (e.g., estimates which are consistently greater than already
 
known upper bounds are of little or no use). Attainment of these objectives
 
requires the accomplishment of appropriate tests and analyses. For example,
 
experimental test applications should be conducted on various classes of
 
materials wherein the buried loadings are controlled (known). In addition,
 
further analytical studies should be pursued which relate to the effects
 
of (1) errors in the measurement of A and X , (2) the assumption of
 
uniformly distributed organisms and (S) the errors introduced by virtue
 
of the fact that estimates relate to the mean concentration rather than
 
-the particular concentration going aloft in a spacecraft.
 
A research area requiring investigation is the engineering practicality of 
applying the proposed procedure. It must be determined, for example, 
whether appropriate control and measurement of the area exposed, A , is 
feasible. (The requirements on this accuracy should evolve'from tfe efforts 
discussed in the preceding paragraph.) The practicality of appropriately 
culturing the exposed surface areas also requires additional study. 
Finally, consideration must be given to the economics of the proposed'
 
procedure. For the most part, this should be based upon the cost of se­
curing and processing sufficient numbers and varieties of sample spacecraft
 
materials.
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APPENDIX A
 
Computation of Confidence Intervals
 
for Binomial "Success" Probability
 
APPENDIX A - Computation of Confidence Intervals for a Binomial "Success"
 
Probability
 
Confidence intervals can be established for the "success" parameter of a
 
Binomial distribution by using an approximating normal distribution.
 
These intervals can then be transformed into upper and lower bounds upon
 
the bio-load.
 
As indicated in the main body of this report, the confidence limits estab­
lished for the mean bio-load are directly related to the confidence intervals
 
for a Binomially distributed variable p, which represents the observed pro­
portions of times contamination xzas detected in the load estimation procedure.
 
Expression (Al) on the facing page expresses the definition of a confidence
 
interval. The interpretation of this expression is; for a confidence of i-a!
 
the probability that the parameter p is contained within the interval (p , p )
 
is greater than or equal to I- o. For the particular use of a Binomial kis­
tribution, Expression (Al) is solved by first considering expressions (A2)
 
and (A3). In these expressions, the parameters pu and pL take on the largest
 
possible value such that the given inequalities are satisfied. This would
 
then give the (l-a) confidence interval of (p1 , p ) on the parameter p. How­
are sub­ever, from a computational point of view, Expression (A2) and (A3) 

ject to round-off errors and machine overflow. By using a well-known normal
 
approximation to the Binomial distribution, wie can replace Expressions (A2)
 
and (A3) with the corresponding expressions resulting from this approximation.
 
--The approximating normal distribution will have mean p and standard deviation
 
p (-p)
 
A 
Thus p and p are related as in Expression (A4) on the facing page. This
 
equation must be solved for p in order to obtain p and p . It can be shown
 
that Expression (A5) is the result of solving (A4) to obtain p in terms of
 
Expression (A4) with the plus sign corresponds to the upper half of an ellipse
 
which gives the upper confidence limit on p. Likewise, using this expression
 
with the negative sign gives the lower half of this ellipse corresponding to
 
the lower confidence limit on p. A family of these ellipses is shown in
 
Figures (I-B) thru (IV-B) of Appendix B. Since we are interested in upper
 
bounds on the bio-load, Expression (A6) gives the upper bound on the bio-load
 
in terms of Pu"
 
A 
In the load estimation procedure a value for p would be obtained for the
 
Aparticular sample size used. For this value of p and for a desired confidence
 
level, p would be obtained from Expression (A5).
 
C(A-i)
 
P r{pL~ 
P > 
p } 1-a' 
= 
xr spLu 
- <) 
(Al) 
(A2) 
P< P = 
x 0 
( (A3) 
P p± 
s 
s+ 
p + -
2s 
+ 
-
-
(A4) 
(A5) 
s 
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= 
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APPENDIX B
 
Graphical Displays of Confidence Limits
 
Figure I-B Upper and Lower Confidence Bounds for Binomial
-50% 

"Success" Probability (sample size indicated for
 
each curve)
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The Release of Buried Microbial Contamination
 
by Aeolian Erosion
 
A. INTRODUCTION
 
1. Brief statement of planetary quarantine objective
 
2. Description of the physical process treated
 
B THE EROSION PROCESS
 
1. Derivation of AV/V for a sphere
 
2. Numerical data for erosion rates of lucite, aluminum
 
3. Numerical data for Martian wind velocities
 
C. PROBABILITY OF RELEASE
 
1. Derivation of P (release I AV erodes in tq) 
2. Sensitivities of P (release I AV erodes in tq) 
D. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
 
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROCESS BEING TREATED
 
The impact of a lander on a planet could have serious conse­
quences if one desires not to contaminate the planet. In the light
 
of this one should examine the implications of fracturing and ex­
posing of surfaces which might "instantaneously" or subsequently
 
release viable spores. Here we will consider the relatively slow
 
process of erosion although the fracture and the erosion phases are
 
not necessarily independent. For our purposes we will take the
 
fracture as having occurred and characterized by a fracture-ratio.
 
(ref. #2 ) The fracture-ratio is defined as the area exposed
 
through fracture divided by the volume of the sample. An expres­
sion for the erosion of spherical shaped particles and an expres­
sion for the probability of release given that a quantity of the
 
sample erodes in the quarantine period have been derived. Calcu­
lations based on experimental data have been made for the erosion
 
rate.
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THE EROSION PROCESS
 
Assume no preferred wind direction and assume the fragments
 
roll about freely. Then erosionof a fragment bywind-bore agents
 
.s often radially symmetric. This suggests that we can study the
 
erosion of a sphere as typical of the erosion process.
 
Figure 1. The geometry which will be considered here.
 
The ratio of volume removed to original volume of the fractured piece is
 
(case ) x = R - etq if R etq
 
or (case 2) x = 0 if R < etq 
where e = erosion rate (rate of eroding surface) (ref. #2) 
tq time of quarantine. 
when R > etq, Equation I becomes ALV = I tq (2)
V -R
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I
 
The equation in this form is unmanagable due to the fact that the
 
R parameter is still present. We would like to find R as a function
 
of a macro-parameter, say the fracture-ratio f as previously defined
 
(ref. #2). To do this it is necessary to assume some break-up model
 
(i.e the way R is related to the dimensions of the original sample of
 
material)
 
Suppose the original sample were a cube of edge length L, and
 
fractures completely into equal sized particles of which a sphere of
 
radius R is typical. The number of particles is approximately
 
3L3
 3N - 4i (3)
 
= N4 R2 - 6L2
f = - Si 
and the fracture ratio is 

V La 
where Sf is the final surface exposed and S is the initial surface.
 
Equation (3) simplified gives,
 
1 =f + 	 (4)
R 3 L
 
Equation (2) then becomes AV - [ - tq( f + 	 (5)
-T - l - 05 L) 
The erosion rate (6) can be determined from existing data. In
 
(ref. #r3)
experiments by Neilson and Gilchrist , lucite and aluminum were 
eroded by aluminum oxide particles of 210 micron diameter. The results 
show that 
dm =E () .0 . A 	 (6)
dt
 
where 	 dm the rate of loss of mass
 
dt
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E (e) = a proportionality factor depending upon 
the angle of attack and the material 
0 = the mass-flux of particles per unit area 
striking the surface. 
A = the cross-sectional area 
The mass eroded from the sphere in Figure 1. is
 
Am= dAV d4y (R 3 -x ) (7)
3
 
where d = density of substance being eroded 
Dlifferentiating (7) with respect to time and combining With (6)
 
gives,
 
C= dx = E(e).0 (8) 
dt 2d
 
Substituting equation 8 into equation 5 gives,
 
S 
-A 1-V- E() 0t ( f + ) (9)2d 3 
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ESTIMATIOIN OF PAZAMETERS 
Hertzler at McDonnell Aircraft Corporation in simulation of
 
the Martian atmosphere has arrived at estimates of velocities of
 
winds on Mars and volume of abrasives carried by the wind (ref.4)
 
Average wind velocity = 220 fps. 
Particle concentration 10 4 oz./ft3 
Then 	the mass-fluence per unit area is,
 
0 = 4.68x105 lb/M 2/YR. 
so 	 0 5h&lA 0 
40 VPS Au 
_10 A4 ~ 0I,_ 	 7 
30. 60 so-	 0 60 0 
Figure 2. (after Neilson and Gilchrist) ref. #3
 
(a) 	Erosion vs. angle of attack (b) Erosion vs. angle of attach charac­
characteristic for Incite teristic for aluminum eroded 
eroded by 210p aluminum oxide by 21011 aluminum particles 
particles at 420 fps. at 220 fps. 
From 	figure 2a one may estimate E (¢.We will take the maximum 
of the curve for lucte for our calculation. (i.e. E (0) E=2.5x10- 3)
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Note, however, that the experiment for lucite was conducted for
 
particles at 420 fps where as we are postulating wind and parti­
cle velocities averaging 220 fps. A corrected estimate of E is
 
taken to be
 
6.9 x I0
 E = 2.5xl0 ( 220 )2 = _
 
3

For lucite d = 1.3x62.4 = 2 .9x10 lb/M 3 (.305)'
 
or the erosion 
rate for lucite is e = 
E . 
" 
2d 
-
= 
5.6 x 10 H/YR. (10) 
2 
A similar calculation 
for aluminum yields 
C = l.9x4I0 M/YR. 
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MODEL OF THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE
 
Assume a cube of edge length L impacts and fractures with
 
fracture-ratio f. Also, assume that AV of the original volume
 
V is eroded away during the period of time tq. If M spores are
 
distributed randomly in the volume V then
 
P(release AV erodes in tq) = e - M AV 
Substituting equation 10 into equation 9 and combining with
 
equation 11 gives an estimate of the probability of release

-M1 [-Eot (.f +2) 
P(release I AV erodes in tq) = 1 -e {3 [ 2d (12) 
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SENSITIVITY OF P ( re/AV erodes in tq) TO e, f, AND L 
We calculated the following two cases.
 
PARAMETER BEST WORST
 
-
10 6 m/year 10-2 m/year
 
1 
 mf 102 m 10
5 
-
L im 10- m 
Graphs Figure 3a and 3b are the results of the calculations.
 
In both graphs the model indicates virtually no dependence on L,
 
the size of the sample, and only when all parameters are "near" 
best case does dependence on e, f become important. In other
 
words, the amount of material eroded from the spacecraft debris,
 
after a hard impact, is almost independent of its size but does
 
depend on the fracture ratio f due to impact, and the erosion
 
rate e of the materials present. A further observation can be
 
made if the-quantity
 
+etq /f <<I 
6 
then Eq. 12 becomes P (re/AV) = 1- e- Mtq (f +-) (13) 
6 
furthermore if Metq (f +-) <<I 
6 
then expansion of P ( re/AV) = M stq ( f + ) (14) 
the exponential
 
gives the approx­
imation
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Note the similarity between Eq. 14 and the model of P(re/V) 
in reference No. 1 if one makes the following transformations 
6 6L2f (0) 6 = -r 
f-> f 
M(o)-> M 
P(reIAV) = M(o) etq ( f(0) + f ) (15) 
Figure 4 shows the error involved in using equation 15
 
instead of equation 12 as a function etq (I+ 2 ) if M is on
 
the order of 1.
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Equation 15
 
(ref. #1) 
Equation 12
 
C;0
0 
0 I ,I,
 
10-a 10-2 10 - 1 1 5
 
+
c t q 
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-4 
C 
f 
0ri 
0 
1010 
-4 
f 
L 
= 
= 
10 
1 
3a. All "bes t" 
f = 
L = 
case except for variation of one parameter 
105 
10-2 
0 
0 
~f.L 
0.5. 
oo 
P4 (Same scale as above)
 
3b. All "worst" case values except for varaton of one parameer.
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CONCLUSION AND RECOMbENDATIONS
 
Curves 3a and 3b indicates that the dimensions of the
 
original sample are not of primary importance in estimating the
 
P (release AV erodes in tq) .
 
On the basis of this model the erosion rate e and the fracture
 
ratio (f) show no clear domination one over the other for the range
 
of parameters considered. There is difficulty in estimating both
 
but there is more uncertainty about s. The range chosen for s is
 
lO 2 M/yr. to 10-61M/yr. This involves 4 decades and includes the
 
totally "worst case" situation in which the eroding agent is assumed
 
to be uninterpreted at a rate of 220 feet per 6econd for 17 years'
 
The other extreme is the order of magnitude of terrestrially observed
 
erosion rates. This wide range of uncertainty arises from our un­
certainty about the flux of the eroding agent, 0. It is recommended
 
that a closer examination be taken of 0 with a view to arriving at
 
an estimate of the expected abrasive-flux. This might possibly be
 
done by examining the distribution in crater populations of the
 
moon and Mars as photographed by Mariner's V, and VI to arrive at a
 
better estimate of 0 for Mars. Because of the scarcity of small
 
craters on Mars (Ref. #5) estimates of the extent of the transport­
erosion process can be made.
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
 
This report summarizes the study conducted by Exotech Incorporated
 
under Task D of the subject contract. This task was initiated under
 
modification No. 2 to the contract dated August 15, 1969.
 
The study described herein represents a follow-on effort to the
 
planning study conducted by Exotech Incorporated under an earlier contract
 
aimed at selecting an approach to establishing an organic constituent
 
inventory for the Moon1 . Based on the results of this planning study
 
NASA selected an approach containing the following two essential guide­
lines­
(a) Documentation of lunar mission spacecraft should be
 
preserved for possible future examination to identify
 
types and quantities of organic materials deposited
 
on the Moon. A detailed analysis of this documenta­
tion should not be undertaken until justified by
 
requirements from investigation of lunar sample
 
materials.
 
(b) An information system should be established which
 
identifies regions of the Moon where the risk of
 
contamination in surface samples is significant,
 
including identification of the degree of risk and
 
the spacecraft which contribute to the location ­
dependent material contamination.
 
The present study represents the initial step in the implementation
 
of the above approach in that it considers the detailed procedures and
 
tasks to be undertaken to collect, evaluate, store and disseminate data
 
which will serve anticipated needs of lunar sample investigators, consistent
 
with the requirement that costs associated with implementation and operation
 
of the inventory be consistent with known needs for this information. The
 
primary tasks pertinent to this effort involved (1) determining the avail­
ability of lunar mission vehicle documentation and the means for collecting
 
it in a form suitable for future evaluation, (2) the collection and
 
tPlanning Study for an Organic Constituents Inventory Program,
 
R.C. Lyle, Exotech Incorporated, Report No. TRSR-68-029 under
 
Contract No. NAS1i-1666,\May 1968
 
utilization of spacecraft trajectory parameters, landing sites and dispersion
 
patterns for crash and soft landings, and (3) evaluating the compatibility
 
of required date inputs with the existing Planetary Quarantine information
 
system.
 
Sections II and III of this report summarize, respectively, the
 
approach taken in this study and the detailed analysis of the questions
 
considered. This is followed in Section IV by a set of recommendations
 
for implementing the chemical materials inventory in accordance with the
 
guidelines set forth above. A summary of these recommendations is also
 
provided below.
 
The minimum requirements for the preservation of pertinent mate­
rials information are retention of documentation by lunar mission
 
spacecraft contractors and notification of the Planetary Quarantine Office
 
prior to disposal. This would apply to NASA contractors for the Ranger,
 
Lunar Orbiter, AIMP, Surveyor and Apollo programs. In addition to this,
 
however, the following procedures are recommended for consideration by
 
NASA:
 
1. 	Designate a Federal Records Center to receive all docu­
ments and organize a filing system by mission designa­
tions.
 
2. 	Order all documentation sent by U.S. Mail to the designated
 
Federal Records Center at end of the existing contractual
 
requirements for retention, including those documents,
 
already in other records centers.
 
3. 	When contractors and agencies desire to retain copies of
 
the information, require film copies suitable for aper­
ture card insertion to be forwarded to the designated
 
center.
 
4. 	Expand COMAT/TRIS System of Apollo program to include
 
materials information on module sections not now covered.
 
Information is not to include flammability or other data
 
as in current system, but should include specification
 
and property information which would be of use in iden­
tifying portions of the material at a later date.
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5. Require copies of documentation on future flights to be
 
supplied within thirty days after launch.
 
Concerning the preparation of an information system, a two step pro­
cedure is recommended as follows:
 
1. 	Prepare a contamination risk model of the lunar surface
 
either in tabular form or preferably as a "risk-contour"
 
map, based on the best available estimates of spacecraft
 
landing sites and the particle dispersion associated with
 
the mass and velocity characteristics of hard and soft
 
landers. Dispersion models suitable for this purpose are
 
the 	Sandia and Grumman models referred to in the text.
 
2. 	Disseminate among lunar sample investigators, and to
 
others associated with the planning of lunar scientific
 
exploration information concerning the documentation to
 
be kept in storage and the available information. Include
 
a questionnaire to permit the estimation of expected usage
 
of information systems data of various levels of detail.
 
The above recommendations are expected to result in an optimum pro­
cedure for the implementation of a lunar chemical contaminant inventory,
 
consistent with known cost and technical constraints. These recommendations
 
and the source data upon which they are based, are elaborated upon in the
 
body of this report.
 
The study described herein has been conducted by Robert C. Lyle and
 
Lester D. Shubin of Exotech's Systems Research Division, under the overall
 
direction of Samuel Schalkowsky. The contributions of highly pertinent
 
information by the various personnel cited in this report from NASA, NASA
 
contractors and from the scientific community, are gratefully acknowledged.
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II. APPROACH TO THE STUDY
 
1. Definition of the Problem
 
The proper application of the results of this study should make
 
possible the preservation of space vehicle documentation from which con­
taminant identification and quantization may be developed if required,
 
and should enable the delineation of contamination risk zones on the lunar
 
surface.
 
In order to gain an in-depth understanding of the entire problem,
 
it was subdivided into separate tasks. These taskc define the inputs re­
quired to accomplish the goals set
 
a. 	Determine the location and form of the documentation
 
required to identify spacecraft materials.
 
b. 	Examine the available dispersion models developed for
 
high speed impact and soft landing vehicles and deter­
mine their applicability.
 
c. 	Determine the most productive course to follow in the
 
collection and storage of pertinent documentation.
 
2. Procedures Followed in the Investigation
 
Personal communication was established with the cognizant personnel
 
(see Table 1) at the agencies and companies holding the documentation.
 
Discussions covered the availability of the documentation, the amount, the
 
current form, its storage location, and the length of time that it would
 
be retained. These conversations were followed by written correspondence
 
which formalized estimates by these companies of the costs of copying,
 
transferring and sorting the documentation in several ways. These alterna-,
 
tives are presented within this report.
 
Documents were acquired from the Grumman Aerospace Corp., detailing
 
the dispersion model for contaminants emanating from soft landers and from
 
the Sandia Corp., relating to both the dispersion of fragments from hard
 
landers and the Planetary Quarantine Lunar Programs Information System.
 
These documents were examined to ascertain the applicability of the dispersion
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TABLE I 
PROJECT NAIA OF-CONTACT ORGANIZATION 
Ranger Mr. Irl Newland,' 
Librarian 
JPL 
Surveyor C. W. Lefever, Mgr.** 
Contracts, SSD 
Hughes Aircraft 
Orbiter H. M. Miller, Mgr. *" 
Contracts Space 
Boeing 
Apollo Arlie Carter 
J. Steinthal 
GE/Houston 
NASA/MSC 
AIMP F Ledoux GSFC 
*For Technical Information 
Mrs V. Pritchard (213-354-4321) 
** Perry Ackerman (213-648-4134) 
*** W, C. Galloway (206-656-2121) 
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models to the inventory problem and to define the interface between the
 
existing information system and the inventory. In addition to this
 
literature study, personal communication was established with a number
 
of personnel concerned with the content of these documents, and with re­
.lated problems of lunar surface contamination.
 
In addition to the personnel listed in Table 1, conversations were
 
held with the following persons­
1. 	Mr. A.L. Roark of Sandia Laboratories on the Lunar
 
Information System computer program;
 
2. 	Dr. M. Aronowitz of Grumman Aerospace Corp., on the
 
dispersion model of the LM exhaust products;
 
3. 	Dr. A.L. Burlingame, Space Sciences Laboratory, Univ.
 
of Calif., on the sensitivity of mass spectrometric
 
measurements of lunar materials,
 
4. 	Dr. Elbert King, Curator of the Lunar Receiving
 
Laboratory, concerning current practices of sample
 
preservation,
 
5. 	Dr. P.R. Bell, Manager of the Lunar Receiving Laboratory,
 
concerning possible need for the inventory,
 
6. 	Dr. Donald Flory, Gas Analysis Laboratory, LRL, to
 
discuss LM exhaust products, and possible contamination
 
in the Surveyor 3 crater;
 
7. 	Dr. I. Adler of the Theoretical Branch at GSFC, to explore
 
possible needs of the inorganic chemistry investigators.
 
Communication was also established with the Data and Tracking Group at JPL
 
to obtain the impact location of Orbiter IV, and with the National Geographic
 
Society in order to determine the accuracy and sources of information used
 
for placement of the impact sites of the USSR vehicles on their Moon chart.
 
The Micromation Co., of Washington, D.C. supplied estimates of the
 
cost of various methods of copying documents.
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When all of the information was at hand, the alternatives were
 
studied and conclusions were reached concerning the procedures which
 
would accomplish the intended goals in the most effective manner. Rec­
ommendations have been developed on the basis of these conclusions which
 
will enable the cost effective implementation of the previously selected
 
inventory approach, mentioned in the Introduction and described in detail
 
in Exotech s previous report
 
2 Ibid.
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III. ANALYSIS
 
A. Current Status of Documentation
 
Ranger: The current status of the Ranger Project documentation,
 
the earliest of the programs under study for this report, has been reason­
ably well defined. All documentation currently existent is stored under
 
the cognizance of Mr. Irl Newland, Chief Librarian, and his assistant,
 
Mrs. Vivian Pritchard, of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. The bulk of the
 
material is stored at the Federal Records Center, at Shelly Air Force Base.
 
The documentation is supposed to be reviewed every three years for possible
 
disposal, but to date this has not been done, and the Exotech investigator
 
was told that it will be stored indefinitely. Some documentation continues
 
to turn up in various files in JPL offices and is sent to the library when
 
it is found.
 
Most of the Ranger documentation is on 16 and 35mm film and much 
of it, especially the drawings, is stored on aperture cards for easy re­
trieval. Good estimates of the amount of documentation involved in the 
Ranger project have been difficult to obtain, but the best available indica­
tions are that approximately 10,000 documents and drawings are contained 
within the files. 
Lunar Orbiter Boeing Aircraft Co., Seattle, Washington is con­
tractually obligated to retain Lunar Orbiter spacecraft documentation for
 
the following time limits: technical data-3 years, financial data-10 years.
 
In each case the period begins from the time of the official termination of
 
the contract. It should be noted that parts lists for the Orbiter spacecraft
 
are contained within 13,000 drawings and identify the applicable specifica­
tions which are on file at the Department of Defense Information Center,
 
where they are available to NASA.
 
Surveyor: The Surveyor spacecraft was fabricated in two configurations.
 
Surveyors I through IV are designated Group A, Surveyors V through VII are
 
Group B. There are sufficient differences between the two configurations
 
to warrant this division, which results in an increase in the amount of docu­
mentation required to completely describe the spacecraft. The documentation
 
system used by the contractor, Hughes Aircraft Company, permits reproduction
 
of both sets of data.
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The documents pertaining to the Surveyor vehicles are currently
 
held by the Hughes Aircraft Co., El Segundo, California in the form of
 
films, aperture cards, and paper copies. Most of the technical data is
 
recorded and stored on aperture cards which are of the punched card type
 
containing a microfilm insert, coded for retrieval with the document
 
identification such as the drawing number. The coding can be extended at
 
any time to include such other identification as is needed.
 
The Hughes Aircraft Co. estimates that it has approximately 3500
 
aperture cards in its possession relating to the Surveyor project. It is
 
likely that some additional documentation exists that Hughes has not
 
included, since this is a surprisingly low quantity in comparison with the
 
Boeing Company estimate for the Lunar Crbiters. However, the additional
 
number of documents is not expected to be large and the estimate by Hughes
 
Company is considered acceptable for the purposes of this study.
 
Apollo' There are some 600 major contractors and numerous sub­
contractors and suppliers for the Apollo program. They have produced
 
thousands of drawings and documents, many of which are pertinent to the
 
identification of chemical contaminants placed on the Moon.
 
Discussions with Mr. Gerald White at the Grumman Aerospace Corp.,
 
Bethpage, N.Y.-revealed that the General Electric Corp. Houston office
 
is the operating contractor of the COMAT System for NASA on the Apollo pro­
ject. COMAT is an acronym for "Characteristics of Materials". The COMAT
 
system is a computerized central data bank used in the recording and control
 
of the use of non-metallic materials in the crew bays of the Apollo space­
craft. It is designed for the storage and retrieval of data on the use,
 
status and characteristics of non-metallic materials considered for applica­
tion in the manned spacecraft. The usage data consist of an accounting
 
of materials in terms of their locations in the spacecraft and quantities
 
and the functional requirements of their application. The status data con­
sists of evaluation of the material safety and habitability in its appli­
edtiop in terms of such parameters as combustion rate, fire point,
 
odor, and carbon monoxide emission. The characteristics data include se­
lected elements of flammability and outgassing test data.
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The documentation used to supplement the COMAT data system is
 
3
handled by the TRIS system (Test and Reliability InfQrma~agn System)
 
This is a specialized document acquisition, storage and retrieval system,
 
using automatic data processing to provide multiple listings and cost­
indexing. TRIS acquires, microfilms, stores, retrieves and distributes
 
documentation required to assist the reliability and quality control groups
 
in their evaluation of certain parts, materials, and other hardware con­
sidered for use in the Apollo Program.
 
AIMP: An examination was made of the status of the documentation
 
of AIMP D and E at the Goddard Space Flight Center. Mr. Frank LeDoux,
 
of the Project Office, estimates that approximately two cubic feet of
 
paper documentation including photographs exists. The documentation con­
tains lists of materials, test results, and manufacturers specifications
 
on much of the spacecraft materials. It is currently maintained in loose
 
leaf folders and stored in a filing cabinet by Mr. LeDoux at GSFC.
 
The photographs are a necessary input to the inventory since they
 
,are keyed to the test programs and the identification of spacecraft parts
 
would be difficult without them.
 
According to ML. LeDoux, identification of materials used in
 
experiment packages would not present a difficult problem. This is due to
 
the fact that his records are virtually complete, and he knows the location
 
of the additional data required.
 
3 General Electric, TRIS User's Manual, Houston, Texas 
B. Alternative Methods far Prserving the Documentation
 
At this time, it is possible to retrieve the bulk of the documenta­
tion relating to the U.S. missions which have impacted or soft landed
 
spacecraft on the Moon. However, it may be seen from Table 2 that the
 
endsof the contractors' retention periods for the technical data are in
 
the very near future. This imposes a constraint on the time available for
 
implementation of the documentation collection required for the selected
 
inventory model.
 
The alternatives available to the Planetary Quarantine Office
 
under the specifications of alternative (d) of the previous Exotech reportO
 
requiring the preservation of documentation of all lunar contact missions
 
are in increasing order of complexity­
1. 	Extend documentation retention agreements with the
 
contractors pending a later decision
 
The simplest solution to the problem of preserving the
 
documentation is to extend the retention agreements until at
 
least 1975 and postpone a decision on the disposition of the
 
documentation until then. This will gain time needed to
 
determine the full extent of the requirements of the in­
vestigators.
 
The primary advantage of this alternative lies in its
 
simplicity, and relatively low cost. The disadvantages are
 
many, including the fact that the documentation is not
 
readily available for examination by persons other than the
 
contractors. In addition, it will be widely dispersed
 
throughout the country, making it extremely difficult to
 
gain any meaningful information from the documentation with­
out considerable travel and time investment.
 
2. 	Direct contractors to transfer documentation to a
 
designated Federal Records Center when the retention
 
time expires
 
Under this alternative, the Government would require
 
4Lyle, Loc. Cit.
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TABLE 2 
CUSTODIAN APPROXIMATE 
OF NUMBER OF CONTRACTOR RETAINS 
PROJECT DOCUMENTATION DOCUMENTS DOCUMENTATION UNTIL 
Ranger JPL 10,000 1970 (9) 
Surveyor Hughes 3,500 1973"-
Orbiter Boeing 13,000 1977*k 
Apollo GE/Houston unknown 1975j-* 
AIMP GSFC 4,000 Indefinite 
Project continuing 
* Analysis not needed-document call outs included 
** Estimated close of contract 
(9) Estimated 
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the 	contractors to transfer the documentation as it exists
 
to a designated Federal Records Center at the termination
 
of the retention period. The planetary Quarantine Office
 
would be notified of any impending changes in the location
 
of the record material.
 
The advantage of this alternative is that it requires
 
virtually no expenditure of funds. There are no storage
 
or handling charges, and no transportation charge to NASA
 
if the U.S. mails are used for shipping. In addition, the
 
documentation eventually will all be located in a single
 
storage center.
 
The main disadvantages are the time delay involved in
 
transferring the documentation to the Government and in the
 
variety of forms which must be handled.
 
3. 	Copy documentation in any form and send to designated
 
Federal Records Center
 
Under this alternative, the contractors would submit
 
duplicates of the documentation in whatever form is con­
venient-to a selected Federal Records Center prior to a
 
specified date.
 
The principal advantage gained is that the documentation
 
will be transferred to a single Government operated i Iity
 
at an early date, permitting greater accessibility than if
 
kept only by the contractors.
 
The 	primary disadvantage of this alternative is that
 
a variety of documentation forms must be dealt with. Retrieval
 
of information from a collection of such diverse inputs would
 
be difficult and costly.
 
4. 	Copy documentation into a suitable form for present and
 
future use and store in a designated Federal Records Center
 
The significant gain in this alternative is the uniformity
 
in the format of the stored documentation. The use of a
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single type of copy will result in a time saving in
 
handling the material during any subsequent search and
 
retrieval over that in the other alternatives. The
 
preferred format would be one which could be used in an
 
aperture card at a later date if desired.
 
This procedure till cost more than the others 
initially, but may save money in the long run if informa­
tion retrieval requests are expected. It is not necessary 
to process the data into a final form, only into a form 
which may later be processed into final retrieval form. 
This may be accomplished by converting the documentation 
into microfilm which could be entered into an aperture
 
card system at a later date.
 
If the decision is made to store all lunar contact
 
spacecraft documentation, a single Federal Records Center
 
should be designated as the repository rather than utilizing
 
the Federal Records Center nearest the present location
 
of the documentation. If the U.S. Mail is used for ship­
ment of the documents, the cost of transportation to NASA
 
can be neglected. It would therefore be more beneficial
 
to collect the documentation at a central point. From
 
the point of view of convenience, this should be in or
 
near the Manned Spacecraft Center, because the Apollo pro­
gram is still in progress, and will be for some time, thus
 
making it desirable to examine all the documents at this
 
single location.
 
Consideration was given to the feasible methods of
 
duplicating the documentation. The alternatives are
 
Microfilm,
 
Microfiche,
 
Paper copies,
 
Aperture cards, or
 
Computer tapes.
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From the point of view of the initial cost, microfilm
 
and microfiche are slightly more expensive than the hard
 
copies. This is borne out by the Boeing Co. quotations
 
for copying the Lunar Orbiter documents. The cost of
 
supplying paper copies is approximately t3600 less than
 
film copies. However, film copies are better suited to
 
automated search and retrieval from the total inventory
 
collection of documentation. If the documentation is
 
stored on microfilm at the outset, considerable effort
 
may be saved later in the event that in-depth searches
 
must be made.
 
Many of the documents now stored are in the form of
 
aperture cards. Aperture cards, while basically yielding
 
the same information as the films and hard copies, possess
 
an advantage over the other forms with the exception of
 
-computer tape, in that they are easily retrieved using
 
a machine sorter. The principal drawback is the fact
 
that the film size constraints require two cards for many
 
drawings for complete coverage.
 
Storage of the documentation in the memory bank of a
 
computer must be considered, since techniques exist for
 
the reproduction of drawings, circuit diagrams and similar
 
representations. The computer has not been considered as
 
the prime storage and retrieval system for the Ranger, -

Orbiter and Surveyor, because the expense of conversion to
 
this type of system is unwarranted at this time. If it
 
were planned to convert the documentation of these missions
 
to a form usable on a computer, considerable time would
 
have to be devoted to programming and input. This goes
 
beyond the requirements of the Space Science Board, and
 
should not be done without certain knowledge that there
 
will be sufficient demands on the system to justify addi­
tional expenditures.
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C. 	Other Alternatives for Documentation Preservation
 
In the event that the demands from the investigators are sufficiently
 
numerous, and require more information than is available under the intended
 
inventory collection plan, it will become necessary to augment the system
 
to enable retrieval of more detailed materials information. Therefore
 
requests were made of the contractors for estimates of the cost of extrac­
ting the materials data and transferring it to NASA in a usable form.
 
The costs indicated here reflect the fact that the selection would be done
 
by personnel experienced with the projects, resulting in cost savings
 
due to time lost by inexperienced personnel in learning about the projects.
 
The Hughes Aircraft Co. proposed that the following six tasks 
would be required to accomplish this selection for Group A and Group B
 
Surveyor spacecraft:
 
1. 	Obtain a list of materials approved for Surveyor and
 
identify those containing organic material.
 
2. 	Review Indentured Tarts and Drawing Lists, for Groups
 
A and B configured spacecraft, and identify those
 
drawings potentially containing organic material.
 
3. 	Obtain Duplicate Aperture Cards (DACs) for each
 
drawing. On the average, two (2) Duplicate Aperture
 
Cards are required per drawing, since the area
 
covered by a DAC "frame" is limited to 44 inches.
 
4. 	Review the DACs for organic material and identify
 
the type and amount of material involved.
 
5. 	compile a matrix of the amount of organic material
 
by type and subsystem or control item.
 
6. 	Conduct a study to determine the amount of organic
 
materials contained in the rocket engine products of
 
combustion, which would remain on the lunar surface.
 
It is estimated that the above effort would require 17 man-months
 
and $1500.00 in Other Direct Costs (materials and reproduction) The
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estimated total fixed price for this job, including general and adminis­
trative expense and profit, is $53,300.
 
In the case of the Lunar Orbiter Spacecraft, the Boeing Co.
 
personnel who are intimately familiar with the spacecraft are still
 
-available and could accomplish the following tasks­
1. 	Examine all drawings and documentation.
 
2: 	 Determine the composition of the airborne hardware.
 
3. 	Furnish a report containing the classification of
 
the organics and their approximate weight.
 
This effort would require six months of effort at a cost to the
 
Government of $105,591.
 
Exotech has been unable to get a firm quote from JPL with respect
 
to the Ranger documentation costs for similar efforts.
 
AIP documentation is to a large extent already broken down in
 
the manner described and little additional effort is required to maintain
 
the documentation in this form.
 
The estimated cost of completing the materials documentation for
 
the 	Apollo program, copying it into a suitable format and entering it
 
into the current COMAT/TRIS System is $50-100,000 It should be noted that
 
many thousands of documents exist in the hands of approximately 600 con­
tractors, sub-contractors and other suppliers. The content of these docu­
ments in terms of organic materials is unknown at this time, and this
 
uncertainty contributes significantly to the cost spread.
 
D. Dispersion Nodels
 
A survey of analytical methods for evaluating the dispersion of
 
contaminants from hard impacts and soft landings was conducted during the
 
period of this effort. This survey was carried out in order to determine
 
the applicability of existing models to the determination of contamination
 
risk areas, and the requirements for programming the models into the
 
Interactive Computer Information System for Planetary Quarantine for Lunar
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Programs. Two models5 , vere found suitable for use in the pre­
dicting contaminant spread as a result of landings on the Moon's
 
surface.
 
1. Soft Landings
 
The model by Aronowitz et al covers the chemical con­
tamination of the lunar surface by LM exhaust during a soft
 
landing. The total contaminant distribution is bifurcated
 
into two phases of contamination a far field distribution
 
and a near field distribution.
 
a. Far Field Distribution
 
The gas plume issuing from the LM descent rocket
 
engine nozzle into the vacuum around the moon interacts
 
with the lunar surface causing contamination of the
 
surface. The rocket plume has two major flow regimes
 
Adjacent to the nozzle exit there is a compressible
 
continuum fluid flow regime, but as the gas continues
 
to expand out from the nozzle the density decreases,
 
and a free molecular flow, far field regime develops.
 
When the LM vehicle, in its landing trajectory,
 
is at an appreciable altitude, only the fully developed
 
far field of the exhaust plume intersects the moon.
 
This interaction produces the far field contamination
 
that has been analyzed and determined by assuming free­
molecular point-source flow of the exhaust gas in the
 
lunar gravitational force field.
 
Flow Model - The flow model thus consists of a
 
moving, free molecular-flow point source in the lunar
 
gravitational force field. The velocity of the gas
 
5 Grumman Research Dept. Report RE-242 - Investigation of Lunar Surface
 
Chemical Contamination by IM Descent Engine and Associated Equipment
 
by L. Aronowitz et al.,March 1966.
 
6 Report SC-M-68-539 "The Chances of Retrieval of Viable Microorganisms
 
Deposited on the Moon by Unmanned Lunar Probes", by Martin S. Tierney,
 
Sandia Laboratories, Aug. 1968.
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molecules flowing from the source is the vector
 
sum of the velocity at which the source (LM) is
 
moving and the source exhaust velocity. At
 
ignition of the descent engine the LX velocity
 
is approximately half the exhaust velocity and
 
so must be included in the analysis. The random
 
thermal velocity is considerably smaller. The
 
molecules follow orbital trajectory flight paths
 
that may intersect the spherical lunar surface
 
where, as a first approximation, they can be
 
assumed to be fully adsorbed.
 
Analysis for Contamination Calculation - The
 
total far field contamination distribution on the
 
lunar surface is obtained by integrating at each
 
of a series of fixed lunar points the time history
 
of contamination flux for the time period of the
 
far field portion of the IM landing trajectory.
 
The input data (IM position and velocity and the
 
point source exhaust velocity and density factor
 
distribution) are such that the integration must
 
be done numerically by determining the flux at
 
discrete times over the powered descent phase of
 
the IM trajectory.
 
The principal equation in the flux calculation
 
is the standard gravitational-force-field particle­
trajectory equation that defines the flight path
 
of a particle as a conic section. This equation is
 
most easily solved in a spherical coordinate system
 
with origin at the center of the Moon and with polar
 
axis going through a known point on the trajectory.
 
To calculate the total contamination at a fixed
 
point on the lunar surface, the particle trajectory
 
equation must be applied repeatedly to the source
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as it moves along the LM trajectory. The move­
ment of the source means that the local coord-inate
 
system for the particle trajectories rotates rela­
tive to the fixed point. Furthermore, the particle
 
trajectory equation does not explicitly determine
 
which particle will land at the fixed point. To
 
circumvent these difficulties, a different, indirect
 
approach must be taken. Therefore, at a given time
 
or, equivalent, for a given position of the source,
 
the velocity that a particle must have at the source
 
to intersect the fixed point is calculated and this
 
velocity uniquely determines the particle flux at
 
that point.
 
b. Near Field Distribution
 
The near field distribution is concerned with
 
the study of lunar contamination by the LM rocket
 
gases when the vehicle is close enough to the Moon
 
such that a region of continuum fluid mechanics
 
exists from the exhaust nozzle down to the lunar
 
surface. This problem is considered as the near
 
field erosion problem. For purposes of this study,
 
erosion characteristics will not be considered in
 
the determination of contamination. However, the
 
program can be used to calculate the redeposited
 
particle distribution on the surface and the
 
associated temperature testing for a suspension
 
model. A conclusion reached in the near field dis­
tribution research is that particles of 0.1 mm
 
radius may fall as far as 130 meters from the rocket
 
nozzle centerline.
 
c. Adsorption Estimation
 
Adsorption of Rocket Exhaust Gas on the Lunar
 
Surface has been calculated using a solid lunar surface
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model. Adsorption of the IM descent rocket ex­
haust gas on lunar surface material can introduce
 
significant amounts of contaminants into the
 
samples of the lunar surface that the Apollo
 
astronauts will bring back to earth for scientific
 
analysis. Discussed herein is a model used for
 
quantitative calculations of the amount of rocket
 
gas adsorbed on the lunar surface, and the sub­
sequent desorption of those surface contaminants.
 
I 
The model chosen for the lunar surface is a
 
rough plane. This choice agrees well with the
 
current knowledge of the lunar surface. The
 
composition of the lunar surface material, in
 
this model,was considered to be mainly metal
 
silicates.
 
As the IM descends toward the touchdown site,
 
gas molecules from the rocket exhaust Will strike
 
the lunar surface. While the LM altitude is above
 
100 or 200 feet, the molecules striking the sur­
face are in the free molecular flow regime. At
 
lower altitudes, the gas contacting the lunar
 
surface in the vicinity of the IM is in the con­
tinuum flow regime. The formulation uses gas­
dynamic equations appropriate to the continuum
 
regime.
 
d. Computer Program Usability
 
The computer programs developed for the con­
taminatlon distribution estimates for both Far and
 
Near field distribution as well as the adsocption
 
computations are operational on an IBM 7094 digital
 
computer. It is reasonable to conclude that these
 
programs have been written in FORTRAN, a widely
 
used scientific computation language. It is felt
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that with some modifications to these programs, con­
version to the CDC 3100 may be possible.
 
2. 	Hard Landings
 
The Sandia repor't7 describes the dispersonal 6f contaminants
 
during hard landings. Two possibilities are modeled.
 
" 	Dispersion of lunar soil ejected by a space­
craft making a hard landing on the Moon.
 
* 	 A range distribution for fragments of a space­
craft making a hard landing on the Moon. 
The 	range distribution model can be used to determine the
 
probability that beyond a given distance from impact point no
 
fragmentation is expected to be found.
 
The assumptions under which the range distribution pro­
babilities are derived should be noted.
 
Impact of the lunar probe is normal to the
 
Moon's surface.
 
* 	Fragments are ejected isotropically.
 
* 	 Angle of ejection of a fragment is independent 
of the fragment mass and speed. 
The soil ejection model was not used. Its output is given 
in surface density of crater ejecta per square kilometer rather 
than fragmentation distribution. 
The interaction aspelts of the Planetary Quarantine Lunar 
Programs Information System are not operational, however, the
 
computational algorithms for the hard impact model are opera­
tional on the CDC 3100 computer. The soft landing model is
 
operational on an IBM 7094 computer.
 
3. 	Applications of Dispersion Models
 
Table 3 gives a listing of the latest information avail­
able on landing sites, impact mass, velocity, and date of con­
tact. The location of Orbiter IV, previously unreported, was
 
7 Tierney, Loc.Oit.
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TABLE 3 
SPACECRAFT LANDING COORDINATES 
DATE OF 
U S LAT. LONG. AREA NAME/CRATER IMPACT MASS/KG SPEED IcM/SEC CONTACT 
Ranger 4 13.90s 129.4W * 331 2.669 4/26/62 
Ranger 6 9.3N 21.4 0E Mare Tranquillitatis 365 2.66 2/2/64 
Ranger 7 10.7°S 20.7 ° W Mare Cognitum 366 2.616 7/31/64 
Ranger 8 2.71950 N 24.6195 0E Mare Tranquillitatis 367 2.651 2/20/65 
Ranger 9 12.9 0S 2 .40W Alphonsus 366 2.669 3/24/65 
Surveyor I 2.460S 4 3.32 ° W Oceanus Procellarum 270 3.96 m/sec 6/2/66 
Flamsteed 
Surveyor 2 4+0.40N ll+1..1W Sinus Aestuum 292 2.38 m/sec(7) crash 9/22/66 
Surveyor 3 2.99-3.06S 23.32-23.34 ° W Oceanus Procellarum 285 Soft Landing 4/19/67 
Surveyor 5 1.450 N 22.25°E Mare Tranquillitatis 281 Soft Landing 9/11/67 
Surveyor 6 0.46-0.51ON 1.37-1.39°W Sinus Mediz 282 Soft Landing 11/9/67 
Surveyor 7 40.890 S I1.440W Tycho 284 Soft Landing 1/10/68 
Surveyor 4 0.42ON 1.33°W Sinus Medi 284 U 7/16/67 
Orbiter 1 16.35ON 160.710E 387 2.38 10/29/66 
Orbiter 2 3. 0 N 119.10 E * 392 2.38 10/11/67 
Orbiter 3 14.6°N 91.70W Einstein 387 2.38 10/9/67 
Orbiter 4 0+100 26+50W Lansberg 392 2.38 10/6/67 
Orbiter 5 2.790S 83.04 W D'Alembert Mts. 392 2.38 1/31/68 
Schrtler 
Apollo 10 DS 
Apollo 11 0041'15"N 23026'E Mare Tranquillitats 7/20/69 
West Crater 
Apollo 12 3°S 23.3°E Oceanus Procellarum 
Apollo 13 60S 170W Fra.Mauro 
Apollo 14 0036'S 32043'E Censorinus 
Apollo 15 22012'N 29020'E Littrow 
Apollo 16 41045'S 11030'W Tycho 
Apollo 17 13045'N 560W Marius Hills 
(cont'd) 
U.S. LAT. 
Apollo 18 2509'N 
Apollo 19 803'N 
USSR 
Luna 2 30.10N 
Luna 5 1.5°S 
Luna 7 9.80N 
Luna 8 9.60N 
Luna 9 7.80N 
Luna 13 18.5°N 
Luna 15 U 
LONG. 

49030'W 

60E 

0.01°E 

25°W 

48.80W 

61.6°w 

650W 

620W 

U 

SPACECRAFT LANDING COORDINATES
 
AREA NAME/CRATER IMPACT MASS/KG 

Schrter's Valley
 
Hyganus
 
Mare Imbrnum/Autolycus 390 

Oceanus Procellarum 1476 

Lansberg
 
Oceanus Procellarum/Marius 1506 

Oceanus Procellarum 1552 

Galilez
 
Oceanus Procellarum 1360 

Oceanus Procellarum 100 

Mare Crisium U 

DATE OF 
SPEED YM/SEC CONTACT 
2.38 9/14/59 
2.38 5/12/65 
2.38 10/8/65 
2.38 12/6/65 
5.5-6.1 m/sec 2/3/66 
Soft Landing 12/24/66 
1.3 Km/sec (9) 7/21/69 
* Not named 
4- U Unknown 
supplied by the Data and Tracking Group at JPL. Luna 15
 
data are not listed, due to the fact that at the time of
 
this report, Exotech has been unable to acquire any in­
formation other than the report made by the Jodrell Bank
 
Observatory during the Apollo 11 flight.
 
The proposed dispersion models must be combined and
 
programmed with terminal trajectory information and impact
 
sites to answer queries such as these
 
What is the probability of the presence of a
 
fragment or fragments of a specified size or
 
mass at a designated sampling site 7 
Which mission(s) would be the principal con­
tributor(s) to contamination in a particular
 
lunar region 9
 
At given distances from the impacts, what
 
size range of fragments is to be expected?
 
What is the closest point of approach to a pre­
viously landed spacecraft where the probability
 
of detectable contamination is less than a
 
selected value9
 
In order to provide answers to these and similar questions,
 
both models must be utilized in such a way as to maintain
 
their separate identity, and allow their outputs to be
 
supplementary or independent. In this manner, the exhaust
 
components from soft landers and fragments from impacts
 
can be reported as part of a total contamxnation picture or
 
as separate constituents.
 
E. Scope of Materials Documentation
 
The analytical efforts of the Lunar Principal Investigators are fre­
quently directed toward the identification of trace amounts of components.
 
If the analysis reveals the presence of a substance such as sulfur or
 
phosphorus, the investigator will be concerned as to whether it is of
 
terrestrial or extraterrestrial origin. The investigator will have an
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interference problem whether the sulfur comes from sodium sulfate or
 
from a type of rubber that deteriorated on the lunar surface. After pro­
longed periods of time, it may be that the two materials are virtually
 
indistinguishable from each other. It would be helpful to the investigator,
 
in any case, to have an estimate of the probability that a certain amount
 
of sulfur can be expected as a contaminant in the area of interest.
 
From the point of view of the life scientists, in contrast to
 
that of the analytical chemist, noted above, the source of the contaminant
 
is important. After some treatments, notably gas chromatography/mass
 
spectrometry, the original composition is destroyed, and the inorganic
 
ions are the same, regardless of the source. The phosphorous from a
 
phospholipid is indistinguishable from that from a phosphate, after treat­
ment nitrate nitrogen appears the same as that from an amine. With addi­
tional effort, differences can be identified, but the problem is obvious.
 
The information available from the inventory would be more com­
prehensive if the scope were broadened to include all non-ihetallic materials,
 
especially those materials which include their composition elements of
 
biological composition. This list should include those elements such as
 
N, P, S, NA, K, Mg, Ca, Sr, F, Cl, Br, and I for example and any others
 
which have been-found necessary for terrestrial life and are present in
 
non-metallic compounds.
 
F. Future Requirements
 
The compilation of a lunar inventory of possible surface contaminants
 
is predicated upon the fact that future needs will require information con­
cerning the identity of these materials. It is obvious that the space­
craft documentation preserved in its present status cannot answer these
 
projected needs. An assessment of future requirements is needed, since
 
any detailed characterization, indexing or categorization of the documenta­
tion beyond that of identification according to missions is unwarranted
 
(except for Apollo) at this time unless a real demand is expected.
 
A program should be initiated which will enable the prediction of
 
these needs and thereby permit planning to accommodate them. Certain
 
assumptions have been made in this-study concerning future needs, although
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the information needed for valid estimates is not available at this time. 
The first assumption that must be considered is whether or not justifica­
tion exists for expecting that this documentation will be requested. 
The rationale for saying that it will be requested is based upo the 
expectation that the next generation of analytical instrumentation will 
operate at increased sensitivity levels, i.e., where parts per billion 
sensitivities are now commonplace, parts per trillion are likely to be 
obtainable in the near future. If this is indeed the case, background 
levels will have to be examined very carefully, and this may lead to re­
quests for more details on the materials which make up this background. 
Along the same line of thought, a twenty year period recommended
 
for retention of documentation is considered sufficient to cover any
 
future need for the inventory.
 
The information requests received during this period will also
 
establish whether or not more detailed procedures are needed for a storage
 
and retrieval system to manage the information contained in the inventory.
 
G. Maintaining the Inventory
 
During the study, considerable difficulty was experienced in
 
attempting to update the landing parameters and location coordinates for
 
several of the missions. In order to maintain the inventory With the
 
best available information, such data should be frequently reviewed and
 
updated. At present, they are scattered among the agencies responsible for
 
the programs, and become less reliable as the groups change. A central
 
source is needed which can provide this type of information to interested
 
personnel. Since much of this effort is directly related to the manned
 
spacecraft program, MSC, Houston is the logical Center to set up and
 
maintain all data on landing sites, impact characteristics, and other
 
pertinent information on lunar mission hardware. An effort should continue
 
to include all available information on USSR landers as well.
 
In describing the potential usefulness of the inventory, an incident
 
of recent occurrence should be noted. No plans have been made to check
 
the accuracy of the model formulated by Aronowitz for soft landers either
 
E-27 
by analyzing specimens taken near the IM on Apollo 11 and 12, or those
 
taken from the crater containing Surveyor 3. A recent publication
 
describing the 1 exhaust products has been published7 , and has ap­
parently enabled one researcher to identify a fluorescent material as
 
having originated in the 1M exhaust. Considerable benefit would result
 
from verification of this model enabling the prediction of uncontaminated
 
sampling sites, and in the degree of contamination to be expected close
 
to the II.
 
The only discrimination of classes of materials presently
 
available in the inventory documentation is that of the Apollo program
 
which separates out the non-metallic components. This is the only
 
limitation applied to the collection of materials information and is
 
a more realistic distinction than organic/inorganic. By increasing the
 
prescribed scope of the inventory documentation to this extent, possibilities
 
of omission would be decreased considerably at little cost since the
 
Apollo documentation system is already observing this division. If this
 
concept is adopted, the inventory would be capable of providing more com­
-prehensive information than would be possible with an arbitrary elimination
 
of inorganic materials.
 
Additional useful information which could be entered into the
 
Planetary Quarantine computed-based information system includes the loca­
tions of the various sub-sections within the spacecraft documentation and
 
general cross-reference index. To illustrate- Although the spacecraft
 
materials information will not be analyzed or categorized, the primary
 
index titles as utilized by the various contractors in filing the informa­
tion could be carried through. Requests for information relating to a
 
particular subassembly on Ranger VII could also provide file locations on
 
similar subassemblies on Rangers VIII, IX, IV and VI at the same time. If
 
information concerning the desired mission is incomplete similar data for
 
an identical spacecraft could be indicated.
 
Apollo Lunar Module Engine Exhaust Products, B.R. Simoneit,A.L. Burlingame,
 
D.A. Flory and I.D. Smith,Science, Vol.,166, No.3906, Nov. 7, 1969
 
E-28 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
 
It is convenient and useful to present recommendations separately 
for (1) the preservation of'documents and, (2) the implementation of a 
materials information system. The first category deals largely with 
detailed data on types and quantities of materials contained on particular 
flight vehicles for which there may or may not be a demand. The second 
category represents the general methods for providing to potential users 
information on the risk or likelihood of sample contamination and, if 
appropriate, also on the type, quantity and source of the contamination. 
The documentation category is therefore a subelement of the information 
system. However, since action taken on the preservation of documents ­
and more significantly, the lack of such action has an irreversible effect 
on the future usefulness of an information system, the recommendations
 
concerning the preservation of documents require early attention.
 
A. Implementation of an Information System
 
To assure that costs are compatible with known benefits, it is
 
recommended that implementation of an information system be carried out
 
in two steps as follows:
 
1. Preparation of Contamination Risk Model for the Moon
 
Information concerning the likelihood of sample con­
tamination by materials of terrestrial origin (due to prior
 
lunar flights) should be prepared and made available to
 
interested personnel within NASA and the scientific com­
munity. This is most readily accomplished either
 
in tabular form or as a map of pertinent regions of the
 
Moon containing contamination probability "contours".
 
The updating of the system at KSC with all pertinent
 
lunar mission spacecraft parameters is required. The in­
formation is currently not available from a single source,
 
but must be sought from the various responsible agencies.
 
The dispersion models of Aronwatz and Tierney should
 
be programmed into the Planetary Quarantine computer system
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in a manner that will provide identification of surface areas
 
in the vicinity of spacecraft landing sites where contamina­
tion may affect the samples. In order to apply the dispersion
 
models delineated by Aronowitz and Tierney, and to specify
 
their effect on the various sampling sites, the best avail­
able information on the impact parameters and locations of
 
the spacecraft must be applied. This input to the inventory
 
should be updated as better information becomes available.
 
It should be noted that the inclusion of this input to the
 
information system is important in order to provide estimates
 
of the distribution of contaminants over the lunar surface,
 
and to provide an estimate of the probability of a con­
taminated surface sample being drawn from a particular
 
region of the Moon. The more precise these inputs are, the
 
better the estimates will be. Unlike the materials docu­
mentation input which treats U.S. spacecraft alone, this
 
information treats all spacecraft, including those originat­
ing in the USSR.
 
The most important output from this system, initially,
 
is the delineation of the contamination risk areas. The
 
intended Apollo landing sites through Apollo 20 have been
 
tentatively selected. Issuance of the expected contamina­
tion levels (risk areas) in these and adjacent areas would
 
be valuable aids in planning these missions.
 
2. Assessment of Future Requirements
 
With the information no7 available, the precise questions
 
to be expected from investigators of lunar sample materials
 
cannot be predicted at this time with sufficient certainty.
 
Provisions for gaining additional information on potential
 
requirements are therefore necessary.
 
It is recommended that a questionnaire be distributed to
 
recipients of the Lunar Contamination Model. The question­
naire should determine the aim of the research, the general
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techniques and instrumentation to be used, the elements of
 
interest, the interferences, the expected use of the data
 
system, particular types of information desired, and other
 
relevant data. From these questionnaires, estimated usages
 
can be made, conclusions as to indexing requirements can
 
be drawn and the type of retrieval system which will be most
 
useful can be selected.
 
B. Preservation of Documents
 
1. 	Minimum Requirements
 
The fundamental consideration with respect to space­
craft materials documentation is that disposal or loss of
 
pertinent records be prevented so long as a possible need
 
exists for such information to support lunar sample inves­
tigations. The mechanism for preservation of these docu­
ments exists in the retention time requirements imposed
 
upon the various contractors. This should be supplemented
 
by a requirement for notification of the Planetary Quarantine
 
Office prior to disposal or transfer of the documents from
 
their present locations. Implementation of a notification
 
requirement would ensure against inadvertent loss of the
 
information.
 
2. 	Recommended Storage Procedures
 
A more direct approach to the solution of the problem
 
is to order transferral of the documentation, or suitable
 
copies thereof (see below), to the Federal Records Center
 
nearest the cognizant agency at the end of the contractually
 
specified retention time for technical data. The exception
 
is the Apollo documentation. In this area, the COMAT/TRIS
 
system should be expanded to contain the additional docu­
mentation required for all nonhabitat areas, e.g., the
 
descent stage. The documentation need not be completely
 
detailed with respect to test results of flammability or
 
tests of other types pertinent to the current needs of the
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system, but should contain all nonmetallic organic materials
 
information pertaining to amounts, classifications, and
 
specifications of the material. Incoming documentation
 
should be separated into two categories: (1) that which con­
tains no materials information; (2) the remainder. Category
 
(2) should be indexed with a brief descriptive title and
 
entered into the system. The responsibility for locating
 
and transferring the documentation should be shared by the
 
personnel currently managing the system, aided by the
 
prime contractors, North American Rockwell, Grumman Aircraft
 
and the Manned Spacecraft Center. The urgency of this move
 
cannot be overstressed since construction of the remaining
 
Apollo spacecraft is now virtually complete and personnel
 
now assigned to these projects are likely to be transferred.
 
With this action, the location of many documents in the
 
hands of suppliers will become obscured. The documents
 
pertaining to the habitability areas of the CM and LM are
 
necessary, but in themselves not sufficient for the inventory,
 
because the descent stage of Apollo 10 will impact at a
 
future date, and the ascent stage from Apollo 12 impacted
 
on November 20, 1969.
 
3. Suitable Copy Recommendations
 
Of the formats described previously, the one that is most
 
suitable for both present and evisioned future needs is the
 
aperture card. It is readily indexed in any way desired,
 
lends itself to rapid and selective retrieval, requires
 
little storage space in relation to the amount of informa­
tion it can carry and is durable enough to withstand a great 
deal of handling. It is therefore recommended that the 
aperture card be established as the standard copy for all 
information to be copied for transferral, and that this also 
be the form that any future indexing or categorization 
should follow. 
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A requirement should be issued that the documentation
 
concerning nonmetallic materials, their specifications,
 
and other pertinent data, but excluding such items as
 
flammability tests, for all future lunar missions be sent
 
to the COMAT system for inclusion into the inventory.
 
This will aid in keeping future search costs down. It
 
is likely that little further documentation can be ex­
pected under the Apollo requirements except for the Lunar
 
Vehicle, but this will constitute a large amount of
 
material input that will not have to be processed at a
 
later date. This can also accommodate the inputs from
 
the possible lunar orbit shuttle-vehicles for extended
 
exploration of the surface.
 
In the event that requests from principal investigators
 
warrant the additional effort necessary to provide more
 
specific information concerning the organic materials, it
 
is recommended that the COMAT/TRIS system format be used
 
as a nucleus for an active inventory system.
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
 
Contract NAS-1734 was initiated 23 April 1968. It specified anal­
ysis and planning activities to support NASA's Planetary Quarantine (PQ)
 
Office in four areas, viz.
 
Review and Interpretation of Planetary
 
Quarantine Requirements
 
Analysis of Microbial Survival
 
Development and Application of Pertinent
 
Analytical Techniques
 
Implementation of a Lunar Chemical Con­
tamination Inventory
 
The results of the work in these areas is reported herein Where pre­
liminary findings have already been presented in interim reports, these
 
are referenced Copies of these interim documents are appended in those
 
cases where their content is felt necessary to support the material
 
presented herein.
 
A WORK ELEN3TNTS
 
A listing follows of the work elements involved in the four tasks
 
enumerated above
 
(1) - RevieT and Interpretation of Planetary Quarantine Requirements 
Development of an approach to the justification
 
of modified PQ requirements
 
Review of PQ requirements for proposed Planetary
 
Explorer Missions to Mars and Venus.
 
Review of Mars Mariner 169 PQ Plan
 
Review of Viking Project PQ Provisions document.
 
Development of plans for the review of Viking
 
PQ related documents.
 
(2) Analysis of Microbial Survival
 
Survival curve analysis.
 
Study of physical processes in microbial resis­
tance to sterilization.
 
(3) Development and Analysis of Pertinent Analytical Techniques
 
Analytical estimation of buried contamination
 
Study of microbial release through material
 
break up and erosion.
 
(4) Planetary Chemical Contamination
 
Planning for the implementation of a Chemical
 
contamination inventory.
 
B. DELIVERED PRODUCTS
 
Among the products delivered under this contract are
 
Exotech Inc., Systems Res. Div.: An Analytical Basis
 
for Assaying Buried Biological Contamination. Appendix C.
 
Report no. TRSR-036. Jan. 1969.
 
Exotech Inc., Systems Res. Div.: Implementation of a
 
Chemical Contaminant Inventory for Lunar issions.
 
Appendix E. Report TRSR 70-07. Dec. 1969.
 
Barrett, M. J.* Investigations into a Diffusion Model
 
of Dry Heat Sterilization. Appendix B. Report no. TRSR-041,
 
Systems Res. Div., Exotech Inc., May 5, 1969.
 
DeGraff, E.. Review of JPL Report 605-87, Mariner Mars 1969
 
PQ Plan. Systems Res. Div., Exotech Inc., Memo., Aug. 21, 1968.
 
NASA Headquarters Review of Viking PQ Plans. A Document Pro­
viding Background Information for Reviewers of Viking Plans.
 
Space Bioscience Research material dated Nov. 5, 1969 for
 
Code SB Document on Applications.
 
Proposed Planetary Chemical Contamination Requirements statement,
 
Feb. 1969.
 
Guidelines for Review of JPL-Martin Bioburden Accumulation Model,
 
Nov. 13, 1969.
 
Exotech Inc., Systems Res. Div , Monthly Letter Status Reports
 
as Required by the Contract.
 
C. PRESENTED PAPERS
 
"Potential Effects of Recent Findings on Spacecraft Sterilization
 
Requirements", presented at the llth Plenary Meeting of COSPAR,
 
Tokyo, Japan, May 14, 1968.
 
Report on "Development of Analytical Techniques in Planetary
 
Quarantine", presented at Semi-Annual Planetary Quarantine
 
Seminar, Cape Kennedy, June 10, 11, 12, 1968.
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"Effects of Mated D-Values on Terminal Sterilization Cycle",
 
presented to Subcommittee 1A of PQAC, University of Minnesota, 
July 25 - 26, 1968.
 
"Stochastic Diffusion Model for Microbial Survival in Heat
 
Sterilization", presented at Semi-Annual Planetary Quarantine
 
Seminar, Cape Kennedy, February 11 - 12, 1969.
 
"Systems Approach to Compliance vith PQ Requirements", presented
 
at Semi-Annual Planetary Quarantine Seminar, Cape KennLdy,
 
February 11 - 12, 1969.
 
"Estimation of the Mean Concentration of Microorganisms Buried
 
in Spacecraft Materials", presented at Semi-Annual Planetary
 
Quarantine Seminar, Cape Kennedy, February 11 - 12, 1969
 
"Tradeoff Studies in Heat Sterilization',' presented to a committee
 
of the Space Science Board at Stanford University on April 19, 1969.
 
"Consequencesof Stochastic Diffusion of Moisture in Microbes",
 
presented at Semi-Annual Planetary Quarantine Seminar, Las Vegas,
 
September 24 - 25, 1969.
 
"Application of a Systems Model for Spacecraft Sterilization",
 
presented at Semi-Annual Planetary Quarantine Seminar, Las Vegas,
 
September 24 - 25, 1969.
 
D. OTHER MEETINGS ATTENDED
 
Additional meetings attended include:
 
PQAC, NASA/Hdgts., October 1968.
 
Microbiological Assay Standardization Meeting,
 
NASA/Hdqts., December 13, 1968.
 
Planetary Explorer PQ Meeting, NASA/Hdqts
 
January 29, 1969.
 
Taft Health Center, Cincinnati, Ohio, April 22, 1969 -
Review of Experimental Data on Microbial Die Off, 
Lunar Sample Analysis Symposium, 157th National Meeting
 
American Chemical Society, Minneapolis, Minnesota,
 
April 13 - 18, 1969.
 
Viking Planetary Quarantine Review Meeting, Martin Co.,
 
Denver, Colorado, October 22, 1969.
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II. RESULTS
 
Because extensive material has already been reported in interim
 
documents and papers, those results will not be duplicated in this
 
final report Where previous findings are felt necessary for the
 
reader, they are provided in summarized form or appended
 
The material presented herein extends and complements this pre­
vious work. It is reported in the sequence of the four tasks enumerated
 
in the previous section.
 
A. REVIEW AND INTERPRETATION OF PQ REQUIREMENTS 
The pre-contract status of planetary quarantine standards, their
 
formulation and their impact upon spacecraft programs was summarized in
 
a paper presented at the l1th Plenary Meeting of COSPAR on May 11, 1968,
 
in Tokyo, Japan.
 
Although the work summarized at COSPAR was supported under earlier
 
contracts (NASw-1558 and NASw-1666), a copy of the paper is attached
 
(Appendix A) because it adds to the prospective of the work reported here­
in. The formulation of planetary quarantine standards was shown to be a
 
continuing effort requiring a compromise between the assurance of the pre­
vention of planetary contamination and the minimization of the impact of
 
quarantine requirement on planetary missions. It was suggested that further
 
work in several areas could lead to less severe sterilization requirements
 
for planetary spacecraft than had been considered necessary in the past.
 
Such areas for further research include tasks undertaken in the study reported
 
herein. Of specific interest in this regard are-

Estimation of buried contamination.
 
Analysis of release of buried contamination.
 
Microbial resistance to sterilization processes
 
Work in these areas is reported in Tasks B and C.
 
IExotech Incorporated, Potential Effects of Recent Findings on Space­
craft Sterilization Requirements, May 1968, also Space Life Sciences 1 (4)
 
March (1969) 520-530.
 
The focus of activity in this initial task of contract NASw-1734
 
was in the application of planetary quarantine requirements. This is
 
typified in the review of PQ constraints conducted in January 1969 for
 
two proposed Planetary Explorer missions to orbit Venus and Mars. Pro­
babilities of contamination for the two missions were computed based
 
upon COSPAR constraints and estimates made by NASA's Planetary Program
 
Office of the total number of different missions to be conducted within
 
the quarantine period by all nations. The characteristics of the pro­
posed Planetary Explorer missions were reviewed in the light of these PQ
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requirements. An analysis performed by Bird Engineering Research
 
Associates Inc. of the probability of contamination for the two missions
 
was reviewed for accuracy and completeness.
 
Spacecraft project plans and provisions for compliance with PQ
 
requirements were studied. In particular, the Planetary Quarantine
 
Plan proposed for Mars Mariner 1969 was assessed.3 The Viking project
 
PQ Provisions document4 was reviewed for compliance with PQ standards.
 
In addition, plans were developed for the systematic review of further
 
Viking project PQ related documents including:
 
The PQ Plan
 
The Microbiological Assay and Monitoring Plan
 
The Sterilization Plan
 
Methodology for the development and evaluation of feasible alternative
 
approaches for compliance with PQ constraints was presented in the Semi-Annual
 
Planetary Quarantine Seminar at Cape Kennedy in February 1969.
 
2Letter report 24 February 1969, Bird Engineering Research Associates Inc.
 
to GSFC, Code 724 "Preliminary Report on Planetary Explorer Contamination Problem."
 
3Exotech letter 21 August 1968, subject. Review of JPL Report 605-87
 
4Langley Research Center document, "Viking Planetary Quarantine Provisions",
 
No. M73-109-0, February 20, 1969.
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B. 'A LYSIS OF MICROBIAL SURVIVAL
 
lKnowledge of the life and death processes of microorganisms is
 
essential to the development of realistic PQ requirements and NASA's
 
Planetary Quarantine Office has directed several research efforts in
 
a total program with the objective of expanding this knowledge
 
Exotech's efforts in this program involved a study of microbial resis­
tance to sterilization. An earlier report5 had suggested the advantages
 
of log-normal over the simpler logarithmic model to describe the decay
 
of viable microorganisms when subjected to heat sterilization This
 
report recommended that further analyt3 cal work be complemented by phy­
sical modeling and be closely related to measured laboratory parameters.
 
The exceptional resistance of microbial spores to sterilization by
 
heat had long been observed in laboratory tests The lack of a cohesive
 
theory to explain this behavior, however, represented a weakness in the
 
development of a defensible basis for the formulation of sterilization
 
requirements. Exotech attempted under this contract to form an empirical
 
framework from fragmentary theories and hypotheses so as to relate the
 
effectiveness of environmental factors on dry heat sterilization as prac­
ticed in the NASA planetary quarantine program.
 
Earlier work reviewed included the "water activity" theory of Murrell
 
and Scott 6 who observed experimentally the existence of an optimum water con­
tent in the spore that maximizes spore resistances to heat destruction,
 
, and more recent research
water and heat effect measurements by Angelott 
7
 
5 Schalkowsky & Wiederkehr "Estimation of Microbial Survival in Heat
 
Sterilization" COSPAR Technique Manual No. 4, November 1968.
 
6W . G. Murrell and W. J. Scott, "The Heat Resistance of Bacterial Spores
 
at Various Water Activities", J. Gen Microbiol. 43, 411-425 (1966).
 
7R. Angelotti, "Protective Mechanisms Affecting Dry-Heat Sterilization",
 
COSPAR Technique Manual Series, Manual No. 4, November 1968.
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of water intake and release by Campbell and coworkers . Various
 
mechanisms have been considered in an effort to explain this often­
observed non-logarithmic heat destruction characteristic of spores in
 
terms of their water content and its changes.
 
In the model under investigation the heat resistance of spores
 
is attributed to the partial dehydration of some unidentified but
 
vital protein in the cytoplasm. During sporulation, chemical binding
 
of water to this protein is inhibited by the chelating agent, calcium
 
dipicolinate. This action frees nonessential water molecules, which
 
can then be squeezed from the cell by the surrounding cortex that
 
appears to contract as the spore forms. During wet heat sterilization,
 
water diffuses through the outer layers of the spore and interchanges
 
with the chelating agent, thus, increasing the susceptability of the
 
vital protein to denaturation, resulting in nonviable spores. The large
 
differences between resistances of species may be due to the variable
 
efficiency of the outer layers in inhibiting water diffusion. The great
 
-difference in heat resistance of B subtilis and B. stearothermophilus
 
in aqueous solutions, which essentially disappears in dry heat sterili­
zation, can be attributed to this diffusion effect
 
A time dependence of the spore's water activity can be predicted
 
on the basis of a diffusion mechanism whereby loosely bound water migrates
 
from one molecule in the microbe to another, with a mobility determined by
 
the temperature and the existing gradient, according to well-kno'in physical
 
laws of diffusion.
 
A technical report was presented at the February 1969 Semi-Annual
 
Planetary Quarantine Seminar at Cape Kennedy and early results were sub­
mitted in Exotech report TRSR-041, "Investigations into a Diffusion Model
 
of Dry Heat Sterilization", May 1969, attached as Appendix B. Further
 
results on this effort were reported at the Semi-Annual Planetary Quarantine
 
Seminar in Las Vegas in September 1969. At that time the existence of two
 
8 
Private communication, J. E Campbell, PHS, Cincinnati, Ohio.
 
11-4 
distinct bonding sites for water in B. subtilis was demonstrated from
 
data 9 supplied by Campbell A sample of the evidence presented for this
 
conclusion is given in Figure 1, which is a replot of the experimental
 
measurements, demonstrating that the rate of water release can be
 
described by the sum of two exponentials. This supports the theoretical
 
framework of the diffusion approach, but further work vould be necessary
 
to identify and locate the two sites within the spore.
 
The implications of this work to the quarantine program are signi­
ficant. First, it promises an analytical basis for the observed deffi­
ciencies in the simple logarithmic description of the microorganism
 
die-off curve. The existence of a significant "tail off" in this curve
 
can perhaps be quantitatively defined and predicted, thus, providing a
 
defensible basis for the design of realistic sterilization cycles. This
 
work also suggests the advisability of monitoring or perhaps controlling
 
the humidity levels during assembly of spacecraft to modify the contami­
nants present for greatest susceptibility to subsequent sterilization con­
ditions. Perhaps a low temperature preconditioning cycle during which the
 
water activity is equilibrated at some sensitive value could precede high
 
temperature sterilization to make it more effective. Finally, water con­
tent of such materials as lucite and epoxy might be controlled during manu­
facture to make their buried contaminants more susceptible to sterilization.
 
C. DE\ELOPIENT AND APPLICATION OF PERTINENT ANALYTICAL TECENIQUES 
The need for improved estimation of the amount of buried contamination
 
and of its probability of release was indicated in earlier work (gee page 2)
 
as worthy of further study. The difficulties in detecting and enumerating
 
buried contamination derive from their inaccessibility. To overcome this,
 
the contaminated material may be physically shattered or chemically dis­
solved and the resultant released microorganisms then counted. In both cases,
 
however, there are serious questions of the validity of the yield since die­
off can occur in the release processes.
 
9Private communication, J. E. Campbell, PHS, Cincinnati, 
Ohio.
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FIGURE 1
 
RATE OF WATER RELEASE AT 300
 
-4t4- 30 0 
--- -- -zz----- i 
- -- --- --L __ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 minutes
 
Rate (mg/sec) at which water is released by a sample of B. subtilis
 
spores in a current of dry air at 300C. (Datus points, provided by
 
Dr. J. E. Campbell of the Taft Health Center, Cincinnati, Ohio, have
 
been corrected for background wyater release. Straight lines indi­
cate that the sum of two exponentials would reproduce measurements
 
after an initial build-up period.)
 
A statistical assay technique originally suggested by Mr. L. Hall,
 
NAS Planetary Quarantine Officer, was further developed by Exotech and
 
1o0
 
a protocol proposed for its application (See Appendix C). The statis­
tical assay technique does not require that all microorganisms contained
 
in the material be recovered but produces an upper bound estimate based
 
upon assay results of new surface exposed by minor fracturing which in­
troduces minimum lethality.
 
The procedure requires the controlled fracture of representative
 
samples of a material whose buried loading is of interest. Each sample
 
is tested for biological contamination on the totality of new surfaces
 
exposed as a result of the fracturing process The basic datum or ob­
servation consists of the proportion of samples which yield contamination
 
upon culturing. Conventional statistical techniques, combined with an
 
analytical expression relating the mean concentration of organisms buried
 
within the material and the observed datum, produce an upper bound esti­
mate for the unknown mean concentration, expressed to any prescribed level
 
of confidence. In principle, the'bonfidence level" of the resulting esti­
mate is directly related to the sample size and the amount of surface area
 
exposed by fracture, as the sample size and exposed area increase, the
 
difference between the estimate and the unknown mean load tends to decrease.
 
The procedure can be very useful in the development of more realistic
 
spacecraft sterilization specifications where the sterilization cycle is
 
sensitive to the estinated number of buried contaminants. In particular,
 
a significant decrease in the severity of the cycle may be possible if
 
realistic estimates of the buried bioloads can be developed. (These bene­
fits are not restricted to spacecraft applications but could also be
 
extended into sterilization processes in the food and drug and other spin off
 
areas.)
 
10Exotech Incorporated, TRSR-036, "An Analytical Basis for Assaying
 
Buried Biological Contamination", January 1969.
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A preliminary analysis of the probability of microbial release
 
of buried contamination considered two release mechanisms, viz., break
 
up in hard impact and aeolian erosion. Further, it formulated analytic
 
expressions for the probability of release as a function of pertinent
 
parameters and identified areas of uncertainty.
 
Specifically, the fracture ratio, i.e., the ratio of newly exposed
 
area to the initial volume of material, upon which the non-nominal land­
ing probability of release is especially sensitive,was one area of study.

12
 
The results of impact tests conducted by the Boeing Aircraft Company
 
were reviewed and a method was devised for accounting for impact die off.
 
The ratio of the viable spores recovered from the fragmenLs to the initial
 
load seeded into the pellet is a product of the release depth, the fracture
 
ratio and the degree of impact die off. Values for release depth can
 
confidently 13 be assigned in the i to 3 micron range. Fracture ratios can
 
be determined by physical measurement of the recovered fragments. The
 
accuracy of this measurement varies with the number and size of the frag­
ments and has yet to be quantitatively bounded.
 
when values for release depth and fracture ratio are assigned, the
 
recovered lethality ratio is then a direct measurement of the impact die
 
off. This method of analysis will be applied when additional impact data
 
becomes available.
 
t1 Exotech Incorporated, TRSR 70-03, "Development and Application of
 
a System Model for Spacecraft Sterilization", August 1969.
 
12S. J. Fraser, "Survival and Release of Viable Microorganisms After
 
a Hard Impact", Boeing Company report #D2-114143-1, May 27, 1968
 
13N. J. Peterson, R. G. Cornell, and J. R. Puleo: 
')elease of Micro­
bial Contamination from Fractured Solids!' Paper presented at lth Plane­
tary Meeting of COSPAR, Tokyo, Japan, May 1968
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Further study of theoretical fracturing may provide an insight
 
into fracturing mechanisms. An upper bound to the area exposed dur­
ing impact can be calculated from the kinetic energy at impact,
 
knowing the energy required for a unit area of fracture. The materials
 
of interest are mostly noncrystalline, buried viable spores are incon­
ceivable in metal structures. Measurements in polymeric materials
 
give 0.5 in.-lb/in2 (about l0' erg/cm2) for energy per unit area of
 
14
 
fracture. This estimate may be useful for preliminary upper-bound
 
calculations of fracture associated with hard impact landings. Further
 
work remains in this area.
 
Microbial release due to aeolian erosion was also studied and is
 
reported in Appendix D 1 5 . Although a model has been developed, conclu­
sions as to nhether a release factor significantly less than unity for
 
Mars can be invoked will require an agreed upon estimate of Martian
 
meteorology. It is well known that astronomers have interpreted shift­
ing haze that occasionally obscures the planet's features as being due
 
..to large sandstorms. Sand or dust is, of course, a major erosion agent,
 
and simulations of the erosion effect of postulated sandstorms have been
 
16

reported . Analysis of the photography of the planet's surface by
 
Mariner 6 and 7 tends to support the sandstorm hypothesis: the scarcity
 
of small craters in the size distribution can be accounted for by an
 
erosion process.
 
14M. L. Williams, "The Fracture of Viscoelastic Material" in
 
Fracture of Solids, D.C. Drucker and J. J. Gilman (ed,), Interscience (1963)
 
15M. J. Barrett and J. 1. Woodall: The Release of Buried Microbial
 
Contamination by Aeolian Erosion. Exotech Report No. TRSR 70-14.
 
16G. Dyhouse, "Simulated Martian Sand and Dust Storms and Effects on
 
Spacecraft Coatings", ASTM/IES/AIAA Second Space Simulation Conference
 
(Sept. 1967). Am. Soc Testing Materials, 1967, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
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i A second area of uncertainty that deserves investigation is the
 
pos Ibility of spore destruction during the erosion process The di­
mensions of a spore, typically on the order of a micron, are consi­
derably smaller than those of the average sand particle encountered
 
on Earth. Those dust particles in the micron range are generally more
 
dominant in the stratosphere, and particle size can be loosely correlated
 
with altitude since smaller size permits particles to be carried higher
 
and farther by the wind. Presumably, the same mechanisms apply on Mars,
 
and a lander in a Martian dust storm would be pelted by particles con­
siderably larger than a spore. The erosion model to be applied, there­
fore, is aklin to the use of boulders in chipping away seeds. One sus­
pects a significant amount of lethality in this process.
 
Further study should concentrate on areas most conducive to per­
mitting the unit value of probability of release to be reduced thereby
 
alleviating sterilization cycle requirements. Analysts should be con­
ducted to identify the areas of uncertainty where additional knowledge
 
--	 will produce the maximum benefit. Each factor should then be reviewed 
to permit selection of those most achievable within time and resource 
constraints. Effort should be expended only so long as a payoff in 
terms of further relaxation of the probability of release will result. 
C. CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION
 
A common prereqjisite for space exploration is the absence of con­
tamination by terrestrial material in the area being explored. In the
 
search for biological life, this concern has led to the establishment of
 
rigorous planetary quarantine standards. The danger, however, exists in
 
all science fields where experiment objectives can be compromised by the
 
undesired introduction of unknown quantities of'foreign" matter.
 
In previous work 
17
, Exotech studied the problems of unintentional
 
contamination of lunar samples to be returned to Earth for analysis.
 
1 7Exotech Incorporated, TRSR 68-029, "Planning Study for an Organic
 
Constituents Inventory Program", May 1968.
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Adopting a philosophy that absolute purity cannot be guaranteed and that
 
some contamination will be introduced by astronauts, vehicle ejecta and
 
the capsule environment, an approach was developed %7hich attempts to
 
identify and quantify the types and levels of expected contamination.
 
This is achieved by establishing an inventory of organic materials con­
tained in Lunar landing spacecraft as part of an information system
 
which can identify regions of high contamination risk and the probable
 
contaminating materials.
 
The study undertaken in this contract defines the initial step in
 
the implementation of the above approach. It considers the detailed pro­
cedures and tasks necessary to collect, evaluate, store and disseminate
 
data which will serve anticipated needs of lunar sample investigators,
 
consistent with the requirement that costs associated with implementation
 
and operation of the inventory be compatible with known needs for this
 
information. The primary tasks pertinent to this effort involved
 
(1) determining the availability of lunar mission vehicle documentation 
- and the means for collecting it in a form suitable for future evaluation, 
(2) the collection and utilization of spacecraft trajectory parameters,
 
landing sites, and dispersion patterns for crash and soft landings, and
 
(3) evaluation of the compatibility of required data inputs with an exist­
ing Planetary Quarantine information system. The final report 1 8 of this
 
effort is appended.
 
Should further implementation be warranted, future efforts should
 
include the following-

Retention of documentation identifying types and
 
quantities of chemical materials in lunar mission
 
spacecraft landers.
 
18Exotech Incorporated, TRSR 70-07, "Implementation of a Chemical
 
Contaminant Inventory for Lunar Missions," December 1969
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Designation of a Federal Records Center to receive
 
these documents and organization of a suitable filing
 
system
 
Preparation of a contamination risk model of the
 
lunar surface based on the best available estimates
 
of spacecraft landing sites and the particle disper­
sion associated with the mass and velocity charac­
teristics of hard and soft landers.
 
Dissemination among lunar sample investigators, and
 
others associated with the planning of lunar scienti­
fic exploration, of information concerning the docu­
mentation to be kept in storage.
 
With the advent of landing missions to the planets of the solar
 
system, siilar attention is warranted to the question of chemical con­
tamination by terrestrial material. The study should be extended to
 
consider the acquisition of documentation and material samples from
 
planetary flight missions. Information requirements of current and
 
potential experimenting scientists who will analyze planetary materials
 
should be collected. Information system designs xhich can serve these
 
needs for data on material contamination should be formulated.
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III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
 
1. 	 Planetary quarantine requirements, policies and constraints should
 
be reviewed in the light of past experience and new knowledge to
 
insure that maximum possible relaxation of sterilization specifi­
cations is realized.
 
The implication on planetary quarantine requirements for approved
 
flight projects of reconmendations made by the Space Science
 
Board 	at its December 11, 1969 meeting should be evaluated.
 
2. 	 Flight project quarantine plans should be evaluated for their respon­
siveness to NASA PQ requirements and compatibility with accepted
 
practices for their implementation.
 
3. 	 Past planetary flights should be evaluated to develop realistic
 
levels for the probability of contamination for future missions.
 
4. 	 The probability that microorganisms contained on landing spacecraft
 
will be released in a viable state on a planetary surface should be
 
further studied. The effect of fracture upon impact and aeolian
 
erosion during the period of biological exploration and the survi­
vability of microorganisms in the course of the above release mechanisms
 
should be considered.
 
5. 	 Analytical models should be developed to facilitate the implementation
 
of planetary quarantine requirements on flight projects through the
 
utilization of new laboratory data or related technological progress in
 
the following areas:
 
(a) 	Estimation of microbial contamination in spacecraft
 
environments.
 
(b) Dry heat resistance of microorganisms on open sur­
faces, mated surfaces and buried contamination in
 
spacecraft equipment. Microbial die off in dry heat
 
sterilization should be further analyzed with empha­
sis on the role of moisture content.
 
(c) 	Thermal dynamics in heat sterilization of space­
craft equipment.
 
(d) 	System tradeoff model encompassing all relevant
 
factors prior to, during, and after the applica­
tion of heat sterilization.
 
6. 	 The requirements for a planetary chemical inventory should be
 
studied. Potential information requirements of scientists who
 
will perform analyses of planetary materials to be collected
 
during planetary flight missions should be identified, other
 
material information systems should be investigated for their
 
applicability.
 
7. 	 A quarantine document system should be designed specifically
 
oriented to serve the management of planetary quarantine on
 
flight missions.
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APPENDIX A
 
Potential Effects of Recent Findings on
 
Spacecraft Sterilization Requirements
 
POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF RECENT FINDINGS 
ON SPACECRAFT STERILIZATION REQUIREMENTS 
S. Schalkowsky( 2) , L.B. Hall (1 ) and R. C. Kline(2 ) 
ABSTRACT 
An important task related to the formulation of planetary quarantine 
standards is the achievement of an acceptable compromise between (1) the 
prevention of planetary contamnation and (2) the impact of quarantine 
requirements on the conduct of planetary nssions. Such a task is a con­
tinuing effort which must take all pertinent new information into account as 
it becomes available. This paper provides an analytical framework for the 
assessment of data which has become available during the past year or which 
is currently being evolved. In particular, an evaluation is made of the prob­
ability of release of viable organisms from the spacecraft as a function of- (1) 
impact velocity magnitudes and the probability of their occurrence, (2) the 
degree of equipment fracturing at impact velocities, and (3) the number of 
viable oigamsms in spacecraft materials. Work being done to quantify each 
of three types of contanination, i. e. that on open surfaces, mated surfaces 
and buried contamination, is described in the context of seeking an approach to 
spacecraft sterilization that would be most compatile with the implementation 
of planetary missions. It is concluded that the results of work now in progress 
on spacecraft material fracturing, on the estimation of buried contamination 
loads and on microbial resistance on mated surfaces may lead to less severe 
dry-heat sterilization of planetary spacecraft than had been considered necessary 
m the past. 
'Work reported herein by Exotech Inc. authors has been supported under contract 
NASw- 1558 with the NASA Office of Planetary Programs and under contract NASw­
1666 with the NASA Office of Blosciences. 
(1) National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington, D C. 
(2) Exotech Incorporated, Washington, D. C 
L INTRODUCTION 
The process of specifying spacecraft sterilization requirements encom­
passes numerous factors, many of winch contain considerable uncertainty. A 
suitable analytical model or structure is necessary in order that the various 
factors be properly weighed and their relatiLve impact on requirements assessed. 
This paper summarizes the essential aspects of an extended analytical model, 
beyond that used in the past, to accommodate information which has been devel­
oped in the past year, or which is currently being evolved. The various factors 
currently receiving detailed attention are discussed in this paper and their poten­
tial effects on spacecraft)sterilization requirements assessed. 
This paper reflects some basic premses currently under consideration in 
the implementation of planetary quarantine constraints by the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration of the United States. In particular, the use of gaseous 
treatment for spores is viewed as an effective decontanmnant, but such treatment 
is not considered to provide adequate confidence in the destruction of all viable 
spores present Similarly, emphasis is placed herein on the evolution of dry heat 
sterilhzation requirements, reflecting an earlier choice of this method over radia­
tion sterilization for spacecraft equipment. 
2. 	 MAJOR CONSIDERATIONS IN THE FORMULATION OF
 
STERILIZATION REQUIREMENTS
 
The degree of risk which should be accepted for planetary contamination 
has been the subject of discussion in the past. This aspect of the problem is 
readily summarized in the simple but adequate relataonship, 'COSPAR Info Bull. 
(1966) and NASA (1966),' 
P0 = N P(N) + N' P(N') (1) 
P0 is the probability that the planet will be contaminated in the course of 
planetary exploration and a value agreed upon for this parameter is P, = lx 103, 
'COSPAR Info. Bull (1966)', 
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N and N' are, respectively, the number of landing and non-landing spacecraft 
w1hich are expected to be flown during unmanned planetary exploration and 
P(N) and P(N') are the respective probabilities that any given landing or non­
landing flight wvill cause planetary contamination. Using a total number of 
flights of N+N' = 100 and allowing the contamination probabilities for landing 
and non-landing missions to be equal, it is readily found that the constraint 
- ,on any one mission reduces to P(N) = P(N') :1 x Io0 i.e. the probability 
that any one planetary spacecraft will contaminate the planet should be 
< I x i0 - . In this paper, attention is focused on the requirement P(N) for 
landing missions since it is for these spacecraft that sterilization procedures 
become necessary. As demonstrated in connection with planetary fly-by 
missions, the constraint of 1 x l0 can be met for non-landing missions by 
taking precautionary measures in mission design without having to resort 
to spacecraft sterilization. 
One major area of uncertainty is the probability P(g) of growth and 
spreading on the planet by microbial contamination of terrestrial origin. 
Thus, assuming that a viable terrestrial organism has been deposited onto 
the planet surface, it is necessary to assign a probability that it will grow, 
spread and bias future biological exploration of the planet. For consistency 
with the analytical iiiodel to be used herein, it is essential to note that this 
probability refers to a single viable orgamsm released onto the planet sur­
face, the fact that the probability of planetary contamination is increased if 
more than one viable orgamsm are released is accounted for in the model. 
It can be shown that the ratio P(N)/P(g) is no greater than 
the mean number of viable microorgamsms which can be released onto the 
planet surface by any one landing spacecraft. This ratio is denoted as n(r). 
If P(g) = 1W- 3 , a value currently considered a conservative assessment of 
the growth probability on Mars, then n(r) 10- . From the point of view 
of implementation, n(r) is the controlling planetary quarantine constraint. 
(The "mean" number, as used herein to characterize a microbial count, 
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represents the number to be expected, on the average, over repeated trials. For 
example, n = I x 10-2 implies that if a count was repeated 100 tames, we would, 
on the average, expect to find only one organmsm during one of these counts and 
no organisms in the other 99 counts ) 
The major considerations which enter into the evolution of explicit sterlh­
zation requirements from the planetary quarantine constraint on n(r) are summa­
rized in Figure 1. Thus, the landing spacecraft is partitioned into discrete 
sources of contamination, classified in accordance with actual, physical sub­
assemblies of the spacecraft. The constraint n(r) can therefore be viewed as 
being distributed amongst all of these subassemblies and the requirement is 
that the sum of the n, (r) not exceed the constraint n(r) (The designation ni (r) 
refers to the contribution of the ith subassembly. ) Within each subassembly a 
distinction is also made between the following three sources of biological con­
tamination (1) contamination located on open surfaces, (2) contamination which 
has been occluded between mated surfaces, and, (3) that wich is buried inside 
spacecraft materials. (In Figure 1 the subscript j denotes the particular 
source under consideration and the superscripts %, identify the source as 
being either of the surface, mated or buried type.) 
The above classification of sources emphasizes the fact that any one sub­
assembly in the spacecraft can contain, and usually does contain, all three types 
of contamination sources. The contribution of any one of these sources to the 
problem can be assessed in terms of the major post-launch and pre-launch 
factors shown in Figure 1. The major pre- launch factors are (1) the pre- stell­
lization microbial load at the various spacecraft locations, categorized into sur­
face, mated, or buried types, and (2) microbial resistance to sterilizatlon for 
the three types of contamination. Referring to the major post-launch factors 
in Figure 1, all but one of these relate to the probability that viable organisms 
present in the spacecraft at launch will be released upon arrival at the planet. 
The first tvo factors, i. e. spacecraft impact velocities and the probabilities 
that these impact velocities will occur, are unrelated to the partltomng of the 
spacecraft into subassemblies or contamnnation sources. However, the other 
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o release factors are intimately related to this parntilomng. Thus, in order 
to"evaluate microbial release caused by a crash landing from a particular 
source, it is necessary to know to what degree the impact velocity is attenuated 
at is source. Similarly, the degree of equipment fracturing must be con­
sidered in terms of the physical and design characteristics associated with a 
particular contamination source. 'The last itema noted in the post-launch cate­
gory is the probability of microbial survival in transit and has to do with the 
effects of hard vacuum and ultraviolet rachation during flight to the planet. 
The major elements of a sterilization specification axe shown in the 
last block of Figure 1. To explicitly define these sterilization controls and 
procedures, and to do it in a manner which would meet the requisite planetary 
quarantine constraint, n(r), without unduly constraimng mission implementa­
tion or unnecessarily degrading engineering and scientific mission success 
probabilities, it is necessary to quantitatively account for all of the factors 
shown in Figure 1. 
In view of the above, effort is being applied to gain a better under­
standing of andwherc possible, to quanify the major factors in the pre-launch 
and post-launch categories. In the sections which follow, pertinent aspects of 
these factors are discussed as a preliminary step to the consideration of their 
potential effects on sterilization requirements. 
3.DISCUSSION 
In discussing the individual post and pre-launch factors, it will be rele­
vant to establish the degree to which any one of them is either determinable or 
controllable. The determinability of a factor depends upon how amenable it is 
to measurement and, also, on the degree of confidence which can be placed upon 
the values measured or estimated However, regardless of how well a factor can 
be deternimed, it is equally important to establish the degree to which it is con­
trollable, for it is often possible to confine a factor to below a value which would 
make it a sLgnlfLcant influence on the sterilization requirements 
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3. 1 Initial Microbial Load - n' 5 (a) 
Progress made in assessing and quantifying the imntial microbial load varies 
in accordance with the source category considered Because of the availability of 
suitable experimental techmques, the accumulation of microbial contamnation on 
open surfaces is most readily assessed. Microbial load on mated surfaces is, of 
course, the result of the occlusion of what was at a prior stage an open surface. 
Knowledge of contamination on open surfaces can therefore be transferred, to 
some degree, also to mated surfaces. However, a direct measurement of mated 
surface contamination is not readily made. The measurement of microbial loads 
contained within spacecraft materials is least amenable to effective experimental 
procedures and reliable data m this category are therefore not available. 
Depending upon the size of the spacecraft and controls used ji assembly 
and manufacturing, it is estimated that the microbial load on open surfaces would 
-be in a range between i0) and I7. A proportionate range could be applied to 
mated surfaces. Any estimate of the buried contamination would at tis time be 
largely speculative. However, a reasonable upper bound can be established in 
terms of microbial concentration per unit volume of material, depending upon 
the contamination present during manufacturing and heating or other sterilizing 
factors, which might be natural aspects of the manufacturing or quality assur­
ance processes. 
A recent development which may enhance the estimation of buried con­
taminatlon is associated with the experimental work by'Peterson et al. (1968)'. 
This work was oriented towards the assessment of microbial release, or 
exposure, from fractured material, but it now appears feasible to reverse the 
statistical procedures used and, by fracturing sample spacecraft materials and 
measuring growth on these fractured surfaces, to obtain an estimate of the con­
centration of viable contamination in the materials. 
The imtial load can be controlled or limited during fanal spacecraft 
assembly and to a lesser degree during subassembly. Control derives primarily 
from the use of clean-rooms and/or decontamination procedures. - During compo­
nent manufacture, however, limiting of the contamination load is not too practical. 
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3. 2 Microbial Resistance - D IS' 
The resistance of microorgamsms to dry heat sterilization has been found 
to vary considerably depending upon whether the orgamsms are contained within 
materials, between mated surfaces or on open surfaces. In terms of the loga­
rithmic reduction time, i. e. the D-value, or the time required to reduce the 
population by one decade, the resistance on open surfaces is about 0. 3 hours 
whereas spores in spacecraft materials have shown resistance as high as 5 hours. 
On mated surfaces, imcrobial resistance ranges between 0. 3 and about 4. 4 hours, 
depending upon conditions of moisture-vapor transfer at the mated surface and the 
relative humidity prior to and during sterilization. 
It has been well established in the past few years that moisture plays a 
dominant role in determining the resistance of microorganisms to heat sterilization. 
(Pflug, 1967 and Angelotti, 1967). Further attention is currently being given to under­
standing the role of moisture in a way wbich,illpermatmore effective control over 
sterilization procedures. This is particulaxlyrelevant for mated surfaces, as it 
would be highly desirable to be able to characterize tius type of microbial resis­
tance towards the lower range of the D-values given above and thereby make 
them nearly equivalent to open surfaces. 
3. 3 Spacecraft Impact Velocities - Vh 
The velocity of the spacecraft upon arrival on the planet is critical to the 
consideration of microbial release from the spacecraft. Under nominal soft 
landing conditions, there can be microbial release from external surfaces but 
not from internal surfaces or from the inside of spacecraft materials. In 
general, it can be assumed that so long as spacecraft landing is at nominal soft­
landing velocities, spacecraft equipment will have been designed to operate at 
these velocities without breakup. 
Since hard impact velocities are critical to the estimation of release 
probabilities, it is not adequate to evaluate them in general terms. Specifically, 
it is necessary to establish the explicit events for a given planetary mission 
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,whichwould lead to non-nominal landing conditions and to assess the impact 
velocities, vh, associated with these events. As mission design progresses, 
the quantification of these velocities becomes a feasible task 
3. 4 Probabilities of Impact Velocities - P (vY) 
The explicit events wich lead to impact velocities are related to 
failure modes of particular spacecraft equipments, e. g. deviations from 
planned rmdcourse maneuvers, failures in deorbit equipment, or failures in 
landing deceleration equipment such as parachutes. The probability that a 
particular impact velocity will occur is therefore intimately related to the 
engineering reliability of spacecraft equpment and mission design The 
probabilities of various impact velocities will thus be constrained for engi­
neering reasons and the possibility of closer control for quarantine purposes 
is available, at least in principle. 
3. 5 Attenuation of Spacecraft Velocities - U,, 
As noted n Figure 1, the various release factors must be viewed in the 
context of discrete spacecraft subassemblies and particular sources of con­
tamnation within these subassemblies. It is therefore necessary to ascertain 
what additional effect may result from the attenuation of spacecraft impact 
velocity at the source under consideration. In some instances, such as external 
structural pieces, this may not be too significant a consideration. However, 
some very fragile subassemblies within a functional element of the spacecraft 
may have significant velocity attenuation by virtue of the physical path between 
this element and the point of spacecraft impact. Although a detailed quantifica­
tion of velocity attenuation factors may be difficult, it may be possible to esti­
mate them using well developed theory and empirical knowledge on the shock 
resistance of structural elements in various configurations. The controllability 
of this factor can be similarly characterized, i. P. to the extent that techniques 
are known which will increase impact resistance, they can be utihzed in space­
craft design in appropriate circumstances. 
A-8 
3. 6 Equipment Fracturing - f I (vh"- a) 
In the case of mated and open surfaces, it is assumed that when a critical 
velocity is reached, contamnation from these sources is released. However, in 
the case of buried containmation it is necessary to identify an additional event 
before actual release from the inside of materials can occur Specifically, for 
any assumed impact velocity, it is necessary to establish the degree to which the 
material will break up. This parameter is identified herein as the fracture ratio, f, 
and is given by the ratio of area exposed in the course of impact to the original 
volume of material under consideration. To complete the characterizaion of 
microbial release from materials, it is also necessary to consider a parameter 
noted herein by 'Peterson et al. (1968' as the exposure depth coefficient X.This coef­
ficient can, for the present purposes, be viewed as the depth at the exposed sur­
face to which a microorganism is considered physically free from the material 
and, therefore, released onto the planet surface. 
Peterson et al (1968) has established experimentally the value of K to be 
about 3 microns. In these experiments, the value of X represents, to some 
degree, the amount of penetration of the nutrient medium into the exposed sur­
face. For the present purpose of considering physical release at impact, it 
appears reasonable to assume that the value of X is of the order of the size of 
the microorganism, 'i. e. about 1V. Considering the uncertainty in other param­
eters, it is of little consequence at present whether X is taken to be 1 or 3 
microns. 
Efforts are currently in progress to quantify fracture ratios for typical 
spacecraft materials, based on information in other areas where experimenta­
tion has been carried out. It is also possible to establish upper bounds on the 
value of the fracture ratio by assuming all of the energy at impact to go into 
producing fractured areas. * 
Contributions by Dr. William C. Cooley of Exotech Incorporated on obtaimng
 
upper bounds of f are gratefully acknowledged. ­
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In general, the fracture ratio, f, would be proportional to the square of the 
imf act velocity To obtain some feel for the magnitudes of f, consider a solid cube 
of material a-tout I ft. on each side. 'This volume of material would fracture into 
about 260, 000 pieces when the fracture ratio is about 1, 200 3 /m. A fracture 
ratio on the order of 10 implies pulverization of the material to micron size and 
represents a release probability of uity. 
3. 7 Probability of Microbial Survival in Transit - pitlB (a) 
The effects of ultraviolet radiation on microorganisms located on the exte­
riors of the spacecraft, and the effects of hard vacuum on other microbial con­
tammation, have been considered in the past as possible causes of micxobial 
destruction in transit. The effectiveness of ultraviolet radiation is limited by 
uncertainties on microbial exposure to tis radiation. As regards the destruc­
tive effects of vacuum in interplanetary space, some imtial die- off has been 
observed in laboratory experimentation but the long-term effects have not been 
substantiated to make this a major destructive factor, (Stern, 1968) 
4. ANALYTICAL MODEL 
Equation 2 below provides a basic framework for assessing the effect of 
the various factors discussed above on the development of spacecraft steriliza­
tion requirements. 
P (N)/P (g) n (r:) 
-=II [1 ()Ss. 5 +to."s.t4(Y()k (2) 
The double summation in equation 2 reflects the need to partition the 
requirement, n (r), into the various spacecraft subassemblies and to consider 
within any one subassembly the different contamination sources. The parameter 
k sunmarxizes all of the post-launch factors which influence the stcrilization 
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requirement To permit a reasonably simple presentation, this parameter is 
formulated below under the simplifying assumption that the spacecraft will 
either land at the desired velocity, 1.e. a soft landing, or 	else there Will be 
a single impact velocity denoted by vh, 
1, for exterior surfaces 
K = Pl (a) pfl (r) Pt~ (i)= P(vh), 	 for interior suifaces (3) 
ifv Z vL/i 
0 otherwise 
JF(vb), if "h:vYj /y, j 
01= P j (a) Pj (:) P,4 (r)= (4) 
0, otherwise 
Xflj(vh YI%) P(Vj), if vh1 
kt4 = P3 eja Plt (r)={ 	 1 j/ Yijj(a) - (r) (5) 
0, otherwise 
where k = l07m for f in umtsof /mP 
The velocities, vtm' 8, above represent critical velocities at which the contamination 
contained at indivdual sources will be released onto the planet surface. It is to be 
noted that release from surfaces and mated surfaces is taken to occur only if the 
spacecraft impact velocity exceeds this critical velocity, 	 as modified by the attenu­
ation factor for the source considered. 
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The parameter pSMB (s) in equation 2 denotes the probability that any one 
microorganism will survive sterilization of a specified duration. In the case ofI 
heat sterilization, p' 1 ' (s) could be represented by the corresponding D values, 
VIZ. 
pSMB (s) = 10- t ' (6) 
The Ds' M 8 above, axe the microbial resistances at a constant sterilization temper­
ature and t is therefore the time required to maintain this temperature in order to 
achieve a desired value of P(s). In practice, suitable allowances are made for time 
at transient temperatures in a sterilizing range. For present purposes, t can be 
viewed as representing the terminal sterilization reqmrement. 
The above model, and extensions thereof which allow for a wider spectrum of 
Impact velocities, is appropriate for operational use i developing specific sterah­
zation procedures and controls. The subject matter of this paper is, however, more 
readily treated in terms of the simplified version defined below. 
5. POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF RECENT FINDINGS 
A conservative approach to the implementation of the constraint n (r) would 
result if the spacecraft impact velocity, vt, is taken to be larger than the smallest 
critical velocity, Vsi , at the individual contamination sources. It will also be 
assumed that microbial destruction in transit will be effective only for external sur­
faces. It will therefore be convement to segregate open surfaces into external ones, 
denoted by the superscript s x, and internal surfaces, denoted by . This yields 
the following expressions for n(r) in terms of total initial contamination on open 
and mated surfaces and the various factors previously defined 
SXS10- t/D3
 
n (r) n ' (o)- P (a) 10 +
 
8 (7)+ P(v)[n s (0). 1 t/D +n'(o).10- + 10 -t/DB1 1 8 ()f(' 
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It is evident from equation 7 that the terms for each source category, a. e. 
for iopen surfaces, mated surfaces, and buried contamination, must separately be 
less than the quarantine constraint, n (r). Furthermore, that term in equation 7 
which is largest will necessarily dominate the specification of the sterilizaton 
tume t. The principal questions, therefore, relate to winch of these source 
categories represents the dominant term and whether the dominant term yields 
the smallest terminal sterilization time. A corollory question is whether a pre­
ferred term could be made dominant. Figure I indicates a number of controls 
winch might be made a part of the specification of sterilization procedures for 
the above purpose. For example, design constraints may be imposed on space­
craft impact velocities and/or the probabilities of their occurrence. Similarly, 
some latitude may be available in altering critical velocities of components 
winch may contain large contamination loads, or to improve the velocity attenua­
tion at these sources through appropriate design procedures. Another control is 
that of minmizing the contamination load through the use of clean-rooms and 
related procedures. Some, or all, of these, may be useful. However, to justify 
their use, it must be ascertained that they axe contributing to the reduction of 
a dominant term in equation 7. 
Until recently,a conservative estimate was made of the probability of 
release of buried contamnation. In terms of the parameters defined herein, a 
probability of release of umty is equivalent to a fracture ratio of about ls, 
which implies pulverization of the entire spacecraft. Tis is clearly not a 
reasonable estimate of conditions which are likely to occur. Although work on 
fracture ratios of typical spacecraft materials is still in progress, it is evident 
that the fracture ratio will be significantly lower than that implied in earlier 
estimates In any event, the probability of release must be less than unity by 
virtue of the fact that the probability of non-nonnal landing velocities is less 
than unity. 
Earlier conservative estimates of microbialrelease of buried contami­
nation, combined with the known higher resistance of such contamination to heat 
sterilization, have made buried contamination the dominant term and, necessarily, 
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led to a relatively stringent terminal sterilization requirement Referring to the 
terms in the parenthesis of equation 7, it is likely that work now in progress will 
show the product k Z 1; n1Bj (o) f(vh yt j) to be smaller than nM (o). Tls 
would imply a shift towards mated contamination as a basis for defining steriliza­
tion requirements. Howvever, to benefit from such a shift in any significant way, 
D would have to be sigmffcantly smaller than DE. For, as noted earlier, 
current work sets the value of IP between 0. 3 and 4. 4 hours and the upper 
value is very close to microbial resistance for buried contamination, upon which 
requrements have been based to date. There is thus a need to gain a better 
understanding of both the effects of equilibrium humidity and pressure at the 
mated surfaces during assembly and sterilization. This may then produce a 
D4value of closer to 0. 3 hours, and lessen the ultimate sterilization require­
ments. 
It is also evident from equation 7 that even very low fracture ratios and 
low microbial load for buried contamination could not move sterilization pro­
- cedures to the point -where only gaseous or other non-thermal (or radiation) 
treatment could be used. To permit consideration of the latter approaches, a 
sigmficant change would have to occur in the value of n (r), a. e. either in P(N) 
or P(g). For unless the value of n(r) is on the order of unity, or larger, each 
of the terms on the right side of equation 7 must be siginfcantly less than unity. 
This implies sterilizing methods which can be relied upon to destroy all spores 
present with a high degree of confidence. 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Work currently in progress is focused on the following areas (1) the degree 
of spacecraft equipment fracturing at spacecraft impact velocities, both in mate­
rials and at equipment interfaces, so as to obtain more realistic estimates of 
probabilities of microbial release; (2) microbial resistance to heat steriliza­
tion at mated surfaces and the physical conditions which will determine its magni­
rude, and, (3) estimation of microbial contamination buried in spacecraft material. 
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The above work, combined 'with suitable controls over mission and space­
craft design procedures, may lead to less stringent terminal heat sterilization 
requirements than had been considered necessary in the past. A determination 
of the specific values to be specified for terminal heat sterilization must, how­
ever, await the more detailed quantification of the various parameters discussed 
herein, it will at all times depend upon the values selected for the quarantine 
goal, namely, the probability assigned to the risk of any one landing mission 
contaminating the planet, and the probability estimated for any one viable 
terrestrial microorganism spreading and gro-wing on the planet surface. 
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ABSTRACT
 
The analytical model described in this study formalizes the hypothesis
 
that dry heat inactivation of microorganisms is closely related to the
 
water content of the spore and its micro-environment. Experimental
 
data are examined relative to this model and it appears to be valid.
 
This model is aimed at overcoming the well known deficiencies of the
 
logarithm model.
 
INTRODUCTION
 
Several recent investigations have related environmental con­
ditions other than temperature to microbial spore survival under heat 
sterilization. Murrell and Scott, Angelotti, and Reid have shoun strong 
dependency of dry heat death rates on ambient relative humidity and on 
water content of the spore . Hunnell and Ordall have found that heat causes 
spores to exude calcium and dipicolinic acid (DPA) prior to death, while 
Alderton, Thompson, and Snell show that spores in aqueous suspension have 
improved heat resistance when calcium ions are present.
 
In addition to these correlations with environmental conditions 
during sterilization, spore survival shows correlations with environmental 
conditions that prevailed when the spore formed. Vinter shows heat re­
sistance is affected by calcium and cystine availability during sporulation; 
Murrell and Warth show correlations of heat resistance with five different 
substances found in the spore. 
These investigations show the importance of environment on heat
 
sterilization characteristics. A simple chemical reaction does not appear
 
to be the complete mechanism for spore destruction. Rather, a sequence of
 
'transport of chemicals, notably water, occurs and modulates the rate at
 
which chemical reactions destroy the viability of the spore.
 
In this report we present a diffusion-denaturation model of
 
spore heat resistance that attempts to correlate with the water effects
 
observed, and to provide a basis for determining the efficiency of proposed
 
dry-heat sterilization plans. Such a model is immediately useful in a dry­
beat sterilization program, and also offers promise of eventual under­
standing of the remarkable resistance of spores to heat.
 
*References are listed at the end of this report.
 
DIFFUSION MODEL
 
A model to predict the water content of a spore as a function
 
of time, temperature and initial water concentration within the spore
 
has been developed. The assumptions made are that heat deactivation in
 
spores is due to protein denaturation and that the rate of this reaction
 
is controlled by the water content of the spore core.
 
A spore is composed of an outer coat (cortex plus spore coats)
 
and a central core (cytoplasm) which is the dormant micro-organism. The
 
cortex protects the core from physical damage, chemical contamination
 
and rapid wetting by the environment. The cortex is mainly composed of
 
mucopeptide polymers (Warth et al, 1963) with the chains twisted and
 
coiled or interwoven (Mayall and Robinow 1957). The coat is mainly pro­
tein with a high cystine disulphide bond content.(Vintcr 1961).
 
The heat resistance of spores is assumed to rest in the ability
 
to control the amount of waLer internal to the spore. A contractile cor­
tex system (Lewis, Snell and Burr 1960) would provide a mechanism to de­
hydrate the oytoplasm and maintain it in this state. Chemical variation
 
in the mucopeptide of the cortex and in the amount of Cu -+ or Ca-DPA
 
(Young 1959) binding to the mucopeptide iThich may cause the contraction,
 
could result in differences in the degree of contraction and therefore in
 
the final water content of the spore, resulting in marked difference in
 
heat resistance.
 
In the development of this diffusion model we have assumed a
 
simplified spore structure composed of an outer coat of negligible thick­
ness at a radius surrounding a spherical, homogeneous one.
 
Water transport thru the spore can be described by the well known
 
diffusion equation
 
DV2C = dC (1)dt
 
where C is the concentration of water/cm, as a function of position and
 
time. D is a diffusion coefficient depending on the medium.
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Figure 1. ode) of Spore 
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For a simple example, assume the initial water content in a
 
spherical spore is distributed radially according to
 
rC(r) b -n - " -s-in 2rrr (2 
[sinIS b jb (2) 
where C(r) is the Water concentration at a distance r from the center of
 
the spore, and b is the radius of the spore (see Fig 1). This expression,
 
as seen in Figure 2, corresponds to a distribution that is peaked in the
 
outer portion of the spore, and can be considered as approximating the
 
case where a spore contains more water than an optimum amount. This ex­
cess water is stored in the cortex.
 
Applying the diffusion equation to this initial distribution re­
sults in the time variation shown in Figure 3. Water diffuses inward to
 
the cytoplasm, and the spore gradually loses water to the medium. As a
 
result, the initially-dry central region reaches a peak concentration of
 
water that occurs around a time t given by 
D t 1.5 (3) 
b 
where D is the diffusion coefficient of the system. This simple model 
assumes D to be independent of position. As a result, it approximates the
 
situation when the spore is buried in an appropriate medium, since normally
 
one Would expect the diffusion coefficient of vater outside a spore to dif­
fer from D inside the spore.
 
Data have been reported by Angelotti (1966) for the thermal ster­
ilization of spores in lucite. These data (Fig 4) indicate the death rate
 
to be greatest at about 1.5 hours after commencing to heat the spores at
 
12500. Using this value for t, in the above equation, xye arrive at an es­
timate for the diffusion coefficient at 125°0
 
D = 1.2.10- a (cm2 /sec) (4) 
This estjmate is in reasonable agreement With values for diffusion of protein 
molecules in water (Clark, p. 138). Our example requires the opposite water 
molecule diffusion in protein, which has-an unknown diffusion coefficient, 
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an iPurther assumes this coefficient does not differ greatly from water 
diffusion in lucite. 
One method of evaluating the diffusion coefficient, which is 
necessary if a diffusion model is to be applied to dry sterilization, is 
to look at wet sterilization curves. Such curves are shown in Figure 5 
for four temperatures. In wet heat, the spores should absorb water to 
some maximum. Then, the denaturation of proteins in the spore, With this 
water present, results in a straight logaritlnmc curve for survivors, as 
a function of time of heating. 
Such a description fits the curves shown. The knee of each
 
curve represents the time at which the cytoplasms of the spores are in
 
equilibrium with the external water. For a purely exponential buildup of
 
water, this occurs about when three relaxation times have passed, accord­
ing to diffusion kinetics. The diffusion coefficient calculated by this
 
method can be fitted to a formula
 
60 K cal
 
D D e H/RT ,where R = 1.98
 
(H = 

o T = temperature (OK) (5)

D Constant
 
Results of the calculations are shown in Figure 6, together with the diffu­
sion coefficient calculated as Eqn. 5. The two sets of experiments seem
 
to be in fair agreeent, and indicate initial success in applying a diffu­
sion model to the data.
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IMPTJCATIONS OF THE MODEL
 
The correlation of water activity with spore resistance in­
dicates that the death mechanism is a denaturation of some vital pro­
tein. Much the same correlation has been observed between protein de­
naturation and water content. Furthermore, the reaction is generally
 
of first-order kinetics, resulting in a logarithmic curve such as is
 
frequently seen for thermal die-off of spore populations.
 
The vital protein is clearly in the cytoplasm, since the
 
outer portions of the spore, shedded during germination, are not vital.
 
This outer portion, the cortex, appears to squeeze water from the cyto­
plasm during the formation of the spore, and thereby provides that there
 
will be a residual concentration that is near the optimum for heat re­
sistance.
 
Part of the heat resistance of spores has been shown to be
 
due to calcium dipicolinate, manufactured during the formation of the
 
spore, and present in the cytoplasm. Ca-DPA is a chelating agent. Pre­
sumably, the vital protein has sensitive bonds that are protected by
 
Ca-DPA and other sensitive bonds protected by water molecules.
 
Germination of the spore presumably requires that the protein
 
be rid of these protections. Excess water can remove the Ca-DPA; the
 
attached vater molecules may separate thermally (heat shock). These
 
separations, if reversible, would be of little help to germination un­
less the protecting molecules stripped from the protein were to leave
 
the cytoplasm. This is the argument for diffusion- it alloWs proteins
 
to react with enzymes, etc., in the germination process without hin­
drance from the former bond-protecting agents. At the same time, the
 
proteins become more sensitive to heat.
 
Diffusion is the random movement of molecules. It is charac­
terized by straight-line paths between molecule interactions, and arbitrary
 
change of direct3on after the interaction. The net result of the ran­
dom motion is a movement of molecules from regions of high density to
 
regions of low density. Frequently, these interactions are mere colli­
sions. In such a case, the diffusion constant D is proportional to
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temperature. A less frequent situation is where the collisions involve
 
chemical reactions. The molecule moves in a straight line, collides
 
and "sticks" to a fixed obstacle, is freed by the action of heat, and
 
moves off in an arbitrary direction. This kind of diffusion, charac­
terized by a diffusion constant as given in Eq. 5, appears to fit the
 
process of water diffusing through the spore cortex.
 
The environmental conditions prevailing during spore forma­
tion have been shown to affect the subsequent resistance of the spore to
 
heat. This, too, is as the model would imply. There is no known
 
mechanism by which the spore can control the water concentration in the
 
cortex and spore coats. As a result, the moisture content of these
 
regions will vary so that they are in equilibrium wlth external con­
ditions. When the spore is heated, the contents of these regions can
 
diffuse inward and outward to affect the heat sensitivity of the spore. 
I These two mechanisms - diffusion and chemical reactions of 
proteins - appear responsible for the survival probability of spores as
 
a function of humidity, temperature and time. Much work remains in the
 
analysis of their quantitative aspects. What are the equilibrium moisture
 
9
contents of spores? What is the water distribution inside the spore

What are the surface transfer properties9 Does the Ca-DPA diffuse, too9
 
What is the protein denaturation reaction that occurs9 H017 many pro­
tein molecules musf denature before the spore becomes nonviable9 The
 
answers to these questions require further study. Many previous experi­
ments, unfortunately, are of little help since not all the pertinent
 
variables were measured.
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-RECOINMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
1. Moisture Content Analysis
 
Measurements of the moisture content of spores are needed.
 
For ease in comparing results of different environments, only one
 
species (B. subtilis var. niger is the accepted norm) should be used
 
and standard harvesting, washing, and drying procedures employed. Se­
lection of procedures is a subject for discussion, but standardization
 
will permit studies of the results to be concentrated on the environ­
mental effects.
 
The environments to which t'he spores are equilibrated can
 
vary in temperature, in humidity, and in length of time of equilibration.
 
Down-side and up-side equilibration need separate studies, in view of
 
the "hysteresis" effect observed. The rate at which spores give off
 
water during an analysis, together with the cumulative water emission,
 
should be measured.
 
These measurements should be analyzed to see whether they con­
form to the hypotheses discussed in this report. Evaluations of dif­
fusion coefficients and surface transfer effects should be possible.
 
2. Correlation of Moisture and Sterilizability
 
Dry beat sterilization, with moisture content as a parameter,
 
has been measured with uncertain results. The understanding gained 
from the analysis above should provide benchmarks for future measure­
ments of spore sterilization rates. The early work sometimes suffered
 
from a lack of determination of the pressure'or the relative humidity
 
during sterilization. The substrate deserves attention, if it has
 
good water transference properties 3t can affect the experiment signLf­
icantly.
 
With knowledge of moistuie transfer properties in the spore,
 
on its surface, and through the environment, it should be possible to
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design crucial experiments where the moisture content and temperature
 
of the spores are known quantities. The die-off of spores under these
 
conditions should be measured. Such experiments include­
(a) Spores in vacuum. The moisture transfer outside the spores
 
is a relatively easy calculation.
 
(b) Spores in non-permeable materials (e.g. epoxy). With different
 
initial moisture contents, spores hould show different die-offs, but
 
each experiment should provide nearly logarithmic curves.
 
(c) Spores in air. Moisture transfer is affected by the relative
 
humidity and this can be varied in a sequence of experiments.
 
(d) Spores of different initial A7 in air.
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SECTION 1 - Introduction
 
SUMMARY AND EVALUATION
 
This document prescribes and evaluates a procedure for estimating upper
 
bounds on the mean concentration of viable organisms buried within
 
individual spacecraft materials.'
 
Presented herein is an analysis of a procedure for assaying biological
 
contamination buried or embedded in spacecraft materials. The procedure
 
requires the controlled fracture of representative samples of a material
 
whose buried loading is of interest. Each sample is tested for bio­
logical contamination on the totality of surfaces exposed as a result of
 
the fracturing process. The basic datum or observation consists of the
 
proportion of samples which yield contamination upon culturing. Conven­
tional statistical techniques, combined wTith an assumed relation between
 
the mean concentration of organisms buried within the material and the
 
observed datum, produce an upper bound estimate for the unknown mean con­
centration, expressed to any prescribed level of confidence. In principle,
 
the "conservativeness" of the resulting estimate is directly related to
 
the sample size and the amount of surface area exposed by fracture, as the
 
sample size and/or exposed area increase(s) the difference between the
 
estimate and the unknown mean load tends to decrease.
 
The procedure, if feasible in terms of accuracies derived, engineering
 
practicality and economics, would be very useful in the specification of
 
realistic spacecraft sterilization requirements. This follows from the
 
fact that sterilization requirements are quite sensitive to the release
 
of buried contamination. Significant decreases in these requirements may
 
be possible if realistic estimates of the buried bio-loads are made avail­
able. Conventional bio-assay techniques are impractical for most applications
 
to spacecraft materials since they require that the materials be either
 
pulverized or dissolved. The procedure discussed herein requires neither
 
of these actions and, moreover, requires no direct counting of viable
 
organisms.
 
There are potential shortcomings in the proposed procedure. In particular,
 
there may be practical engineering difficulties or cost considerations
 
which limit the application of the technique. Moreover, the accuracies
 
resulting from its application could turn out to be less than desired. For
 
these reasons, it is important that tests and further analyses be conducted
 
to resolve these questions before steps are taken to operationally imple­
ment the procedure.
 
*The concept underlying the procedure discussed herein was originally
 
suggested by L. Hall, Office of Biosciences, National Aeronautics and Space
 
Administration.
 
SECTION 2 - Background 
SENSITIVITY OF MISSION REQUIREMENTS TO THE RELEASE OF BURIED 
CONTAMINATION 
Sterilization requirements for individual lander missions are quite sensi­
tive to the release characteristics of buried contamination. Effective
 
techniques for assaying buried contamination could lead to substantial
 
decreases in these requirements.
 
Recent analyses indicate that spacecraft sterilization requirements for
 
planetary lander missions are quite sensitive to the release characteristics
 
of contamination buried (embedded) within spacecraft materials.1 In fact,
 
under the majority of presumably realistic situations studied, the threat
 
of buried contamination was the controlling factor in the determination
 
of sterilization requirements. Within the context of the subject analyses,
 
this result was attributed to the relatively high resistance of buried
 
contamination to sterilizing temperatures, as compared with resistances of
 
contamination located on open and between mated surfaces (resistance being
 
represented by the D-value parameter of the exponential survival curve).
 
The relatively high resistance of buried contamination presenLly assumed
 
(viz. DIEOc = 5 hours) was not the only factor contributing to the
 
dominance of buried contamination in the determination of sterilization
 
-xequirements. Two other major contributors were (1) the break-up character­
istics of spacecraft materials containing buried contamination and (2) the
 
amount of contamination actually buried within these materials, i.e. the
 
threat of buried contamination is directly related to the existing amount
 
of contamination and its accessibility to a planetary environment upon
 
impact. The lack of definitive data relating to these factors presently
 
necessitates a pessimistic view of their quantitative effects on steril­
ization requirements. Therefore, in exploring alternatives for decreasing
 
sterilization requirements on individual lander missions, consideration should
 
be given to justifying less pessimistic representations of the effects of
 
these factors. This could be accomplished by determining more realistic
 
estimates of spacecraft break-up characteristics and buried bio-loadings.
 
The break-up characteristics of spacecraft materials should be and are being
 
investigated.2 However, there are inherent difficulties associated with the
 
quantification of this aspect of the buried biological threat. For example,
 
there are practical problems associated with measuring the amount of break­
up and relating it to flight path parameters such as impact velocity, In
 
tact, very little is presently known about the fracturing characteristics of
 
the many varieties of spacecraft materials. In many respects, determination
 
of the amount of buried contamination is less complicated than the break-up
 
problem. For example, the magnitude of the buried bio-load has nothing to
 
,do with the uncertainties of the mission flight path whereas the amount of
 
spacecraft break-up is intimately related to the mission flight path para­
meters. The extensive background material in existence concerning biological
 
loadings and their measurement, also suggests it to be a more fertile area
 
of investigation.
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SECTION 2 - Background
 
DRAWBACKS OF CONVENTIONAL BIO-ASSAY TECHNIQUES
 
Conventional techniques for assaying buried contamination are impractical 
for applications to most spacecraft materials since they require that 
materials be either pulverized or dissolved. 
Standard laboratory procedures for the detection and enumeration of buried
 
contamination fall into two major categories. One class of procedures
 
requires that the subject material be broken into very small pieces (i.e.
 
pulverized) and that direct counts of the exposed organisms be made. A
 
second class of procedures requires that the material under investigation
 
be dissolved in a suitable solvent which is non-toxic to the buried organisms.
 
This second procedure also involves the subsequent counting of exposed
 
organisms.
 
Several drawbacks are inherent in the application of the above techniques,
 
especially where spacecraft materials are involved. Basically, there are
 
serious questions relating to the practicality of pulverizing or dissolving
 
most spacecraft materials (as opposed to laboratory application of those
 
techniques which mainly involve materials that can be appropriately pulverized
 
or dissolved). In the particular case of pulverization techniques, the
 
basic objective is to reduce the solid to particles of a size which essentially
 
releases all organisms that are present without damaging the individual
 
cells. Significant numbers of organisms usually go undetected since the
 
chance of releasing all of them is very small. In addiLion, it has been
 
found that the pulverization process itself damages or "kills" significant
 
numbers of organisms, thus rendering them undetectable. For the most part,
 
these two engineering problems prohibit a precise assay, if the pulverization
 
is complete enough then it is likely that a significant number of organisms
 
will be damaged in the process. The analogous problem associated with the
 
use of solvents is that very few types of materials can be dissolved with­
out using combinations of heat, pressure and chemicals which destroy the
 
buried organisms. Finally, both classes of procedures are appropriate only
 
when counting high concentrations of contamination. They are ineffective
 
or, at best, inefficient when applied to the lo7 numbers of organisms
 
buried withwn aerospace hardware. Their reliability for measuring low densi­
ties, (e.g. less than one organism per cubic centimeter) has not been ade­
quately established.
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BASIC CONCEPTS AND ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE PROPOSED PROCEDURE
 
The proposed procedure is premised upon a more-or-less uniform distribution
 
of buried contamination and the release of the biological contents of a
 
subvolume of material exposed through fracturing.
 
Suppose a given volume of homogeneous spacecraft material which contains
 
buried contamination is fractured into several distinct pieces. It is reason­
able to assume that the fracturing process effectively exposes the bio­
logical contents of a subvolume, Ve, ?f the interior of the material. Anal­
ysis of recent fracturing experiments"1 ) indicates that Expression (1) on
 
the facing page is an acceptable representation of the exposed subvolume.
 
In this expression Ae denotes the surface area newly exposed as a result
 
of fracturing and X denotes an effective depth of penetration, i.e., the
 
depth beneath the exposed surface to which previously buried contamination
 
is released. For convenience, X is designated the "exposure depth co­
efficient". This concept of a subvolume exposed by fracturing was applied
 
to the data obtained from the previously mentioned experiments. Estimates
 
of X evolved which ranged between one (1) and three (3) microns. This
 
range has intiuitive appeal in that it encompasses the mean diameter of
 
microbial spores.
 
It is reasonable to assume that contamination buried within an homogeneous
 
material is, for the most part, uniformly distributed throughout the in­
terior. Moreover, assuming a standardization or uniformity of parts pro­
duction procedures suggests that the concentration of contamination per
 
unit volume of material is randomly distributed about some fixed value, C.
 
These observations, along with recognition of an essentially unending
 
source of contamination in production environments suggest the Toissrn
 
distribution as an appropriate formulation for describing the dispersion
 
of buried contamination within homogeneous solid materials. This being
 
the case, the probability that exactly K organisms are contained within
 
the exposed subvolume V is given by Expression (2). In this expression
 
Ne denotes the number of organisms exposed through the fracturing process.
 
The preceding two assumptions on the effective subvolume of material ex­
posed by fracturing and the uniform dispersion of biological contamination
 
within the selected materials constitute the basis for the analytical bio­
assay procedure presented and applied in the remainder of this report.
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Effective Subvolume of Material Exposed Through Fracturing
 
Ve = XA e (1) 
- Exposure depth coefficient
 
Ae - Exposed surface area
 
Probability that Exactly K Organisms are Exposed Through Fracturing
 
= K (X A eC)K e - X A C 
P {N=K= K e (2) 
K = 0, 1, 2 . . .
 
C = Mean concentration of organisms per unit volume of material. 
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THE BASIC MATHEMATICAL RELATIONSHIP (MODEL) 
The probability that buried contamination will be exposed through fracturing
 
is obtained from the assumed Poisson distribution. The resulting repre­
sentation is the basic relationship or model underlying the proposed blo­
assay procedure.
 
The probability that buried contamination will be exposed when a solid
 
material is fractured can be obtained from the previously developed form of
 
the Poisson distribution (Expression (2) ). It coincides with the Poisson
 
probability, p, that at least one viable organism is contained in the
 
effective subvolume of material exposed as a result of the fracturing pro­
cess. The expression for this probability, indicated by Expression (3) on
 
the facing page, constitutes the basic relationship underlying the proposed
 
bio-assay procedure. For convenience, it is rewritten in Expression (4)
 
as a relationship which specifies the mean concentration, C, of organisms
 
per unit volume of material in terms of the parameters X , Ae, and p.
 
In principle, if values of X , Ae, and p are specified, then the unknown
 
concentration, C, can be determined on the basis of Expression (4). In
 
practice, none of the above parameters can be determined or controlled
 
exactly. The exposure depth coefficient, X , can be estimated on the basis
 
of experimental laboratory data on varied materials. (The previously men­
tioned estimates of X were determined on the basis of Expression (3),
 
controlled values of C and Ae and experimentally obtained estimates of p.)
 
Assuming that the area, Ae, exposed through fracturing can be controlled
 
sufficiently, estimates of p can be obtained experimentally. These estimates
 
of p can be converted to upper bound estimates of C to any level of confidence
 
on the basis of Expression (4) and standard statistical estimation techniques.
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Probability that Buried Contamination is Exposed Through Fracturing
 
p = P{Ne>I} 
(3)
 
1 P t{N,=} 

C
eI 

The Mean Concentration of Buried Contamination Per Unit Volume of Material
 
C -&2(I-R (4)
 
XA
 
C-7 
SECTION 3 - Development of the Bio-assay Procedure
 
STATISTICAL LOAD ESTIMATION PROCESS
 
An upper bound estimate of the mean tic-load, expressible to any level of
 
confidence, is determined from Expression (5) and experimentally obtained
 
estimates of the probability that buried contamination will be exposed
 
by fracturing.
 
Suppose that s samples of a specific spacecraft material are selected at
 
random (e.g., the samples could be piece parts constructed from a particular
 
homogeneous material). Further, suppose that each sample is fractured ex­
posing a predetermined amount of new surface area, the same area being gen­
erated for all samples. Each sample is classified as "positive" if and
 
only if biological contamination is found on the newly exposed surface area
 
upon culturing. Assuming all samples are processed according to a fixed
 
experimental procedure, the number of positives is Binomially distributed
 
with "success" parameter p, as defined in Expression (3). Hence, the pro­
portion, D, of positives has an average or mean value p and is distributed
 
as specified in Expression (5) on the facing page. Knowledge of the dis­
tribution of P allows for the determination of arbitrary confidence in­
tervals for the unknown p, expressed in terms of observed values of t .
 
Appendix A contains a procedure for obtaining confidence intervals for p
 
in terms of 4 and the sample size s. Figures I - B through IV - B of
 
Appendix B are displays of 50, 80, 90 and 95 percent confidence intervals
 
for p, respectively, determined using the procedures outlined in Appendix
 
A. The various curves in each figure correspond to selected sample sizes.
 
Since the mean bio-concentration, C, specified in Expression (4) is an in­
creasing function of p, upper confidence limits for p can be transformed,
 
via this expression into corresponding confidence limits on C. Since this
 
transformation involves the exposed area as well the sample size, a given
 
confidence limit on p transforms into a distinct confidence limit on C for
 
each value of exposed area. Figure V - B through VIII - B of Appendix B
 
display the resulting upper confidence limits on C, corresponding to selected
 
values of s, Ae and the observed proportion, , of positives. It should be
 
noted that the lower confidence limits on p.are not transformed into
 
limits on C in these figures since primary concern here is with upper bound
 
limits.
 
Figures V - B through VIII - B of Appendix B provide the necessary tools for
 
testing and implementing the proposed analytical bio-assay procedure. The
 
remainder of this report contains a step-by-step procedure for applying
 
these figures, an illustrative application and a discussion of potential
 
sources of load estimation error associated with the procedure.
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PA = s = ) p (l-p) (5) 
k =O, 1,2, --­ , s 
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SECTION 4 - Applications of the Bio-assay Procedure
 
SUMMARY PROCEDURE AND ILLUSTRATION
 
The preceding development is converted to an operational procedure using
 
Figures V-B thru VIII-B of Appendix B.
 
On the basis of the preceding development, a protocol for establishing upper
 
bound estimates 6f the mean bzo-load buried within a given spacecraft
 
material is summarized as follows"
 
1. 	Determine an appropriate combination of sample size,
 
s, and area to be exposed, Ae (this decision is
 
based, for the most part, upon "fracturability" and
 
cost considerations)
 
2. 	Select at random a number, s, of samples of the
 
given spacecraft material.
 
3. 	Fracture each sample so as to yield the selected
 
amount, Ae, of newly exposed area.
 
4. 	For each sample, establish whether viable organisms

A 
were exposed upon fracture. Let p denote the
 
proportion of samples which yield contamination,
 
i.e. A is the proportion of positive samples.
 
5. 	On the basis of s, Ae andp and the desired
 
level of confidence read the corresponding upper
 
bound estimate of the mean bio-load on the appro­
priate graph from Figures V-B through VIII-B of
 
Appendix B.
 
The 	indicated graphs do not allow for arbitrary selections of the sample
 
size and exposed area. In the event that curves corresponding to other
 
values of these parameters are needed, they can be determined from
 
Expression (4) and Figures I-B through IV-B of Appendix B.
 
To illustrate the procedure, suppose that 25 samples of a given spacecraft
 
material are selected and each sample is fractured, yielding an exposed
 
area of 2.5 square inches. Suppose that 15 of these samples display con­
tamination on the newly exposed surfaces. Finally, assume that an upper
 
bound estimate of the mean bio-concentration is desired at the 90% confidence
 
level. It is determined from Figure VIII-B of Appendix B, i.e. the graph­
ical display corresponding to the 90% confidence level. The appropriate
 
curve in this figure is the one corresponding to the given sample size, i.e.
 
s=25. The observed proportion of positive samples is given by p = 15/25 = 0.6.
 
This value 'on the horizontal axis of the figure determines the appropriate
 
point on the s=25 curve. Using the vertical scale corresponding to the
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exposed area A = 2.5 in2 , an upper bound estimate of the mean bio­
concentration is seen to be less than 1.04 x 104 viable organisms per
 
cubic inch with 90% confidence. This concentration, when multiplied
 
by the total volume of subject material on the spacecraft, produces an
 
upper bound estimate of the bio-load buried within the given material.
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SECTION 5 - A Preliminary Evaluation of the Bio-assay Procedure 
SENSITIVITY OF LOAD ESTIMATES TO THE CONTROL AND MEASUREMENT OF k AND AI e 
To aI first order approximation, percent errors in the measurement of either
 
or Ae induce equivalent percent errors in estimates of the mean con­
centration of buried contamination.
 
As indicated in Expression (4), the mean concentration of buried contamination 
is inversely proportional both to the exposure depth coefficient, X , and 
to the exposed area, A . Therefore, to a first order approximation, percent 
errors in the measurement of either one of these parameters result in 
identical percent errors in the mean concentration of buried contamination. 
Although this statement cannot be extended beyond certain limits, it does 
provide an approximate quantitative measure of the effects of measurement 
errors in X and Ae on estimates of the unknown mean concentration, C. 
As noted earlier, experimentally determined estimates of X ranged between
 
one and three microns for a specific material (lucite) and particular
 
measurement procedures. If the "true" value.of X lies within this range
 
for all spacecraft materials then a maximum of 300% error in X is possible
 
(i.e., assuming X equals 3 microns but is estimated to be 1 micron).
 
Assuming that order or magnitude estimates of spacecraft blo-loads are
 
sufficient for most applications, errors of the above magnitude appear to
 
be acceptable. In any case, taking X as the lower limit of the range of
 
estimates (i.e., 1 micron) provides more concervative upper bound estimates
 
of C than would any other value selected in the given range, this is con­
sistent with sterility assurance. There is no question, however, that
 
estimates of X corresponding to materials other than lucite is desirable,
 
if not mandatory.
 
There is a sparsity of both theoretical and empirical data on the control
 
and measurement of surface areas exposed by fracturing materials of the
 
types used in spacecraft construction. Moreover, the implications of a
 
given distribution of measurement errors in A are, at best, difficult to 
derive on a statistical basis owing to the reatively complex relationship 
between A , the observed datum , and the estimated mean biological 
concentrahion. For these reasons, it is difficult to speculate on the
 
errors introduced into bio-assay estimates as a result of incorrect measure­
ments of exposed areas. The previously referenced Pheonix experiments (1)
 
failed to provide sufficient data for resolving these questions completely,
 
even as applied to lucite. However, evaluation of the experimental pro­
cedures and the resulting data does suggest that, for this particular
 
material, the area control and measurement procedures used along with
 
selecting X equal to one micron is adequate for present purposes. Here
 
again, extrapolation to other materials may not be valid, hence, additional
 
data in this regard is warranted.
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ADDITIONAL SOURCES OF POTENTIAL ERROR
 
Potential sources of error related to deficiencies in the sampling and
 
culturing processes as well as the analytical model itself indicate the
 
need for controlled tests of the bio-assay procedure.
 
The proposed procedure evolved, in part, from the assumption of a Poisson
 
distribution of viable organisms within the interiors of materials being
 
assayed. Although this representation has intuitive appeal for most appli­
cations, a test and validation phase is nevertheless necessary before
 
implementation is considered.
 
Estimation errors are likely to occur if improper sampling, and/or culturing
 
procedures are followed. In sampling material, care must be taken to insure
 
that a representative cross-section is selected, i.e., samples independently
 
taken from distinct batches of the given material. Otherwise, the selected
 
sample size could be insufficient for attaining a desired confidence level.
 
The culturing procedure is intimately connected with the exposure depth co­
efficient, X , since the depth of penetration is likely to vary with the
 
nature or type of culture medium. For any given depth of penetration, how­
ever, the culturing process should be capable of detecting all viable
 
organisms which are exposed.
 
It is important to note that the proposed bio-assay procedure, if successful,
 
produces upper bound estimates of the mean concentration taken over the
 
total population of the sample material under investigation. This is less
 
than desirable from the standpoint of application to sterilization require­
ments for individual lander missions. For example, it is possible, though
 
quite unlikely, that the dispersion of concentration from sample to sample
 
is very large. If so, an upper bound estimate of the mean concentration to
 
any level of confidence could have a relatively high probability of being
 
less than the concentration of a randomly selected sample and spacecraft.
 
Further testing and analysis are warranted on this basis alone.
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THE NEED FOR TESTING AND FURTHER ANALYSIS 
Tests and additional analysis of the usefulness, engineering practicality
 
and economics of the proposed procedure are recommended prior to
 
implementation.
 
Application of the proposed bio-assay prowedure to any given spacecraft
 
material yields an upper bound estimate, C, of an unknown mean concentration
 
of buried organisms within the material. The usefulness of this estimate
 
depends both upon its accuracy and the amount of information it contains.
 
Acceptable quantitative measures pf the effects of the previously indicated
 
error sources on the accuracy of C must be determined. Further, the pro­
cedure must be shown to yield information which is needed and presently
 
unavailable (e.g., estimates which are consistently greater than already
 
known upper bounds are of little or no use). Attainment of these objectives
 
requires the accomplishment of appropriate tests and analyses. For example,
 
experimental test applications should be conducted on various classes of
 
materials wherein the buried loadings are controlled (known). In addition,
 
further analytical studies should be pursued which relate to the effects
 
of (1) errors in the measurement of A and X , (2) the assumption of 
uniformly distributed organisms and () the errors introduced by virtue
 
of the fact that estimates relate to the mean concentration rather than
 
-the particular concentration going aloft in a spacecraft.
 
A research area requiring investigation is the engineering practicality of 
applying the proposed procedure. It must be determined, for example, 
whether appropriate control and measurement of the area exposed, A , is 
feasible. (The requirements on this accuracy should evolve from tRe efforts 
discussed in the preceding paragraph.) The practicality of appropriately 
culturing the exposed surface areas also requires additional study. 
Finally, consideration must be given to the economics of the proposed
 
procedure. For the most part, this should be based upon the cost of se­
curing and processing sufficient numbers and varieties of sample spacecraft
 
materials.
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APPENDIX A
 
Computation of Confidence Intervals
 
for Binomial "Success" Probability 
APPENDIX A - Computation of Confidence Intervals for a Binomial "Success"
 
Probability
 
Confidence intervals can be established for the "success" parameter of a
 
Binomial distribution by using an approximating normal distribution.
 
These intervals can then be transformed into upper and lower bounds upon
 
the bic-load.
 
As indicated in the main body of this report, the confidence limits estab­
lished for the mean bio-load are directly related to the confidence intervals
 
for a Binomially distributed variable A, which represents the observed pro­
portions of times contamination was detected in the load estimation procedure.
 
Expression (Al) on the facing page expresses the definition of a confidence
 
interval. The interpretation of this expression is, for a confidence of I-a!
 
the probability that the parameter p is contained within the interval (p , p ) 
is greater than or equal to I- (Y. For the particular use of a Binomial kis­
tribution, Expression (Al) is solved by first considering expressions (A2)
 
and (A3). In these expressions, the parameters pu and p L take on the largest
 
possible value such that the given inequalities are satisfied. This would
 
then give the (1-a) confidence interval of (pL p ) on the parameter p. Row­
ever, from a computational point of view, Expression (A2) and (A3) are sub­
ject to round-off errors and machine overflow. By using a well-known normal
 
approximation to the Binomial distribution, we can replace Expressions (A2)
 
and (A3) with the corresponding expressions resulting from this approximation.
 
-The approximating normal distribution will have mean p and standard deviation
 
Ip (l-p)s 
A
 
Thus p and p are related as in Expression (A4) on the facing page. This
 
equation must be solved for p in order to obtain PL and pu. It can be shown
 
that Expression (A5) is the result of solving (A4) to obtain p in terms of D.
 
Expression (A4) with the plus sign corresponds to the upper half of an ellipse
 
which gives the upper confidence limit on p. Likewise, using this expression
 
with the negative sign gives the lower half of this ellipse corresponding to
 
the lower confidence limit on p. A family of these ellipses is shown in
 
Figures (I-B) thru (IV-B) of Appendix B. Since we are interested in upper
 
bounds on the bio-load, Expression (A6) gives the upper bound on the bio-load
 
in terms of Pu"
 
A 
In the load estimation procedure a value for p would be obtained for the
 
A 
particular sample size used. For this value of p and for a desired confidence 
level, p would be obtained from Expression (A5). 
C(A-1)
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The Release of Buried Microbial Contamination
 
by Aeolian Erosion
 
A. INTRODUCTION
 
1. Brief statement of planetary quarantine objective
 
2. Description of the physical process treated
 
B. THE EROSION PROCESS
 
1. Derivation of AV/V for a sphere
 
2. Numerical data for erosion rates of lucite, aluminum
 
3. Numerical data for Martian wind velocities
 
C. PROBABILITY OF RELEASE
 
1. Derivation of P (release I AV erodes in tq) 
2. Sensitivities of P (release AV erodes in tq) 
D. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
 
DESCRIPTION OF THE PROCESS BEING TREATED
 
The impact of a lander on a planet could have serious conse­
quences if one desires not to contaminate the planet. In the light
 
of this one should examine the implications of fracturing and ex­
posing of surfaces which might "instantaneously" or subsequently
 
release viable spores. Here xne will consider the relatively slow
 
process of erosion although the fracture and the erosion phases are
 
not necessarily independent. For our purposes we will take the
 
fracture as having occurred and characterized by a fracture-ratio.
 
(ref. #2 ) The fracture-ratio is defined as the area exposed
 
through fracture divided by the volume of the sample. An expres­
sion for the erosion of spherical shaped particles and an expres­
sion for the probability of release given that a quantity of the
 
sample erodes in the quarantine period have been derived. Calcu­
lations based on experimental data have been made for the erosion
 
rate.
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THE EROSION PROCESS
 
Assume no preferred wind direction and assume the fragments
 
roll about freely. Then erosion of a fragment bywind-borne agents
 
is often radially symmetric. This suggests that we can study the
 
erosion of a sphere as typical of the erosion process.
 
Figure 1. The geometry which will be considered here.
 
The ratio of volume removed to original volume of the fractured piece is
 
S=1 R (1)
 
(case 1) x = R - etq if R ctq 
or (case 2) x = 0 if R < etq
 
where e = erosion rate (rate of eroding surface) (ref. #2)
 
tq = time of quarantine. 
when R Ctq, Equation I becomes v=1- ( Ctq )s(2) 
VD-
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The equation in this form is unmanagable due to the fact that the
 
R parameter is still present. We would like to find R as a function
 
of a macro-parameter, say the fracture-ratio f as previously defined
 
(ref. #2). To do this it 	is necessary to assume some break-up model
 
(i.e the way R is related to the dimensions of the original sample of
 
material)
 
Suppose the original sample were a cube of edge length L, and
 
fractures completely into equal sized particles of which a sphere of
 
radius R is typical. The number of particles is approximately
 
31s
 
N = 4rR 3 (3)
 
2 

Sf -S = N4ti - 6L 
and the fracture ratio is f = 
V 
where Sf is the final surface exposed and S is the initial surface.
 
Equation (3) simplified gives,
 
I f + 	 (4) 
R 3 L
 
Equation (2) then becomes 7AV =1-Fl- etq (5 L(5]f +2 )](5) 
The erosion rate (e) can be determined from existing data. In
 
(ref. #3)
experiments by Neilson and Gilchrist , lucite and aluminum were 
eroded by aluminum oxide particles of 210 micron diameter. The results 
show that 
dm- E (0). 0. A (6) 
dt 
where 	 dm the rate of loss of mass
 
dt
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E (G) = a proportionality factor depending upon
 
the angle of attack and the material.
 
0 = the mass-flux of particles per unit area
 
striking the surface.
 
A = the cross-sectional area
 
The mass eroded from the sphere in Figure 1. is
 
ti= dAY = d4r_ (K3 -x3 ) (7) 
where d = density of substance being eroded 
Differentiating (7) with respect to time and combining with (6)
 
gLves'
 
=-x = E "()0 (8) 
dt 2d 
Substituting equation 8 into equation 5 gives, 
+ 2d L (9) 
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ESTIMATION OF PARAMETERS
 
Hertzler at McDonnell Aircraft Corporation in simulation of
 
the Martian atmosphere has arrived at estimates of velocities of
 
winds on Mars and volume of abrasives carried by the wind (ref. 4)
 
Average wind velocity - 220 fps.
 
-
Particle concentration = 10-4 oz./ft8 
Then the mass-fluence per unit area is,
 
0= 4.68 x 10' lb/M 2/YR.
 
sot
 
CL . o I'0 
zI o .,C,., I . 
0s0 Go IO Go- 90 
Nd- ISSO F7'L &M, E257OPTLEF/GMI 4%=175 F-ILeF IL- 83-Z -TLS / G "A-SC-571
Figure 2 (after Neilson and Gilchrist) ref. #3
 
(a) Erosion vs. angle of attack (b) Erosion vs. angle of attach charac­
characteristic for lucite teristie for aluminum eroded 
eroded by 210p aluminum oxide by 21011 aluminum particles 
particles at 420 fps. at 220 fps. 
From figure 2a one may estimate E (0). We will take the maximum
 
of the curve for lucite for our calculation. (3-e. E (0 = =2.5 x 10 " )
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Note, however, that the experiment for iucite was conducted for
 
particles at 420 fps where as we are postulating wind and parti­
cle velocities averaging 220 fps. A corrected estimate of E is
 
taken to be
 
O 4
3 
 = 6.9x
E = 2.5x10 ( 220 )2 

3
For lucite d = 1.3x62.4 = 2.9x103 lb/M 
(.305)' 
or the erosion . 2e 
rate for lucite is e = = 5.6 x 10 M/YR. (10) 
2d 
A similar calculation C = 1.9 xI0 M/YR. 
for aluminum yields 
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MODEL OF THE PROBABILITY OF RELEASE
 
Assume a cube of edge length L impacts and fractures with
 
fracture-ratio f. Also, assume that AV of the original volume
 
V is eroded away during the period of time tq. If M spores are
 
distributed randomly in the volume V then
 
= 1 - e - M AVP(releasej AV erodes in tq) 

Substituting equation 10 into equation 9 and combining with
 
equation 11 gives an estimate of the probability of release
 
P(release I AV erodes in tq) = I -e 2d " E (12) 
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SENSITIVITY OF P ( re/AV erodes in tq) TO e, f , AND L 
We calculated the following two cases.
 
PARAMETER BEST WORST
 
-
S10 m/year 10- m/year
 
-'
 f 102 m -i 0G m 
s mL i m 10 -
Graphs Figure 3a and 3b are the results of the calculations.
 
In both graphs the model indicates virtually no dependence on L,
 
the size of the sample, and only when all parameters are "near"
 
best case does dependence on e, f become important. In other
 
words, the amount of material eroded from the spacecraft debris,
 
after a hard impact, is almost independent of its size but does
 
depend on the fracture ratio f due to impact, and the erosion
 
rate e of the materials present. A further observation can be
 
made if the quantity
 
etq + «<
 
6 
then Eq. 12 becomes ? ( re/AV) 1 - e-Netq(f + -) (13) 
6 
furthermore if X etq ( f + ) <<1 
6
 
then expansion of P ( re/AV) e ( f )
= Ctq + (14) 
the exponential
 
gives the approx­
imation
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Note the similarity between Eq. 14 and the model of P(re/V1 ) 
in reference No. 1 if one makes the following transformations 
f(O)_ 6 6L' 
f -> f
 
M(O)-> M 
i.e. P(reIAV) = M(o) Etq (f(o) + f ) (15) 
Figure 4 shows the error involved in using equation 15 
instead of equation 12 as a function Ctq (f ) if M is on 
the order of 1. 
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Equation 15(ref. #1) 
Equation 12 
) H
C,) 
0 
In. 
4 
r4 
P 
00 
'-4 
,0 
CU0 
i0 - 3 10 - 2 10 ­ 1 1 5 
D-10 
-4 
f 
Q) 
Cd 
-4 
C 
M/ 
o 
0 
.005 f 
L 
= 
= 
10 
10 p 
I 
3a. All "best" case except for variation of one 
f = 
L = 
parameter 
lo-I 
105 
10- 2 
0 
f.L 
e =10e saleasalve 
0 
0 
3b. .All"est" casele except for vartion of one pareteer 
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dONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
 
Curves 3a and 3b indicates that the dimensions of the
 
original sample are not of primary importance in estimating the
 
P (release JAV erodes in tq) .
 
On the basis of this model the erosion rate e and the fracture 
ratio (f) show no clear domination one over the other for the range 
of parameters considered. There is difficulty in estimating both 
but there is more uncertainty about e. The range chosen for e is 
-
10 2 M/yr. to 10-s M/yr. This involves 4 decades and includes the
 
totally "worst case" situation in which the eroding agent is assumed
 
to be uninterpreted at a rate of 220 feet per second for 17 years'
 
The other extreme is the order of magnitude of terrestrially observed
 
erosion rates. This wide range of uncertainty arises from our un­
certainty about the flux of the eroding agent, 0. It is recommended
 
that a closer examination be taken of 0 with a view to arriving at
 
an estimate of the expected abrasive-flux. This might possibly be
 
done by examining the distribution in crater populations of the
 
moon and Mars as photographed by Mariner 's V, and VI to arrive at a
 
better estimate of 0 for Mars. Because of the scarcity of small
 
craters on Mars (Ref. #5) estimates of the extent of the transport­
erosion process can be made.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
 
This report summarizes the study conducted by Exotech Incorporated
 
under Task D of the subject contract. This task was initiated under
 
modification No. 2 to the contract dated August 15, 1969.
 
The study described herein represents a follow-on effort to the
 
planning study conducted by Exotech Incorporated under an earlier contract
 
aimed at selecting an approach to establishing an organic constituent
 
inventory for the Moont. Based on the results of this planning study
 
NASA selected an approach containing the following two essential guide­
lines­
(a) Documentation of lunar mission spacecraft should be
 
preserved for possible future examination to identify
 
types and quantities of organic materials deposited
 
on the Moon. A detailed analysis of this documenta­
tion should not be undertaken until justified by
 
requirements from investigation of lunar sample
 
materials.
 
(b) An information system should be established which
 
identifies regions of the Moon where the risk of
 
contamination in surface samples is significant,
 
including identification of the degree of risk and
 
the spacecraft which contribute to the location ­
dependent material contamination.
 
The present study represents the initial step in the implementation
 
of the above approach in that it considers the detailed procedures and
 
tasks to be undertaken to collect, evaluate, store and disseminate data
 
which will serve anticipated needs of lunar sample investigators, consistent
 
with the requirement that costs associated with implementation and operation
 
of the inventory be consistent with kno n needs for this information. The
 
primary tasks pertinent to this effort involved (1) determining the avail­
ability of lunar mission vehicle documentation and the means for collecting
 
it in a form suitable for future evaluation, (2) the collection and
 
iplanning Study for an Organic Constituents Inventory Program,
 
R.G. Lyle, Exotech Incorporated, Report No. TRSR-68-029 under
 
Contract No. NASw-1666, May 1968
 
utilization of spacecraft trajectory parameters, landing sites and dispersion
 
patterns for crash and soft landings, and (3) evaluating the compatibility
 
of required date inputs with the existing Planetary Quarantine information
 
system.
 
Sections II and III of this report summarize, respectively, the
 
approach taken in this study and the detailed analysis of the questions
 
considered. This is followed in Section IV by a set of recommendations
 
for implementing the chemical materials inventory in accordance with the
 
guidelines set forth above. A summary of these recommendations is also
 
provided below.
 
.The minimum requirements for the preservation of pertinent mate­
rials information are retention of documentation by lunar mission
 
spacecraft contractors and notification of the Planetary Quarantine office
 
prior to disposal. This would apply to NASA contractors for the Ranger,
 
Lunar Orbiter, AIMP, Surveyor and Apollo programs. In addition to this,
 
however, the following procedures are recommended for consideration by
 
NASA­
1. 	Designate a Federal Records Center to receive all docu­
ments and organize a filing system by mission designa­
tions.
 
2. 	Order all documentation sent by U.S. Mail to the designated
 
Federal Records Center at end of the existing contractual
 
requirements for retention, including those documents
 
already in'other records centers.
 
3. When contractors and agencies desire to retain copies of
 
the information, require film copies suitable for aper­
ture card insertion to be forwarded to the designated
 
center.
 
4. 	Expand COMAT/TRIS System of Apollo program to include
 
materials information on module sections not now covered.
 
Information is not to include flammability or other data
 
as in current system, but should include specification
 
and property information which would be of use in iden­
tifying portions of the material at a later date.
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 Require copies of documentation on future flights to be
 
supplied within thirty days after launch.
 
Concerning the preparation of an information system, a two step pro­
cedure is recommended as follows.
 
1. 	Prepare a contamination risk model of the lunar surface
 
either in tabular form or preferably as a "risk-contour" 
map, based on the best available estimates of spacecraft 
landing sites and the particle dispersion associated uith 
the mass and velocity characteristics of hard and soft 
landers. Dispersion models suitable for this purpose are 
the Sandia and Grumman models referred to in the text. 
2. 	Disseminate among lunar sample investigators, and to
 
others associated with the planning of lunar scientific
 
exploration information concerning the documentation to
 
be kept in storage and the available information. Include
 
a questionnaire to permit the estimation of expected usage
 
of information systems data of various levels of detail.
 
The 	above recommendations are expected to result in an optimum pro­
cedure for the implementation of a lunar chemical contaminant inventory,
 
consistent with known cost and technical constraints. These recommendations
 
and the source data upon which they are based, are elaborated upon in the
 
body of this report.
 
The study described herein has been conducted by Robert C. Lyle and
 
Lester D. Shubin of Exotech's Systems Research Division, under the overall
 
direction of Samuel Schalkowsky. The contributions of highly pertinent
 
information by the various personnel cited in this report from NASA, NASA
 
contractors and from the scientific community, are gratefully acknowledged.
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II. APPROACH TO THE STUDY
 
1. Definition of the Problem
 
The proper application of the results of this study should make
 
possible the preservation of space vehicle documentation from which con­
taminant identification and quantization may be developed if required,
 
and should enable the delineation of contamination risk zones on the lunar
 
surface.
 
In order to gain an in-depth understanding of the entire problem,
 
it was subdivided into separate tasks. These tasks define the inputs re­
quired to accomplish the goals set:
 
a. 	Determine the location and form of the documentation
 
required to identify spacecraft materials.
 
b. 	Examine the available dispersion models developed for
 
high speed impact and soft landing vehicles and deter­
mine their applicability.
 
c. 	Determine the most productive course to follow in the
 
collection and storage of pertinent documentation.
 
2. Procedures Followed in the Investigation
 
Personal communication was established with the cognizant personnel
 
(see Table 1) at the agencies and companies holding the documentation.
 
Discussions covered the availability of the documentation, the amount, the
 
current form, its storage location, and the length of time that it would
 
be retained. These conversations were followed by written correspondence
 
which formalized estimates by these companies of the costs of copying,
 
transferring and sorting the documentation in several ways. These alterna­
tives are presented within this report.
 
Documents were acquired from the Grumman Aerospace Corp., detailing
 
the 	dispersion model for contaminants emanating from soft landers and from
 
the 	Sandia Corp., relating to both the dispersion of fragments from hard
 
landers and the Planetary Quarantine Lunar Programs Information System.
 
These documents were examined to ascertain the applicability of the dispersion
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TABLE I
 
PROJECT NAME OF-CONTACT ORGANIZATION 
Ranger Mr. Irl Newland,* 
Librarian 
JPL 
Surveyor C. W. Lefever, Mgr 
Contracts, SSD 
HTughes Aircraft 
Orbiter H. M. Miller, Mgr 
Contracts Space 
** Boeing 
Apollo Arlie Carter 
J. Steinthal 
GE/Houston 
NASA/MSC 
AIMP F. Ledoux GSFC 
*For Technical Information 
* Mrs. V. Pritchard 
** Perry Ackerman 
W C. Galloway 
(213-354-4321) 
(213-648-4134) 
(206-656-2121D 
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models to the inventory problem and to define the interface between the
 
existing information system and the inventory. In addition to this
 
literature study, personal communication was established with a number
 
of personnel concerned with the content of these documents, and with re­
lated problems of lunar surface contamination.
 
In addition to the personnel listed in Table 1, conversations were
 
held with the following persons:
 
1. 	Mr. A.L. Roark of Sandia Laboratories on the Lunar
 
Information System computer program;
 
2. 	Dr. M. Aronowitz of Grumman Aerospace Corp., on the
 
dispersion model of the IM exhaust products;
 
3. 	Dr. A.L. Burlingame, Space Sciences Laboratory, Univ.
 
of Calif., on the sensitivity of mass spectrometric
 
measurements of lunar materials;
 
4. 	Dr. Elbert King, Curator of the Lunar Receiving
 
Laboratory, concerning current practices of sample
 
preservation,
 
5. 	Dr. P.R. Bell, Manager of the Lunar Receiving Laboratory,
 
concerning possible need for the inventory;
 
6. 	Dr. Donald Flory, Gas Analysis Laboratory, LRL, to
 
discuss LM exhaust products, and possible contamination
 
in the Surveyor 3 crater,
 
7. 	Dr. I. Adler of the Theoretical Branch at GSFC, to explore
 
possible needs of the inorganic chemistry investigators.
 
Communication was also established with the Data and Tracking Group at JPL
 
to obtain the impact location of Orbiter IV, and with the National Geographic
 
Society in order to determine the accuracy and sources of information used
 
for placement of the impact sites of the USSR vehicles on their Moon chart.
 
The Micromation Co., of Washington, D C. supplied estimates of the
 
cost of various methods of copying documents.
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When all of the information was at hand, the alternatives were
 
studied and conclusions were reached concerning the procedures which
 
would accomplish the intended goals in the most effective manner. Rec­
ommendations have been developed on the basis of these conclusions which
 
will enable the cost effective implementation of the previously selected
 
inventory approach, mentioned in the Introduction and described in detail
 
2
in Exotech's previous report
 
2 Ibid'. 
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III. ANALYSIS
 
A. Current Status of Documentation
 
Ranger* The current status of the Ranger Project documentation,
 
the earliest of the programs under study for this report, has been reason­
ably well defined. All documentation currently existent is stored under
 
the cognizance of Mr. Irl Newland, Chaef Librarian, and his assistant,
 
Mrs Vivian Pritchard, of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. The bulk of the
 
material is stored at the Federal Records Center, at Shelly Air Force Base.
 
The documentation is supposed to be reviewed every three years for possible
 
disposal, but to date this has not been done, and the Exotech investigator
 
was told that it will be stored indefinitely. Some documentation continues
 
to turn up in various files in JPL offices and is sent to the library when
 
it is found.
 
Most of the Ranger documentation is on 16 and 35mm film and much
 
of it, especially the drawings, is stored on aperture cards for easy re­
trieval. Good estimates of the amount of documentation involved in the
 
Ranger project have been difficult to obtain, but the best available indica­
'tions are that approximately 10,000 documents and drawings are contained
 
within the files.
 
Lunar Orbiter: Boeing Aircraft Co., Seattle, Washington is con­
tractually obligated to retain Lunar Orbiter spacecraft documentation for
 
the following time limits- technical data-3 years, financial data-10 years.
 
In each case the period begins from the time of the official termination of
 
the contract. It should be noted that parts lists for the Orbiter spacecraft
 
are contained within 13,000 drawings and identify the applicable specifica­
tions which are on file at the Department of Defense Information Center,
 
where they are available to NASA.
 
Surveyor: The Surveyor spacecraft was fabricated in two configurations.
 
Surveyors I through IV are designated Group A; Surveyors V through VII are
 
Group B. There are sufficient differences between the two configurations
 
to warrant this division, which results in an increase in the amount of docu­
mentation required to completely describe the spacecraft. The documentation
 
system used by the contractor, Hughes Aircraft Company, permits reproduction
 
of both sets of data.
 
The documents pertaining to the Surveyor vehicles are currently
 
held by the Hughes Aircraft Co., El Segundo, California in the form of
 
films, aperture cards, and paper copies. Most of the technical data is
 
recorded and stored on aperture cards which are of the punched card type
 
containing a microfilm insert, coded for retrieval with the document
 
identification such as the drawing number. The coding can be extended at
 
any time to include such other identification as is needed.
 
The Hughes Aircraft Co. estimates that it has approximately 3500
 
aperture cards in its possession relating to the Surveyor project. It is
 
likely that some additional documentation exists that Hughes has not
 
included, since this is a surprisingly low quantity in comparison with the
 
Boeing Company estimate for the Lunar Orbiters. However, the additional
 
number of documents is not expected to be large and the estimate by Hlighes
 
Company is considered acceptable for the purposes of this study.
 
Apollo There are some 600 major contractors and numerous sub­
contractors and suppliers for the Apollo program. They have produced
 
thousands of drawings and documents, many of which are pertinent to the
 
identification of chemical contaminants placed on the Moon.
 
Discussions with Mr. Gerald White at the Grumman Aerospace Corp.,
 
Bethpage, N.Y., revealed that the General Electric Corp. Houston office
 
is the operating contractor of the COMAT System for NASA on the Apollo pro­
ject. COMAT is an acronym for "Characteristics of Materials". The COMAT
 
system is a computerized central data bank used in the recording and control
 
of the use of non-metallic materials in the crew bays of the Apollo space­
craft. It is designed for the storage and retrieval of data on the use,
 
status and characteristics of non-metallic materials considered for applica­
tion in the manned spacecraft. The usage data consist of an accounting
 
of materials in terms of their locations in the spacecraft and quantities
 
and the functional requirements of their application. The status data con­
sists of evaluation of the material safety and habitability in its appli­
etion in terms of such parameters as combustion rate, fire point,
 
odor, and carbon monoxide emission. The characteristics data include se­
lected elements of flammability and outgassing test data.
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The documentation used to supplement the COMAT data system is
 
handled by the TRIS system (Test and Reliability InfQrma a@n System) 
3
 
This is a specialized document acquisition, storage and retrieval system,
 
using automatic data processing to provide multiple listings and cost­
indexing. TRIS acquires, microfilms, stores, retrieves and distributes
 
documentation required to assist the reliability and quality control groups
 
in their evaluation of certain parts, materials, and other hardware con­
sidered for use in the Apollo Program.
 
ATMP. An examination was made of the status of the documentation
 
of ARE D and E at the Goddard Space Flight Center. Mr. Frank LeDoux,
 
of the Project Office, estimates that approximately two cubic feet of
 
paper documentation including photographs exists. The documentation con­
tains lists of materials, test results, and manufacturers specifications
 
on much of the spacecraft materials. It is currently maintained in loose
 
leaf folders and stored in a filing cabinet by Mr. LeDoux at GSFC.
 
The photographs are a necessary input to the inventory since they
 
are keyed to the test programs and the identification of spacecraft parts
 
would be difficult without them.
 
According to Mr. LeDoux, identification of materials used in
 
experiment packages would not present a diffLcult problem. This is due to
 
the fact that his records are virtually complete, and he knows the location
 
of the additional data required.
 
3 Geneal Electric, TRIS User's Manual, Rouston, Texas
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B. Alternative Methods for 1reserving the Documentation
 
At this time, it is possible to retrieve the bulk of the documenta­
tion relating to the U.S. missions which have impacted or soft landed
 
spacecraft on the Moon. However, it may be seen from Table 2 that the
 
endsof the contractors' retention periods for the technical data are in
 
the very near future. This imposes a constraint on the time available for
 
implementation of the documentation collection required for the selected
 
inventory model.
 
The alternatives available to the :lanetary Quarantine Office
 
under the specifications of alternative (d) of the previous Exotech report4
 
requiring the preservation of documentation of all lunar contact missions
 
are in increasing order of complexity:
 
1. 	Extend documentation retention agreements with the
 
contractors pending a later decision
 
The simplest solution to the problem of preserving the
 
documentation is to extend the retention agreements until at
 
least 1975 and postpone a decision on the disposition of the
 
documentation until then. This will gain time needed to
 
determine the full extent of the requirements of the in­
vestigators.
 
The primary advantage of this alternative lies in its
 
simplicity, and relatively low cost. The disadvantages are
 
many, including the fact that the documentation is not
 
readily available for examination by persons other than the
 
contractors. In addition, it will be widely dispersed
 
throughout the country, making it extremely difficult to
 
gain any meaningful information from the documentation with­
out considerable travel and time investment.
 
2. 	Direct contractors to transfer documentation to a
 
designated Federal Records Center when the retention
 
time expires
 
Under this alternative, the Government would require
 
Lyle, Loc. Cit.
 
E-l11 
TABLE 2 
CUSTODIAN APPROXIMATE 
OF NUMBER OF CONTRACTOR RETAINS 
PROJECT DOCUMENTATION DOCUMENTS DOCUMENTATION UNTIL 
Ranger JPL 10,000 1970 ?) 
Surveyor Hughes 3,500 1973M* 
Orbiter Boeing 13,000 1977* 
Apollo GE/Houston unknown 1975** 
AIMP GSFC 4,000 Indefinite 
Project contmnuing 
* Analysis not needed-document call outs included 
** Estimated close of contract 
(9) Estimated 
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the 	contractors to transfer the documentation as it exists
 
to a 	designated Federal Records Center at the termination
 
of the retention period. The Planetary Quarantine Office
 
would be notified of any impending changes in the location
 
of the record material.
 
The advantage of this alternative is that it requires
 
virtually no expenditure of funds. There are no storage
 
or handling charges, and no transportation charge to NASA
 
if the U.S. mails are used for shipping. In addition, the
 
documentation eventually will all be located in a single
 
storage center.
 
The main disadvantages are the time delay involved in
 
transferring the documentation to the Government and in the
 
variety of forms which must be handled.
 
,3. 	Copy documentation in any form and send to designated
 
Federal Records Center
 
Under this alternative, the contractors would submit
 
duplicates of the documentation in whatever form is con­
venient to a selected Federal Records Center prior to a
 
specified date.
 
The principal advantage gained is that the documentation
 
will 	be transferred to a single Government operated facility
 
at an early date, permitting greater accessibility than if
 
kept 	only by the contractors.
 
The primary disadvantage of this alternative is that
 
a variety of documentation forms must be dealt with. Retrieval
 
of information from a collection of such diverse inputs would
 
be difficult and costly.
 
4. 	Copy documentation into a suitable form for present and
 
future use and store in a designated Federal Records Center
 
The significant gain in this alternative is the uniformity
 
in the format of the stored documentation. The use of a
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single type of copy will result in a time saving in
 
handling the material during any subsequent search and
 
retrieval over that in the other alternatives. The
 
preferred format would be one which could be used in an
 
aperture card at a later date if desired.
 
This procedure will cost more than the others
 
initially, but may save money in the long run if informa­
tion retrieval requests are expected. It is not necessary
 
to process the data into a final form, only into a form
 
which may later be processed into final retrieval form.
 
This may be accomplished by converting the documentation
 
into microfilm which could be entered into an aperture
 
card system at a later date.
 
If the decision is made to store all lunar contact
 
spacecraft documentation, a single Federal Records Center
 
should be designated as the repository rather than utilizing
 
the Federal Records Center nearest the present location
 
of the documentation. If the U.S. Mail is used for ship­
ment of the documents, the cost of transportation to NASA
 
can be neglected. It would therefore be more beneficial
 
to collect the documentation at a central point. From
 
the point of view of convenience, this should be in or
 
near the Manned Spacecraft Center, because the Apollo pro­
gram is still in progress, and will be for some time, thus
 
making it desirable to examLne all the doouments at this
 
single location.
 
Consideration was given to the feasible methods of
 
duplicating the documentation. The alternatives are
 
Microfilm,
 
Microfiche,
 
Paper copies,
 
Aperture cards, or
 
Computer tapes.
 
E-14 
From the point of view of the initial cost, microfilm
 
and microfiche are slightly more expensive than the hard
 
copies. This is borne out by the Boeing Co. quotations
 
for copying the Lunar Orbiter documents. The cost of
 
supplying paper copies is approximately $3600 less than
 
film copies. However, film copies are better suited to
 
automated search and retrieval from the total inventory
 
collection of documentation. If the documentation is
 
stored on microfilm at the outset, considerable effort
 
may-be saved later in the event that in-depth searches
 
must be made.
 
Many of the documents now stored are in the form of
 
aperture cards. Aperture cards, while basically yielding
 
the same information as the films and hard copies, possess
 
an advantage over the other forms with the exception of
 
computer tape, in that they are easily retrieved using
 
a machine sorter. The principal drawback is the fact 
that the film size constraints require two cards for many
 
drawings for complete coverage.
 
Storage of the documentation in the memory bank of a
 
computer must be considered, since techniques exist for
 
the reproduction of drawings, circuit diagrams and similar
 
representations. The computer has not been considered as
 
the prime storage and retrieval system for the Ranger,
 
Orbiter and Surveyor, because the expense of conversion to
 
this type of system is unwarranted at this time. If it
 
were planned to convert the documentation of these missions
 
to a form usable on a computer, considerable time would
 
have to be devoted to programming and input. This goes
 
beyond the requirements of the Space Science Board, and
 
should not be done without certain knowledge that there
 
will be sufficient demands on the system to justify addi­
tional expenditures.
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C. 	Other Alternatives for Documentation Preservation
 
In the event that the demands from the investigators are sufficiently
 
numerous, and require more information than is available under the intended
 
inventory collection plan, it will become necessary to augment the system
 
to enable retrieval of more detailed materials information. Therefore
 
requests were made of the contractors for estimates of the cost of extrac­
ting the materials data and transferring it to NASA in a usable form.
 
The costs indicated here reflect the fact that the selection would be done
 
by personnel experienced with the projects, resulting in cost savings
 
due to time lost by inexperienced personnel in learning about the projects.
 
The Hughes Aircraft Co. proposed that the following six tasks
 
would be required to accomplish this selection for Group A and Group B
 
Surveyor spacecraft*
 
1. 	Obtain a list of materials approved for Surveyor and
 
identify those containing organic material.
 
2. 	Review Indentured Parts and Drawing Lists, for Groups
 
A and B configured spacecraft, and identify those
 
drawings potentially containing organic material.
 
3. 	Obtain Duplicate Aperture Cards (DACs) for each
 
drawing. On the average, two (2) Duplicate Aperture
 
Cards are required per drawing, since the area
 
covered by a DAC "frame" is limited to 44 inches.
 
4. 	Review the DACs for organic material and identify
 
the type and amount of material involved.
 
5. 	Compile a matrix of the amount of organic material
 
by type and subsystem or control item.
 
6. 	Conduct a study to determine the amount of organic
 
materials contained in the rocket engine products of
 
combustion, which would remain on the lunar surface.
 
It is estimated that the above effort would require 17 man-months
 
and $1500.00 in Other Direct Costs (materials and reproduction). The
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estimated total fixed price for this job, including general and adminis­
trative expense and profit, is $53,300.
 
In the case of the Lunar Orbiter Spacecraft, the Boeing Co.
 
personnel who are intimately familiar with the spacecraft are still
 
available and could accomplish the following tasks'
 
1. 	Examine all drawings and documentation.
 
2: 	 Determine the composition of the airborne hardware.
 
3. 	Furnish a report containing the classification of
 
the organics and their approximate weight.
 
This effort would require six months of effort at a cost to the
 
Government of $105,591.
 
Exotech has been unable to get a firm quote from JPL with respect
 
to the Ranger documentation costs for similar efforts.
 
AIMP documentation is to a large extent already broken doin in
 
the manner described and little additional effort is required to maintain
 
the documentation in this form.
 
The estimated cost of completing the materials documentation for
 
the Apollo program, copying it into a suitable format and entering it
 
into the current COMAT/TRIS System is $50-100,000. It should be noted that
 
many thousands of documents exist in the hands of approximately 600 con­
tractors, sub-contractors and other suppliers. The content of these docu­
ments in terms of organic materials is unknown at this time, and this
 
uncertainty contributes significantly to the cost spread.
 
D. Dispersion Models
 
A survey of analytical methods for evaluating the dispersion of
 
contaminants from hard impacts and soft landings was conducted during the
 
period of this effort. This survey was carried out in order to determine
 
the 	applicability of existing models to the determination of contamination
 
risk areas, and the requirements for programming the models into the
 
Interactive Computer Information System for 'PlanetaryQuarantine for Lunar
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Programs. Two models5'6 Vere found Ouitable for use in the pre­
dieting contaminant spread as a result of landings on the Moon's
 
surface.
 
1. Soft Landings
 
The model by Aronowitz et al covers the chemical con­
tamination of the lunar surface by IM exhaust during a soft
 
landing. The total contaminant distribution is bifurcated
 
into two phases of contamination- a far field distribution
 
and a near field distribution.
 
a. Far Field Distribution
 
The gas plume issuing from the IN descent rocket
 
engine nozzle into the vacuum around the moon interacts
 
with the lunar surface causing contamination of the
 
surface. The rocket plume has two major flow regimes.
 
Adjacent to the nozzle exit there is a compressible 
continuum fluid flowi regime, but as the gas continues 
to expand out from the nozzle the density decreases, 
and a free molecular flow, far field regime-develops. 
When the IM vehicle, in its landing trajectory,
 
is at an appreciable altitude, only the fully developed
 
far field of the exhaust plume intersects the moon.
 
This interaction produces the far field contamination 
that has been analyzed and determined by assumir free­
molecular point-source flow of the exhaust gas in the 
lunar gravitational force field. 
Flow Model - The flow model thus consists of a 
moving, free molecular-flow point source in the lunar
 
gravitational force field. The velocity of the gas
 
5 	Grumman Research Dept. Report RE-242 - Investigation of Lunar Surface
 
Chemical Contamination by LM Descent Engine and Associated Equipment
 
by L. Aronowitz et al.,March 1966.
 
6 	Report SC-M-68-539 "The Chances of Retrieval of Viable Microorganisms
 
Deposited on the Moon by Unmanned Lunar Probes", by Martin S. Tierney,
 
Sandia Laboratories, Aug. 1968.
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molecules flowing from the source is the vector
 
sum of the velocity at which the source (LM) is
 
moving and the source exhaust velocity. At
 
ignition of the descent engine the IM velocity
 
is approximately half the exhaust velocity and
 
so must be included in the analysis. The random
 
thermal velocity is considerably smaller. The
 
molecules follow orbital trajectory flight paths
 
that may intersect the spherical lunar surface
 
where, as a first approximation, they can be
 
assumed to be fully adsorbed.
 
Analysis for Contamination Calculation - The
 
total far field contamination distribution on the
 
lunar surface is obtained by integrating at each
 
of a series of fixed lunar points the time history
 
of contamination flux for the time period of the
 
far field portion of the TM landing trajectory.
 
The input data (LM position and velocity and the
 
point source exhaust velocity and density factor
 
distribution) are such that the integration must
 
be done numerically by determining the flux at
 
discrete times over the powered descent phase of
 
the IM trajectory.
 
The principal equation in the flux calculation
 
is the standard gravitational-force-field particle­
trajectory equation that defines the flight path
 
of a particle as a conic section. This equation is
 
most easily solved in a spherical coordinate system
 
with origin at the center of the Moon and with polar
 
axis going through a known point on the trajectory.
 
To calculate the total contamination at a fixed
 
point on the lunar surface, the particle trajectory
 
equation must be applied repeatedly to the source
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as it moves along the LM trajectory. The move­
ment of the source means that the local coordinate
 
system for the particle trajectories rotates rela­
tive to the fixed point. Furthermore, the particle
 
trajectory equation does not explicitly determine
 
which particle will land at the fixed point. To
 
circumvent these difficulties, a different, indirect
 
approach must be taken. Therefore, at a given time
 
or, equivalent, for a given position of the source,
 
the velocity that a particle must have at the source
 
to intersect the fixed point is calculated and this
 
velocity uniquely determines the particle flux at
 
that point.
 
b. Near Field Distribution
 
The near field distribution is concerned with
 
the study of lunar contamination by the LM rocket
 
gases when the vehicle is close enough to the Moon
 
such that a region of continuum fluid mechanics
 
exists from the exhaust nozzle down to the lunar
 
surface. This problem is considered as the near
 
field erosion problem. For purposes of this study,
 
erosion characteristics will not be considerpd in
 
the determination of contamination. However, the
 
program can be used to calculate the redeposited
 
particle distribution on the surface and the
 
associated temperature testing for a suspension
 
model. A conclusion reached in the near field dis­
tribution research is that particles of 0.1 mm
 
radius may fall as far as 130 meters from the rocket
 
nozzle centerline.
 
c. Adsorption Estimation
 
Adsorption of Rocket Exhaust Gas on the Lunar
 
Surface has been calculated using a solid lunar surface
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model. Adsorption of the LM descent rocket ex­
haust gas on lunar surface material can introduce
 
significant amounts of contaminants into the
 
samples of the lunar surface that the Apollo
 
astronauts will bring back to earth for scientific
 
analysis. Discussed herein is a model used for
 
quantitative calculations of the amount of rocket
 
gas adsorbed on the lunar surface, and the sub­
sequent desorption of these surface contaminants.
 
The model chosen for the lunar surface is a
 
rough plane. This choice agrees well with the
 
current knowledge of the lunar surface. The
 
composition of the lunar surface material, in
 
this model,was considered to be mainly metal
 
silicates.
 
As the IM descends toward the touchdown site,
 
gas molecules from the rocket exhaust will strike
 
the lunar surface. While the IM altitude is above
 
100 or 200 feet, the molecdles striking the sur­
face are in the free molecular flow regime. At
 
lower altitudes, the gas contacting the lunar
 
surface in the vicinity of the IM is in the con­
tinuum flow regime. The formulation uses gas­
dynamic equations appropriate to the continuum
 
regime.
 
d. Computer Program Usability
 
The computer programs developed for the con­
tamination distribution estimates for both Far and
 
Near field distribution as well as the adsorption
 
computations are operational on an IBM 7094 digital
 
computer. It is reasonable to conclude that these
 
programs have been written in FORTRAN, a widely
 
used scientific computation language. It is felt
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that with some modifications to these programs, con­
version to the CDC 3100 may be possible.
 
2. Hard Landings
 
The Sandia report 7 describes the dispersonal of contaminants
 
during hard landings. Two possibilities are modeled.
 
* 	Dispersion of lunar soil ejected by a space­
craft making a hard landing on the Moon.
 
* 	A range distribution for fragments of a space­
craft making a hard landing on the Moon.
 
The range distribution model can be used to determine the
 
probability that beyond a given distance from impact point no
 
fragmentation is expected to be found.
 
The assumptions under which the range distribution pro­
babilities are derived should be noted.
 
Impact of the lunar probe is normal to the
 
Moon's surface.
 
* 	Fragments are ejected isotropically.
 
* 	Angle of ejection of a fragment is independent
 
of the fragment mass and speed.
 
The soil ejection model was not used. Its output is given
 
in surface density of crater ejecta per square kilometer rather
 
than fragmentation distribution.
 
The interaction aspects of the Planetary Quarantine Lunar
 
Programs Information System are not operational, however, the
 
computational algorithms for the hard impact model are opera­
tional on the CDC 3100 computer. The soft landing model is
 
nperational on an IBM 7094 computer.
 
3. 	-Applications of Dispersion Models
 
Table 3 gives a listing of the latest information avail­
able on landing sites, impact mass, velocity, and date of con­
tact. The location of Orbiter IV, previously unreported, was
 
7 Tierney, Loc.Cit.
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TABLE 3 
SPACECRAFT LANDING COORDINATES 
DATE OF 
U.S LAT. LONG. AREA NAME/CRATER IMPACT MASS/KG SPEED KM/SEC CONTACT 
Ranger 4 13.90s 129.40W 331 2.669 4/26/62 
Ranger 6 9.3°N 21.4 0 E Mare Tranquillitatis 365 2.66 2/2/64 
Ranger 7 10.7°S 20.7 0W Mare Cognitum 366 2.616 7/31/64 
Ranger 8 2.71950N 24.6195?E Mare Tranquillitatis 367 2.651 2/20/65 
Ranger 9 12.90S 2.4 ° W Alphonsus 366 2.669 3/24/65 
Surveyor I 2.460S 43.320W Oceanus Procellarum 270 3.96 m/sec 6/2/66 
Flamsteed 
Surveyor 2 4+0.4°N 11+1.1°W Sinus Aestuum 292 2.38 m/sec(?) crash 9/22/66 
Surveyor 3 2.99-3.06S 23.32-23.34OW Oceanus Procellarum 285 Soft Landing 4/19/67 
Surveyor 5 1,450N 22.250 E Mare Tranquillitatis 281 Soft Landing 9/11/67 
Surveyor 6 0.46-0.51ON 1.37-1.39°W Sinus Medii 282 Soft Landing 11/9/67 
Surveyor 7 40.89 ° S 11.440W Tycho 284 Soft Landing 1/10/68 
Surveyor 4 0.42 °N  1.33 °W Sinus Medii 284 U 7/16/67 
Orbiter 1 16.35ON 160.71 0 E 387 2.38 10/29/66 
Orbiter 2 3.0 ° N 119.1°E 392 2.38 10/11/67 
Orbiter 3 14.6°N 91.7 0W Einstein 387 2.38 10/9/67 
Orbiter 4 0+100 26+5 0W Lansberg 392 2.38 10/6/67 
Orbiter 5 2.790 S 83.04OW D1Alembert Mts. 392 2.38 1/31/68 
SchlAier 
Apollo 10 DS 
Apollo 11 0041'15"N 23026'E Mare Tranquillitatis 7/20/69 
West Crater 
Apollo 12 3oS 23.3 0E Oceanus Procellarun 
Apollo 13 60S 170W Fra Mauro 
Apollo 14 0036'S , 32043£E Censorinus 
Apollo 15 22012'N 29020'E Littrow 
Apollo 16 41045'S 11030'W Tycho 
Apollo 17 13045'N 56PWI1 Marius Hills 
(cont'd) 
U.S. LAT. 
Apollo 18 2509'N 
Apollo 19 803 1N 
USSR 
Luna 2 30.10N 
Luna 5 1.5°S 
Luna 7 9.80N 
Luna 8 9.60N 
Luna 9 7.8°N 
Luna 13 18.5°N 
Luna 15 U 
LONG. 

49030'W 

60E 

0.010E 

25°W 

48.80W 

61.6ow 

W
65
 
620W 

U 

SPACECRAFT LANDING COORDINATES
 
AREA NAME/CRATER IMPACT MASS/KG 

Schgcter's Valley
 
Hyginus
 
Mare Imbrium/Autolycus 390 

Oceanus Procellarum 1476 

Lansberg
 
Oceanus Procellarum/Marius 1506 

Oceanus Procellarum 1552 

Galilel
 
Oceanus Procellarum 1360 

Oceanus Procellarum 100 

Mare Crasium U 

DATE OF
 
SPEED KM/SEC CONTACT
 
2.38 
2.38 
9/14/59 
5/12/65 
2.38 
2.38 
10/8/65 
12/6/65 
5.5-6.1 m/sec 
Soft Landing 
1.3 Km/sec (?) 
r 2/3/66 
12/24/66 
7/21/69 
Not named
 
4. U Unknown 
supplied by the Data and Tracking Group at JPL. Luna 15
 
data are not listed, due to the fact that at the time of
 
this report, Exotech has been unable to acquire any in­
formation other than the report made by the Jodrell Bank
 
Observatory during the Apollo 11 flight.
 
The proposed dispersion models must be combined and
 
programmed with terminal trajectory information and impact
 
sites to answer queries such as these
 
* 	What is the probability of the presence of a
 
fragment or fragments of a specified size or
 
mass at a designated sampling site 9
 
" 	Which mission(s) would be the principal con­
tributor(s) to contamination in a particular
 
lunar region 9
 
" 	 At given distances from the impacts, what
 
size-range of fragments is to be expected9
 
* 	What is the closest point of approach to a pre­
viously landed spacecraft where the probability
 
of detecrable contamination is less than a
 
selected value7
 
In order to provide answers to these and similar questions,
 
both models must be utilized in such a way as to maintain
 
their separate identity, and allow their outputs to be
 
supplementary or independent. In this manner, the exhaust
 
components from soft landers and fragments from impacts
 
can be reported as part of a total contamination picture or
 
as separate constituents.
 
E. 	Scope of Materials Documentation
 
The analytical efforts of the Lunar Principal Investigators are fre­
quently directed toward the identification of trace amounts of components.
 
If the analysis reveals the presence of a substance such as sulfur or
 
phosphorus, the investigator will be concerned as to whether it is of
 
terrestrial or extraterrestrial origin. The investigator will have an
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interference problem whether the sulfur comes from sodium sulfate or
 
from a type of rubber that deteriorated on the lunar surface. After pro­
longed periods of time, it may be that the two materials are virtually
 
indistinguishable from each other. It would be helpful to the investigator,
 
in any case, to have an estimate of the probability that a certain amount
 
of sulfur can be expected as a contaminant in the area of interest.
 
From the point of view of the life scientists, in contrast to
 
that of the analytical chemist, noted above, the source of the contaminant
 
is important. After some treatments, notably gas chromatography/mass
 
spectrometry, the original composition is destroyed, and the inorganic
 
ions are the same, regardless of the source. The phosphorous from a
 
phospholipid is indistinguishable from that from a phosphate, after treat­
ment nitrate nitrogen appears the same as that from an amine. With addi­
tional effort, differences can be identified, but the problem is obvious.
 
The information available from the inventory would be more com­
prehensive if the scope were broadened to include all non-metallic materials,
 
especially those materials which include their composition elements of
 
brological composition. This list should include those elements such as
 
N, P, S, Np, K, Mg, Ca, Sr, F, Cl, Br, and I for example and any others
 
which have been found necessary for terrestrial life and are present in
 
non-metallic compounds.
 
F. Future Requirements
 
The compilation of a lunar inventory of possible surface contaminants
 
is predicated upon the fact that future needs will require information con­
cerning the identity of these materials. It is obvious that the space­
craft documentation preserved in its present status cannot answer these
 
projected needs. An assessment of future requirements is needed, since
 
any detailed characterization, indexing or categorization of the documenta­
tion beyond that of identification according to missions is unwarranted
 
(except for Apollo) at this time unless a real demand is expected.
 
A program should be initiated which will enable the prediction of
 
these needs and thereby permit planning to accommodate them. Certain
 
assumptions have been made in this study concerning future needs, although
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the Iinformation needed for valid estimates is not available at this time. 
The first assumption that must be considered'is hether or not justifica­
tion exists for expecting that this documentation Will be requested. 
The rationale for saying that it will be requested is based upon the 
expectation that the next generation of analytical instrumentation will
 
,operate at increased sensitivity levels, i.e., where parts per billion
 
sensitivities are now commonplace, parts per trillion are likely to be
 
obtainable in the near future. If this is indeed the case, background
 
levels will have to be examined very carefully, and this may lead to re­
quests for more details on the materials which make up this background.
 
Along the same line of thought, a twenty year period recommended
 
for retention of documentation is considered sufficient to cover any
 
future need for the inventory.
 
The information requests received during this period will also
 
establish whether or not more detailed procedures are needed for a storage
 
and retrieval system to manage the information contained in the inventory.
 
G. Maintaining the Inventory
 
During the study, considerable difficulty was experienced in
 
attempting to update the landing parameters and location coordinates for
 
several of the missions. In order to maintain the inventory with the
 
best available information, such data should be frequently reviewed and
 
updated. At present, they are scattered among the agencies responsible for
 
the programs, and become less reliable as the groups change. A central
 
source is needed which can provide this type of information to interested
 
personnel. Since much of this effort is directly related to the manned
 
spacecraft program, MSC, Houston is the logical Center to set up and
 
maintain all data on landing sites, impact characteristics, and other
 
pertinent information on lunar mission hardware. An effort should continue
 
to include all available information on USSR landers as well.
 
In describing the potential usefulness of the inventory, an incident
 
of recent occurrence should be noted. No plans have been made to check
 
the accuracy of the model formulated by Aronowitz for soft landers either
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by analyzing specimens taken near the IM on Apollo 11 and 12, or those
 
taken from the crater containing Surveyor 3. A recent publication
 
describing the IM exhaust products has been published 7 , and has ap­
parently enabled one researcher to identify a fluorescent material as
 
having originated in the IM exhaust. Considerable benefit would result
 
from verification of this model enabling the prediction of uncontaminated
 
sampling sites, and in the degree of contamination to be expected close
 
to the IM.
 
The only discrimination of classes of materials presently
 
available in the inventory documentation is that of the Apollo program
 
which separates out the non-metallic components. This is the only
 
limitation applied to the collection of materials information and is
 
a more realistic distinction than organic/inorganic. By increasing the
 
prescribed scope of the inventory documentation to this extent, possibilities
 
of omission would be decreased considerably at little cost since the
 
Apollo documentation system is already observing this division. If this
 
concept is adopted, the inventory vould be capable of providing more com­
prehensive information than would be possible with an arbitrary elimination
 
of inorganic materials.
 
Additional useful information which could be entered into the
 
Planetary Quarantine computed-based information system includes the loca­
tions of the various sub-sections within the spacecraft documentation and
 
general cross-reference index. To illustrate: Although the spacecraft
 
materials information will not be analyzed or categorized, the primary
 
index titles as utilized by the various contractors in filing the informa­
tion could be carried through. Requests for information relating to a
 
particular subassembly on Ranger VII could also provide file locations on
 
similar subassemblies on Rangers VIII, IX, IV and VI at the same time. If
 
information concerning the desired mission is incomplete similar data for
 
an identical spacecraft could be indicated.
 
Apollo Lunar Module Engine Exhaust Products, B.R. Simoneit,A.L. Burlingame,
 
D.A. Flory and I.D. Smith,Science, Vol.,166, No.3906, Nov. 7, 1969
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IV. RECONMENDATIONS
 
It is convenient and useful to present recommendations separately
 
for (1) the preservation of documents and, (2) the implementation of a
 
materials information system. The first category deals largely with
 
detailed data on types and quantities of materials contained on particular
 
flight vehicles for which there may or may not be a demand. The second
 
category represents the general methods for providing to potential users
 
information on the risk or likelihood of sample contamination and, if
 
appropriate, also on the type, quantity and source of the contamination.
 
The documentation category is therefore a subelement of the information
 
system. However, since action taktn on the preservation of documents ­
and more significantly, the lack of such action has an irreversible effect
 
on the future usefulness of an information system, the recommendations
 
concerning the preservation of documents require early attention.
 
A. Implementation of an Information System
 
To assure that costs are compatible with known benefits, it is
 
recommended that implementation of an information system be carried out
 
in two steps as follows:
 
1. Preparation of Contamination Risk Model for the Moon 
Information concerning the likelihood of sample con­
tamination by materials of terrestrial origin (due to prior
 
lunar flights) should be prepared and made available to
 
interested personnel within NASA and the scientific com­
munity. This is most readily accomplished either
 
in tabular form or as a map of pertinent regions of the
 
Moon containing contamination probability "contours".
 
The updating of the system at KSC with all pertinent
 
lunar mission spacecraft parameters is required. The in­
formation is currently not available from a single source,
 
but must be sought from the various responsible agencies.
 
The dispersion models of Aronwitz and Tierney should
 
be programmed into the Planetary Quarantine computer system
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in a manner that will provide identification of surface areas
 
in the vicinity of spacecraft landing sites where contamina­
tion may affect the samples. In order to apply the dispersion
 
models delineated by Aronowitz and Tierney, and to specify
 
their effect on the various sampling sites, the best avail­
able information on the impact parameters and locations of
 
the spacecraft must be applied. This input to the inventory
 
should be updated as better information becomes available.
 
It should be noted that the inclusion of this input to the
 
information system is important in order to provide estimates
 
of the distribution of contaminants over the lunar surface,
 
and to provide an estimate of the probability of a con­
taminated surface sample being drawn from a particular
 
region of the Moon. The more precise these inputs are, the
 
better the estimates will be. Unlike the materials docu­
mentation input which treats U.S. spacecraft alone, this
 
information treats all spacecraft, including those originat­
ing in the USSR.
 
The most important output from this system, initially,
 
is the delineation of the contamination risk areas. The
 
intended Apollo landing sites through Apollo 20 have been
 
tentatively selected. Issuance of the expected contamina­
tion levels (risk areas) in these and adjacent areas would
 
be valuable aids in planning these missions.
 
2. Assessment of Future Requirements
 
With the information now available, the precise questions
 
to be expected from investigators of lunar sample materials
 
cannot be predicted at this time with sufficient certainty.
 
Provisions for gaining additional information on potential
 
requirements are therefore necessary.
 
It is recommended that a questionnaire be distributed to
 
recipients of the Lunar Contamination Model. The question­
naire should determine the aim of the research, the general
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techniques and instrumentation to be used, the elements of
 
interest, the interferences, the expected use of the data
 
system, particular types of information desired, and other
 
relevant data. From these questionnaires, estimated usages
 
can be made, conclusions as to indexing requirements can
 
be drawn and the type of retrieval system which will be most
 
useful can be selected.
 
B. Preservation of Documents
 
1. Minimum Requirements
 
The fundamental consideration with respect to space­
craft materials documentation is that disposal or loss of
 
pertinent records be prevented so long as a possible need
 
exists for such information to support lunar sample inves­
tigations. The mechanism for preservation of these docu­
ments exists in the retention time requirements imposed
 
upon the various contractors. This should be supplemented
 
by a requirement for notification of the Planetary Quarantine
 
Office prior to disposal or transfer of the documents from
 
their present locations. Implementation of a notification
 
requirement would ensure against inadvertent loss of the
 
information.
 
2. Recommended Storage Procedures
 
A more direct approach to the solution of the problem
 
is to order transferral of the documentation, or suitable
 
copies thereof (see below), to the Federal Records Center
 
nearest the cognizant agency at the end of the contractually
 
specified retention time for technical data. The exception
 
is the Apollo documentation In this area, the COMAT/TRIS
 
system should be expanded to contain the additional docu­
mentation required for all nonhabitat areas, e.g., the
 
descent stage. The documentation need not be completely
 
detailed with respect to test results of flammability or
 
tests of other types pertinent to the current needs of the
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system, but should contain all nonmetallic organic materials
 
information pertaining to amounts, classifications, and
 
specifications of the material. Incoming documentation
 
should be separated into two categories: (1) that which con­
tains no materials information, (2) the remainder. Category
 
(2) should be indexed with a brief descriptive title and
 
entered into the system. The responsibility for locating
 
and transferring the documentation should be shared by the
 
personnel currently managing the system, aided by the
 
prime contractors, North American Rockwell, Grumman Aircraft
 
and the Manned Spacecraft Center. The urgency of this move
 
cannot be overstressed since construction of the remaining
 
Apollo spacecraft is now virtually complete and personnel
 
now assigned to these projects are likely to be transferred.
 
With this action, the location of many documents in the
 
hands of suppliers will become obscured. The documents
 
pertaining to the habitability areas of the CM and LM are
 
necessary, but in themselves not sufficient for the inventory,
 
because the descent stage of Apollo 10 will impact at a
 
future date, and the ascent stage from Apollo 12 impacted
 
on November 20, 1969.
 
3. Suitable Copy Recommendations
 
Of the formats described previously, the one that is most
 
suitable for both present and evisioned future needs is the
 
aperture card. It is readily indexed in any way desired,
 
lends itself to rapid and selective retrieval, requires
 
little storage space in relation to the amount of informa­
tion it can carry and is durable enough to withstand a great
 
deal of handling. It is therefore recommended that the
 
aperture card be established as the standard copy for all
 
information to be copied for transferral, and that this also
 
be the form that any future indexing or categorization
 
should follow.
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A requirement should be issued that the documentation
 
concerning nonmetallic materials, their specifications,
 
and other pertinent data, but excluding such items as
 
flammability tests, for all future lunar missions be sent
 
to the COMAT system for inclusion into the inventory.
 
This will aid in keeping future search costs down. It
 
is likely that little further documentation can be ex­
pected under the Apollo requirements except for the Lunar
 
Vehicle, but this will constitute a large amount of
 
material input that will not have to be processed at a
 
later date. This can also accommodate the inputs from
 
the possible lunar orbit shuttle vehicles for extended
 
exploration of the surface.
 
In the event that requests from principal investigators
 
warrant the additional effort necessary to provide more
 
specific information concerning the organic materials, it
 
is recommended that the COMAT/TRIS system format be used
 
as a nucleus for an active inventory system.
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